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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota has an enduring reputation as a progressive, even
liberal state hospitable to the underdog and concerned for fairness.
This is hardly a surprise for the home state of prominent liberal
politicians such as Hubert Humphrey, Walter Mondale, Eugene
1999]
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McCarthy and Paul Wellstone.' The perception of Minnesota lib-
eralism, populism, or pro-plaintiff sympathies extends to the tech-
nical legal realm as well. Lawyers know about prominent Minne-
sota cases favoring claimants. Many are reprinted in casebooks or2
otherwise disproportionately well-known. Most recently, Minne-
sota was again in the news as the state unwilling to join in a pro-
posed national settlement of claims against the tobacco industry
and the state pushing furthest down the path to trial (fifteen weeks'
worth of it) rather than early settlement of such claims. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the titular leader to the state's onslaught against big
tobacco was Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III, the son of
the famous liberal senator.
The perception of the state as politically progressive and
friendly toward underdogs is probably further fueled by the note-
worthy gender equality of the Minnesota Supreme Court, which has
during the 1990s been majority female and remains more gender
balanced than any state supreme court of which I am aware. Min-
nesota's reputation as more legally progressive perhaps also flows
in part from the perception that women are more progressive po-
litically, socially, and legally than men. Although this view has
more than a few aspects of a stereotype (which is perhaps per se
1. I speak to this issue with less distance from the subject than normally
found in a law review article, having grown up largely in Minnesota, both watching
and occasionally participating in its politics and public policy debates. In the
more distant past, I worked for U.S. Representative Bill Frenzel (Republican-3rd
Congressional District; 1976), State Senator Ralph Doty (Democrat-Farmer-Labor
Party, Duluth; 1977), and candidate and subsequent U.S. Senator Rudy Boschwitz
(1977-78) prior to attending law school. I was admitted to the Minnesota Bar in
1981 and from 1983 to 1986 was an associate at the Minneapolis law firm of
Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand prior to becoming a full-time law professor.
Minnesota continues to be the only state bar of which I am a member.
2. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (affirming a Min-
nesota Supreme Court decision in which plaintiff was permitted to benefit from
application of Minnesota substantive law in a case having relatively scant tangible
contact with the state in an automobile accident matter where the parties to the
collision were Wisconsin residents and accident took place in Wisconsin); Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 333 (1980) (overturning, as a violation of the defendant's
due process rights, a Minnesota case in which the court demonstrated consider-
able zeal in allowing a Minnesota plaintiff to sue a nonresident defendant);
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn.
1985), reprinted in KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 53 (2d ed. 1995) (endorsing and adopting the view that insurance
policies should be construed consistently with objectively reasonable expectations
of the policyholder in some cases despite clear policy language to the contrary).
3. See David Margolick, Women's Milestone: Majority on Minnesota Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at B16.
[Vol. 25
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nonprogressive), significant empirical evidence appears to support
this generalization.
To a large degree, however, the perception of Minnesota as
liberal archetype is probably wrong. Although Minnesota will never
be compared politically to Utah or Virginia, neither is it a political
Sweden or a state law legal equivalent of the Warren Court. In-
deed, to a surprising degree, Minnesota courts, at least in insurance
coverage matters, have long been mainstream and in recent years
have even been conservative (i.e., pro-insurer) in orientation. Al-
though the state's insurance law doctrine is generally centrist, it
provides more limited bad faith remedies than are found in most
states in that punitive damages for bad faith breach of the insur-
ance policy are not recoverable absent an independent tort such as
fraud. Insurers can in many cases breach contracts and seldom suf-
fer any fate worse than paying the value of policy proceeds that
should have been paid in the first place,5 although consequential
damages from breach are available and can result in considerable
insurer liability beyond that required on the face of the policy.6 In
4. SeeJohn B. Wefing, State Supreme Court Justices: Who Are They ?, 32 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 47, 71 (1997). Wefing found that approximately half the male supreme
court justices were Democrats while nearly 70 percent of the women justices were
Democrats. See id. Although political party affiliation is not perfectly correlated
with ideology, it cannot be seriously disputed that Democrats are generally more
liberal than Republicans. Certainly, knowledgeable observers hold a general view
that women are on average more politically liberal than men. See, e.g., BeverlyJ.
Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look At the Law of Rape,
100 DIcK. L. REv. 795, 848 (1996) (suggesting that more women judges tend to
make the law more sensitive to the perspective of rape victims and others suffering
injury); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law:
Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Layering, 44 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 621, 653 n.154 (1994) (viewing the increased presence and influence of
women in law as having progressive or liberalizing effects, but also noting former
Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Rosalie Wahl's observation that the additional
number of women judges does not signal inauguration of change in basic legal
analysis).
5. Minnesota courts have held that there cannot be recovery of punitive
damages for the bad faith performance of a contract, even an insurance contract,
unless it is accompanied by an independent tort claim such as one for fraud. See,
e.g., Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775 (1975); Cherne Contracting
Corp. v. Wausau Ins. Co., 572 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Pillsbury Co. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 425 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). Even where
bad faith and an independent tort are shown, state law often refuses to award any
additional damages for the bad faith conduct of an insurer except to the extent
that the damages are different than those available as remedies in the separate tort
action required to sustain a bad faith claim. See Pillsbury Co., 425 N.W.2d at 248-49.
6 See Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1979) (holding an in-
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addition, despite a one-time seeming embrace of the concept of in-
terpreting insurance policies to protect the reasonable expectations
of the policyholder, Minnesota law now appears to protect such ex-
pectations only when policy language is arguably ambiguous, hid-
den, or unfairly surprising.
Despite some Minnesota tilt toward insurers on matters of cov-
erage and liability, one would nonetheless be surprised to discover
(at least I certainly was) that in a case of multiyear tort claims
against a policyholder triggering coverage in many different peri-
ods, the policyholder--despite having purchased more than $60
million of triggered coverage-would be ordered to pay more than
three-fourths of a $2.8 million bill. This result was rendered in
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co.," a 1997 supreme court de-
cision that correctly decided a number of other coverage issues but
misassessed the apportionment issue in the case.
In the 1990s, the issue of insurance coverage for environ-
mental and mass tort claims has become prominent, with state law
again showing no particular solicitude for policyholders. Although
the Minnesota Supreme Court has not been a cheerleader for in-
surers, neither has it been of much comfort to policyholders. In
one important way, Minnesota law has assisted policyholders by es-
chewing an unrealistic view of the "actual injury" trigger of cover-
age used to determine when an insurance policy is activated by a
particular loss. Minnesota does not require unreasonably concrete
or "scientific" proof of damage, particularly in the realm of gov-
ernment-mandated pollution remediation.
surer liable for proximate consequential damages).
7. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn.
1994) (refusing to apply the reasonable expectations approach in favor of a poli-
cyholder where the policy language was viewed by the court not only as sufficiently
clear but also because the court viewed the reasonable expectations approach as
inapt unless language defeating coverage was hidden or unfairly surprising). Al-
though this holding can be squared with Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western National
Mutual Insurance Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985), which contains language
to this effect, most observers of the Atwater Creamery decision in 1985 anticipated
the Minnesota courts would make more aggressive use of the reasonable expecta-
tions approach. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Rea-
sonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN.
INS. L.J. 181, 196-205 (1998) (discussing Minnesota law and finding that the state
has moved away from a seemingly full embrace of the reasonable expectations
concept and toward more constricted use of expectations analysis).
8. 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997), affg 552 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
9. See infra Part II.B (discussing the decision in Northern States Power Co. v.
[Vol. 25
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In the particularly problematic area of apportionment of in-
surer-policyholder responsibility for large losses, Minnesota law
emerging from the mass tort coverage matters of the 1990s has
taken a distinctly pro-insurer and anti-policyholder turn more
reminiscent of Dan Quayle than Hubert Humphrey. In Domtar, a
case involving decades of undiscovered pollution, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the policyholder was responsible for all
but fourteen of the sixty-four years during which property damage
took place.'l
Although the court's allocation of financial responsibility was
motivated by concerns of equity in an opinion that correctly de-
cided many issues of the dispute, the apportionment decision of
the court in fact worked a considerable unfairness to the policy-
holder. Worse yet, the Domtar approach to apportionment in in-
surance coverage disputes involving multiple policy periods holds
grave potential for unfairness and common law impairment of con-
tract diminishing insurance coverage by operation of law.
Understanding this error of Domtar requires a review of the
decision itself, as well as the important related high court decisions
of Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co." and SCSC Corp.
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., key environmental insurance cover-
age cases of the 1990s. After discussing these and other relevant
Minnesota cases, this article examines approaches to allocation of
coverage in other jurisdictions and then assesses the rationales for
and against the proration of coverage responsibility according to
time on the risk and absence of insurance for some period of time.
An alternative approach revising this aspect of Domtar is presented
as a more reasonable means of protecting policyholders, insurers,
and the public.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994)). In addition, one signifi-
cantly pro-policyholder (and correctly decided) aspect of Minnesota law should be
noted: unless otherwise stated in the insurance policy, government-ordered pollu-
tion cleanup costs constitute "damages" within the meaning of a liability insurance
policy. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175
(Minn. 1990).
10. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 732-33.
11. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
12. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
1999]
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II. THE DOMTAR DISPUTE, MINNESOTA LAW OF INSURANCE
APPORTIONMENT, AND COVERAGE ALLOCATION LAW IN GENERAL
A. Domtar
The roots of Domtar, Inc.'s ("Domtar") dispute with its liability
insurers extend to 1924, when Domtar began operating a tar refin-
ing facility on the north bank of the St. Louis River in Duluth."3
The plant operated on approximately six acres from 1924 to 1929,
ceased operations, and renewed operations from 1934 to 1948,
when it was closed.' 4 The plant was dismantled in the mid-1950s,
and Domtar sold the property to Morton Salt Company in 1955.5
An automobile salvage yard was on the property in 1997 at the time
16of the supreme court's consideration of the case.
Pollution was detected near the plant on the river in 1979.7
An entire 230-acre parcel of land on which the six acres of coal re-
fining plant was located was declared a hazardous waste site under
the federal Superfund law. 8  In 1987, the Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency ("MPCA") began investigating the site. 9 In 1991,
the MPCA requested responsive cleanup action by Domtar.20 At
13. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 728.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 728-29.
16. See id. at 729.
17. See id.
18. See id. "Superfund" is the popular name for the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), as re-
vised in part by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(-SARA"). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9662 (1994). Under Superfund, the federal gov-
ernment may order the owner or operator of contaminated property to clean up
the property or may itself conduct the cleanup and demand repayment from any
owners or operators, including owners like Domtar that have not controlled the
property for more than 40 years. The government's claims for such CERCLA re-
sponse costs have been held under Minnesota law to constitute covered damage
under the pre-1986 version of the standard Commercial General Liability ("CGL")
insurance policy. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457
N.W.2d 175, 180-81 (Minn. 1990). Nationally, courts have divided on this point,
with approximately half the states finding no CGL coverage for government-
mandated payments for pollution cleanup, reasoning that these are not "damages"
within the technical sense of the law. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT DisPuTEs § 14.12 (2d ed. 1999). On this point, then, the Minnesota
courts would be considered pro-policyholder.
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this point, Domtar conducted an archaeological search of its rec-
ords, found several older insurance policies covering some of the
time period during which pollution damage took place on the
property or to the groundwater in the area, and notified these in-
surers.2 1 When certain insurers refused to defend the MPCA action
and denied coverage, Domtar commenced a declaratory judgment
22action seeking coverage against those fifteen insurers. As a result
of settlements, the case proceeded to trial against Continental In-
surance Company ("Continental") and Niagara Fire Insurance
Company ("Niagara"), both primary insurers during some of the
years in question, as well as against Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
of London and World Auxiliary Insurance Company, Ltd. (collec-
tively "Lloyd's"), who were excess insurers during some of this time
23period.
Domtar was unable to find policies in effect prior to 1956 but
did produce evidence of occurrence-based Commercial General
Liability ("CGL") insurance from 1956 to 1970 "ranging from $2.1
to $10.0 million of property-damage coverage per year. 24 After
1970, Domtar's CGL carriers, like many liability insurers at that
time, added to the policy an endorsement precluding coverage for
pollution unless the pollution damage to third-party claimants re-
25
sulted from a "sudden and accidental" discharge of pollutants. In
1973, this exclusionary language and exception for sudden and ac-
cidental pollution became part of the standard CGL policy. 26 Con-
sequently, Domtar had no CGL coverage for this type of liability af-






25. See id. at 729 n.2.
26. See id. at 729.
27. See id.
28. Although no supreme court opinion has spoken directly to the issue,
Minnesota appears to be among the slight majority of states that has interpreted
the pollution exclusion using the "sudden and accidental" language (often re-
ferred to as the "qualified" pollution exclusion) to bar coverage for pollution-
related liability claims unless the discharge of the pollutant is abrupt. Under this
exclusion's structure, pollution claims are not covered under the CGL but lan-
guage in the exclusion creates an exception if the release of the pollutant is "sud-
den and accidental." See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv.,
Inc., 40 F.3d 146 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Indiana law); Sharon Steel Corp. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). These states, like Minnesota
1999]
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precedent to date, reason that the term "sudden" must mean "abrupt," particularly
if the word "accidental" is not to be rendered surplusage. See Bell Lumber & Pole
Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 60 F.3d 437, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying
Minnesota law); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 480 N.W.2d 368,
375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). However, both Bell Lumber and Sylvester Bros. may be
suspect as precedent at points because they took the view that whether a policy-
holder had "expected" a loss or "intentionally" caused damage was to be deter-
mined by an objective standard akin to negligence. See Bell Lumber, 60 F.3d at 443;
Sylvester Bros., 480 N.W.2d at 375. Domtar squarely adopted for Minnesota the ma-
jority view that the "expected or intended" exclusion to liability coverage applies
only if the policyholder subjectively expected the injury to occur or knew that the
injury was practically certain to occur. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 735. On the issue
of abruptness and the qualified pollution exclusion, however, Domtar seems tacitly
to have endorsed the view of Sylvester Bros. since the Domtar court found no cover-
age for Domtars gradual discharge of pollutants even though it also found that the
discharge and injury were not intentional. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 735-36.
A substantial number of states have interpreted the qualified exclusion to
bar only intentional pollution because one dictionary definition of "sudden" is
"unexpected" and because insurer representations to some regulators at the time
the exclusion was approved suggested that the exclusion was designed only to bar
intentional pollution. See, e.g., Alabama Plating Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 690
So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1996); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter
Creosoting Co., 923 P.2d 1200 (Or. 1996). See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 14.11.
In the mid-1980s, insurers switched to an "absolute" pollution exclusion
that does not contain the "sudden and accidental" exception. This exclusion has
been effective to bar coverage for environmental degradation claims against poli-
cyholders. Courts interpreting the absolute exclusion are divided, however, on
whether it also excludes coverage for indoor air pollution, toxic torts, or other
claims involving irritants. SeeWilliam P. Shelley & Richard C. Mason, Application of
the Absolute Pollution Exclusion to Toxic Tort Claims: Will Courts Choose Policy Construc-
tion or Deconstruction ?, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 749, 749-50 nn.1-2 (listing cases refusing
to apply and applying the exclusion to bar coverage for toxic tort claims such as
lead paint or carbon monoxide poisoning); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollu-
tion: Correctly Construing the "Absolute" Exclusion in Context and in Accordance with Its
Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 3 (1998); see also League of
Minn. Cities Ins. Trust v. City of Coon Rapids, 446 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that absolute exclusion precludes coverage for claims arising out
of illness to hockey rink patrons caused by fumes from ice resurfacing machine).
Interpretation of the CGL has also produced a divide among the courts
regarding whether government ordered remediation costs for land pollution are
"damage" claims covered by the CGL. Minnesota, like the majority of states, has
concluded that such cleanup costs are covered. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 180-81 (Minn. 1990); STEMPEL, supra
note 18, § 14.12.
Since the absolute pollution exclusion became part of the standard CGL
in 1985, there has been a significant market for Environmental Impairment Liabil-
ity ("EIL") insurance, which provides coverage for liability resulting from the
"sudden and accidental" discharges that were covered under older versions of the
CGL. Although this product has had some popularity, it is generally offered only
with relatively low policy limits as well as high premiums and deductibles or self-
insured retention's ("SIRs"). In addition, these policies may have "burning limits"
in which defense cost expenditures reduce the remaining available policy limit.
[Vol. 25
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Despite the ability to use only fourteen years' worth of cover-
age, Domtar's total liability insurance for the 1956-1970 period ex-
ceeded $60 million. Furthermore, the policies in question had no
aggregate limit.0 Consequently, this entire $60 million of CGL in-
surance coverage remained available for Domtar's benefit if trig-
gered by claims against Domtar arising out of injury inflicted dur-
ing the 1956-1970 period.
Regarding the 1924-1956 time period, Domtar was unable to
obtain coverage because it could not locate specific insurance poli-
cies or "definitive evidence of the terms, conditions, and limits of
the pre-1956 policies.""' However, "Domtar did find considerable
evidence that it had purchased general liability insurance covering
this type of loss from various insurers in the 1930s and 1940s," in-
cluding "evidence that Domtar had purchased 'public liability' and
'public liability and property damage' insurance from Continental
and Employer's Liability insurance companies continuously from




In the coverage litigation, the issue was not so much whether
there was an insured event or whether at least some insurers were
responsible.3 ' Rather, the issue was whether damage to the adjoin-
ing land and groundwater took place during certain policy periods
and the respective coverage responsibilities of the insurers over the
As a practical consequence of these broader developments in insurance
and risk management, after 1970 Domtar essentially was unable to obtain pollu-
tion coverage for the type of liability underlying the coverage litigation.
29. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563
N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997) (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638).
30. See id. at 8 n.2.
31. Id. at 7.
32. Id.
33. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 735-38. The Domtar insurers asserted that the
pollution damage was "expected or intended" by Domtar, was not fortuitous, was a
"known loss," and that Domtar had failed to give post-loss notice for calculating
and paying a retrospective premium adjustment, thus making the insurance con-
tract lapse for want of consideration. See id. The Domtar court firmly (and in my
view quite correctly) rejected these arguments. See id. The insurers also chal-
lenged the rates charged by Domtar's counsel, a challenge also rejected by the
court. See id. at 74041. A more involved issue was the degree to which the costs of
remediation and related response were properly characterized as "defense costs."
See id. at 738-41. The court ruled for Domtar, concluding that such expenses, if
reasonable in amount and prompted by the government claim, were defense costs
within the meaning of the liability insurance policy. See id. at 738-40. However,
the insurers were not responsible for Domtar response and defense costs incurred
prior to Domtar's tender of the claim to the insurers. See id. at 739.
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time period during which damage took place. 4 There was evi-
dence submitted that the pollution resulted from "routine waste-
handling practices and accidental spills and leaks at the plant.
3 5
There was also expert testimony that the primary cause of the pol-
lution was the decommissioning of the plant and the dismantling
of storage tanks at the time the property was sold in 19 5 5 .
The parties disputed the means by which the pollution dis-
charges traveled and did damage. Domtar asserted that the dam-
age was indivisible and continued and expanded through the
property over the years, while Continental and Niagara contended
that the bulk of the damage took place at the time of discharge,
with little movement of pollutants thereafter.3' Not surprisingly, a
finding of little movement would have placed the time of damage
further back in time when another primary insurer, Canadian Gen-
38eral Insurance Co. ("Canadian General"), was on the risk . The
jury verdict determined that property damage began at the site in
1933 and that additional damage took place throughout the 1956-
1970 time period.3 9 The jury also found a breach of the duty to de-
fend by Continental and Niagara. 40 Based on this, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Domtar for more than $1.15 million
in defense costs (both engineering and remediation expenses as
34. See id. at 731-34.
35. Id. at 729.
36. See id. According to a 1948 inventory by Domtar, approximately 50,000
gallons of "sludge or residual muck" remained in the tanks at the time the plant
was decommissioned. Id. A base on which these tanks rested remained on the
property at the time of sale and was ultimately found to have a "two-to-three foot
layer of coal tar derivatives" sitting atop the base. Id. at 730.
37. See id. at 730.
38. See id. at 734-35. Canadian General was Domtar's primary insurer from
1956 to 1965, with Lloyd's as excess insurer during that time period. See id. at 730
n.4. Continental and Niagara were primary insurers during the 1966 to 1970 time
period, with Lloyd's continuing as excess during the 1966-1969 time period. See id.
at 730. Canadian General contested the personal jurisdiction of Minnesota courts
over it and was not part of the trial reviewed by the supreme court in the Domtar
decision discussed in this article. After the verdict and in a separate decision, the
court found personal jurisdiction existed over Canadian General. See Domtar, Inc.
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 533 N;W.2d 25, 34-35 (Minn. 1995). The Domtar litigation
remains pending. Domtar and its insurers also are involved in other insurance
coverage litigation involving other sites.
39. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 730. Thejury was not asked to specifically assess
whether damage took place from 1934 to 1956 because there was no insurance
coverage dispute for that time period. See id. However, the logical deduction
from the jury verdict is that the 1933 pollution continued to do damage until the
time of remediation.
40. See id. at 730.
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well as counsel fees) and $1.68 million in legal expenses incurred
in litigating the coverage action against the insurers.
Many aspects of the Domtar opinion are well-reasoned. The
court continued to apply the actual injury trigger in a manner sen-
sitive to the realities of pollution coverage litigation, as it had in
Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. ("NSP'),42 by hold-
ing that all insurers between the time of onset of pollution injury
and its discovery or remediation were triggered.43 Domtar held that
remediation expenses were covered "defense" costs under a CGL
responding to government-mandated cleanup orders." Domtar also
rejected insurer suggestions that the cost of the cleanup was not in-
45surable on fortuity-related grounds, and it rejected insurer efforts
to quibble over the costs incurred by the policyholder in vindicat-
ing its rights under the policies. 46
As to the nub of the case, the trial court determined that
where pollution damage does not result from a single, discrete
event and is continuous and indivisible, responsibility for the soil
remediation:
should be allocated evenly from 1933 (when damage be-
gan) to the year in which clean-up efforts begin. The trial
court's formula absolved the defendants of liability for
costs allocated outside of their policy periods; Domtar
would bear the costs allocated to the years before 1956
and after 1970.47
The trial court apportionment formula, affirmed by the court of
appeals, was based on the supreme court's 1994 decision in NSP,
41. See id. In other words, it cost Domtar more to sue to obtain insurance
coverage (for which it had already paid premiums) than to adjudicate the pollu-
tion remediation action. Irrespective of the merits of the coverage decision, these
costs suggest an excessively daunting path for the policyholder attempting to col-
lect insurance.
42. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
43. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 731-32. The Domtar court was somewhat vague,
however, regarding whether the date of the discovery of pollution or date of
cleanup should serve as the end of the triggered period. See id. The implications
can be significant. For example, in Domtar itself, the pollution was detected in
1979 but remediation did not occur until the 1991-1996 period. See id. at 729.
44. See id. at 738-39.
45. See id. at 736-37.
46. See id. at 739-41.
47. Id. at 730.
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discussed at greater length below,48 which stated that in multiyear
occurrences triggering multiyear policy periods, the respective re-
sponsibilities of the triggered insurers should be allocated accord-.49
ing to the insurers' respective time on the risk.
Before the supreme court was the question of whether finan-
cial responsibility for the pollution cleanup could be assigned to
Domtar for years outside the 1956-1970 period in which Domtar
possessed liability insurance and which was at issue in the coverage
litigation. 0 Domtar contended that allocation to the policyholder
was both unfair and inconsistent with the insurance policy contract
language, which stated that the insurers were to be responsible for
"all sums" of liability against the policyholder for covered claims.5'
As might be expected, the insurers supported the allocation deci-
sion because it had the effect of forcing Domtar to pay for nearly
three-fourths of the cleanup in that Domtar was insured for only
fifteen years of the 64-year time period (1933-1996) during which
52property damage took place.
Domtar argued that each insured policy "triggered" by the oc-
currence of covered property damage during its policy period
should be responsible for indemnifying Domtar for the damage
(up to each insurer's respective policy limit) if the amount of dam-
age was sufficient, so long as Domtar did not obtain double recov-
ery or overindemnification.5 ' The insurer argument both invoked
the NSP precedent's general principle of temporal allocation of li-
ability responsibility and argued that allocation across all years dur-
ing which damage took place was fair in that it forced Domtar, as a
polluter, to shoulder its share of the responsibility for the environ-
48. See infra Part II.B.
49. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664
(Minn. 1994).
50. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 731-32.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 731 (describing respective positions of the parties).
53. See id. at 732. The primary policies of Continental and Niagara both con-
tamined the "all sums" language relied upon by Domtar. See id. The Lloyd's excess
insurance policies were "follow-form" policies that committed themselves to pro-
viding excess insurance when underlying primary insurance was exhausted accord-
ing to the coverage terms of the primary policy. See id. at 731. Excess insurance
generally follows-form to the primary policy, with perhaps some additional exclu-
sions. However, if the excess insurer does not wish to cover every matter encom-
passed in the primary policy, the excess insurer must include a clear, unambigu-
ous, and specific exclusion. See generally EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION ch. 13 (1997); STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 16.1 (describing
nature of excess insurance).
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mental damage. 54 In addition, the insurers argued that the lan-
guage of their policies, which provide for coverage of damages tak-
ing place during the policy period, limited their respective cover-
age liability.55
The parties to the dispute had significant allies. The insurers
were joined by amicus the Insurance Environmental Litigation As-
sociation ("IELA"), "a trade association of major property and
casualty insurers."56 Also siding with the Domtar insurers was an
amicus consortium of insurers that were parties to a case styled First
State Insurance v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,57 in which
the insurers sought a declaration of no coverage or limited cover-
age in connection with claims against Minnesota Mining & Manu-
facturing Co. ("3M") arising out of the sale of silicon breast im-
58plants by a 3M subsidiary during the 1977-1985 period.
Policyholder 3M also pursued amicus participation because of po-
tential overlap between Domtar coverage issues and legal issues in
the First State matter.9 In addition, the State of Minnesota partici-
54. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 732.
55. See id.
56. Brief of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Association
("IELA") at 1, Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997)
(Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638). IELA submitted the brief on be-
half of member insurers "AIG Insurance Companies, American States Insurance
Co., Chubb & Son, Inc., Envision Claims Management Corporation, Fireman's
Fund Insurance Companies, Hanover Insurance Company, Hartford Insurance
Group, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Royal Insurance Company, Selective
Insurance Company of America, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, The Trav-
elers Indemnity Company, and United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company." Id.
at 1 n.1. Although CNA Insurance Companies is also an apparent IELA member,
the amicus brief was expressly not submitted on its behalf because of CNA's affilia-
tion with defendants Niagara and Continental. In addition, the amicus brief was
not submitted for apparent IELA member Allstate and other members who were
part of a group of"3M Insurers" who participated as amicus curie. See id. at 1 n.1.;
see also infra notes 58-59 and accompanying discussion. However, several of the
IELA members signing on to the IELA brief were also 3M Insurers signing on to
the amicus brief of the 3M insurers.
57. First State Ins. Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., No. C3-94-12780
(Ramsey Co. Dist. Ct. Sept. 22, 1994).
58. See id. The "3M Insurers," numbering 44, are too numerous to bear list-
ing but include such prominent insurers as First State, AIG, Royal, and Chubb. See
Appendix to Brief of Amicus Curiae Certain Insurers of 3M at 1-5, Domtar, Inc. v.
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997) (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626,
and C7-95-2638).
59. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. at 1-2, Domtar,
Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997) (Nos. C9-95-2673, Co-
95-2626, and C7-95-2638). 3M had first sought amicus participation, engendering
its insurers' request to participate as amicus in Domtar.
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pated as amicus.6° IELA and the 3M insurers argued for a strict
rule of proration by time in cases of multiple triggered coverage
periods, including allocation of coverage responsibility to the poli-
cyholder. 61 3M and the State of Minnesota argued that allocation
among insurers or to the policyholder, although perhaps apt in
certain cases, should not be universally required in all cases where
consecutive periods of insurance are triggered.62
Although responding in part to the 3M and Minnesota amici
by resisting a per se rule of allocation as to the Domtar matter itself,
the supreme court to a large degree appeared to embrace the in-
surers' position on apportionment of liability and coverage respon-
sibility. Noting the obvious similarity with NSP, the Domtar court
stated:
Based on the facts of this case, NSP is the starting point for
analyzing whether Domtar is responsible for self-insured
periods. Like Domtar, the insured in NSP was prompted
by the MPCA to respond to environmental contamination.
The contamination arose from NSP's operation of two
coal-tar gasification facilities; operations ceased sometime
after 1933, the entire property was sold by 1978, and NSP
sought coverage from its 1946-1985 insurers. On appeal,
we considered allocation and related issues with respect to
NSP's 1958-1973 CGL insurer. Like the CGL policies in
this case, the policies at issue in NSP covered occurrences
"during the policy period," but also promised to pay "all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
pay as damages because of injury or destruction of' prop-
erty. The policy limits applied to "each occurrence or se-
ries of occurrences" arising out of one event.
Domtar believes that NSP did not indicate whether an
insured is liable for self-insured periods, but its reading of
our decision is too narrow. NSP made three rulings rele-
60. See Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Minnesota at 1, Domtar, Inc. v. Niag-
ara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997) (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and
C7-95-2638).
61. See Brief of Insurance Environmental Litigation Association ("IELA") at
14-17, Domtar (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638); Brief of Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. at 5-8, Domtar (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638).
62. See Brief of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. at 5-8, Domtar (Nos. C9-95-2673,
CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638); Brief of State of Minnesota at 12-17, Domtar (Nos.
C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638).
63. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 734-37.
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vant to continuous and indivisible environmental con-
tamination cases: (1) we established a guiding principle
for triggering standard CGL policies-a policy is triggered
if property damage occurred during the policy period; (2)
we indicated that, in such cases, an insurer's liability is
limited to property damage occurring during its policy
period or periods-insurers become consecutively liable
rather than concurrently liable; and (3) we recommended
a fair method for allocating losses among CGL insurers
who are consecutively liable for continuing property dam-
age, in the absence of applicable policy language-pro
rata by time on the risk. In these cases, the insured bears
the burden of proving that a policy has been triggered,
but if the insured proves when the contamination began
and when it ended or was discovered, then the trial court
should presume that property damage was continuous
from its initiation until the time of clean-up or discovery.
The burden of proof then shifts to any party seeking to
demonstrate that no appreciable damage occurred during
a particular time period. All policies in effect when dam-
ages occurred are triggered, and liability is allocated to
each policy according to the proportion of time each was
on the risk. 64
Although the jury had not specifically been asked to determine
if pollution and property damage took place between 1933 and
1956, the court found that this was both the jury's implicit conclu-
sion and a fact the court could determine on the record as a matter
65of law. In addition, the court in essence found that Domtar either
had waived the right to contend that no damage took place during
the 1934-1955 era or that Domtar was estopped from so arguing
61
on appeal.
On the matter of apportionment, however, the Domtar court
delivered a sweeping victory for the insurers, requiring the policy-
holder to shoulder seventy-five percent of the cleanup costs even
64. Id. at 732 (citations omitted).
65. See id. at 733. The court noted, "The jury concluded that property dam-
age commenced in 1933 and nothing in the record supports the conclusion that it
abruptly discontinued at any point before 1956 or after 1970." Id.
66. See id. at 733. The court stated, "Any party believing that no appreciable
damage occurred during a particular time period bears the burden of proving that
fact." Id.
67. See id. at 733. The court stated, "Domtar's own expert testified that his
opinion as to continuing damage was the same after 1970." Id.
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though the policyholder had ample insurance for a 14-year period
during which covered loss took place. .6 However, the Domtar court
suggested some cautionary limitations on judicial resort to pro rata
allocation of coverage responsibilities in multi-year tort and insur-
ance coverage matters:
[T] he defendants' reading of NSP is too broad. It is inac-
curate to conclude that a CGL insurer is never liable for damages
occurring outside of the policy period. CGL policies come in
many forms and it is a mistake to read our case law as if
the scope of coverage has been resolved for all such poli-
cies, no matter what their language. The proper scope of
coverage also will depend on the facts of the case. When
environmental contamination arises from discrete and identifi-
able events, then the actual-injury trigger theory allows those poli-
cies on the risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for all
property damage thatfollows. This interpretation of the poli-
cies is in accord with the common understanding of the
terms "occurrence" or "accident." It is only in those difficult
cases in which property damage is both continuous and so inter-
mingled as to be practically indivisible that NSP properly applies.
NSP provides a judicially manageable way for trial courts
to adjudicate certain pollution-coverage disputes when it
is difficult to determine when an "event" or "occurrence"
or "damage" giving rise to legal liability has occurred. NSP
does not establish hard-and-fast rules; it offers a practical
solution in the face of uncertainty.69
The Domtar holding, although in the main correctly decided
and fair to policyholders, is thus something of a mixed blessing for
policyholders. As noted above, the Domtar court rejected strained
insurer coverage defenses and ruled, in a natural extension of prior
precedent,70 that the CGL without an absolute pollution exclusion
provides coverage for the engineering and investigative fees re-
quired to defend a Superfund claim as well as the costs of actual
remediation." The Domtar allocation holding, however, works a
68. See id. at 734.
69. Id. at 733-34 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
70. See supra note 33. Cf Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 457 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. 1990) (holding that payment of government-
mandated environmental remediation costs are "damages" within meaning of
CGL).
71. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 734.
[Vol. 25
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/5
DOMTAR BABY
significant injustice to the policyholder by reducing otherwise ap-
plicable coverage on the basis of a formula seemingly drawn from
the court's visceral but misplaced sense of fairness. Where there is
triggering injury, multiple insurance policies are implicated-but
overall insurance is reduced pro rata where any time period during
the damage period lacks collectible insurance.
This allocation portion of Domtar is clearly a victory for insur-
ers, albeit one the Domtar court states is limited to the "difficult"
and "uncertain" context of multiyear pollution claims.72 If Domtar is
so limited in the future, its worst traits can be confined to a subset
of coverage claims that appears to have reduced potential for mis-
chief and where the special facts of pollution liability may make al-
location by time closer to a fair trade in return for broad, virtually
continuous application of the injury trigger. Pollution liability and
cleanup claims of this type may be a decreasing proportion of cov-
erage litigation. In addition, the advent of the "absolute" pollution
exclusion designed to foreclose coverage for CERCILA claims tends
to remove coverage for almost all cases like NSP and Domtar,
thereby making allocation issues moot. Because the advent and
progression of soil and water pollution is difficult to prove and
trace, insurers can argue with some force that policyholders have
been accorded a significant benefit through the broad trigger rules
used in cases like Domtar. In return for such trigger liberality bene-
fitting the policyholder, insurers might argue that a temporal allo-
cation rule is necessary to restore equilibrium by benefitting insur-
ers. Although this argument is ultimately unpersuasive, it is most
forceful in the pollution context.
73
However, even if confined to pollution claims-or even if con-
fined only to Superfund-style pollution claims-Domtar's approach
strongly favors insurers on the issue of allocation of responsibility
where bodily injury or property damage is not caused by a single,
discrete, and identifiable event. If the pollution is lengthy enough
in duration, undiscovered for a significant period of time, or slow
to be rectified, a substantial portion of the liability is imposed on
the policyholder, even if the insured bought and paid for more
72. See id. at 733-34.
73. See infra Part III.A. 11 (discussing the relationship of trigger and allocation
and concluding that liberal application of actual injury trigger does not work an
inequity upon insurers and consequently does not justify countervailing inequity
for allocating coverage responsibility pro-rata to the policyholder for periods of
exhausted, uncollectible, unavailable, or unpurchased coverage).
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than enough insurance to cover the claims. The Domtar approach
can work grave unfairness upon policyholders despite its professed
aim of equity in the face of uncertainty.
7 4
If Domtar allocation is applied to product liability or toxic tort
claims, its allocative unfairness is multiplied both in frequency and
in magnitude. Adding products claims and coverage matters to en-
vironmental cleanup cases obviously expands the number of cases
where allocation by time can work its mischief upon the policy-
holder. In addition, there is no justification for a trigger-allocation
tradeoff as might be the case for pollution matters. For most prod-
uct claims, information as to the onset and progression of injury is
more readily available and the time of product-related injury is
likely to be considerably shorter than is the case for pollution
claims even if the alleged injury or property damage from the poli-
cyholder's product spans more than one discrete event. Although
the worst aspects of Domtar may be confined to Domtar-like matters,
the potential for harm to policyholders remains substantial.
B. Contemporary Minnesota Insurance Coverage Law on Allocation
To some extent, Domtar cannot be fully understood unless read
in conjunction with Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty
1 75 • ••76
Co., decided in 1994, and SCSC Co. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.,
decided in 1995. As noted above, and by the Domtar court, the NSP
case was quite similar in that it involved clean up of property dam-
age caused by multi-year pollution." SCSC also involved pollution,
78but with a more limited causal occurrence. The distinction re-
sulted in crucial differences in the cases and crucial differences in
coverage consequences under this emerging Minnesota law. The
Domtar decision, although perhaps a natural extension of these de-
cisions, emphasized the degree to which this aspect of Minnesota
coverage law has significant potential for negative consequences.
74. See infra Part III.A.11.
75. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). The official published NSP opinion is a
revised version of the NSP opinion that first appeared at 517 N.W.2d 918 (Minn.
1994). See infra Part II.C. The revised official NSP opinion differs primarily from
the first opinion in that the revised opinion eliminated certain language stating
the policyholder is to be allocated a percentage of the coverage burden based on
any time periods where the policyholder had no applicable insurance coverage.
See id.
76. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995); see infra Part II.C.
77. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 732.
78. See SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 309.
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NSP involved a MPCA order to clean up property contami-
nated by operations of a coal-tar gasification site purchased by NSP
in 1924. Prior to the NSP purchase, an oil and gas processing
plant had operated on the site since 1873.0 After the purchase,
NSP built another coal gasification facility in 1928 and operated
the site for several years, selling both sites by 1978.81 Groundwater
pollution was discovered in 1981, with NSP investigating and reme-
diating the site from 1984 to 1987, notifying its insurers the same
12year. A 1988 consent order required NSP to pay $1.6 million in
response costs to the MPCA and continuing monitoring costs of
83$40,000 per year.
Trigger of coverage was a significant issue in the NSP matter.
Minnesota has consistently applied an "actual injury" trigger in
which liability insurance coverage is activated when a third-party
claim alleges that the claimant was injured by policyholder actions
and that the injury took place during the period of insurance cov-
84erage. In pollution cases, insurers commonly argue that the poli-
cyholder must prove through direct evidence or very strong cir-
cumstantial evidence precisely what damage took place at what
time. The NSP application of the injury trigger implicitly rejected
so painstaking a requirement and instead found it sufficient "if the
insured shows damage began on a particular date, X, and ended
on, or was discovered at, a later date, Y, which period of time in-
cludes the policy periods for the policies at issue.
8 5
79. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 658-59.
80. See id. at 659. From 1873, the site was operated by the Faribault Gas Light
Company, which consolidated with the Faribault Electric Light Company in 1889.
See id. The plant was rebuilt in 1897 and purchased by the Consumers Power
Company in 1910. See id.
81. See id. The record was apparently sketchy as to the operations of the NSP-
owned plant. It perhaps ceased operations as early as 1933 and the exact date of
sale was identified as taking place by 1978. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. (giving a more complete description of the background of the pol-
lution and cleanup history).
84. See Singsaas v. Diederich, 307 Minn. 153, 15-56, 238 N.W.2d 878, 880-81
(1976); Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156,
159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The actual injury or "injury-in-fact" trigger of coverage
is most widely accepted. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 14.09. Other coverage trig-
gers applied to pollution claims include exposure (when the person or property is
exposed to the pollutant), manifestation (when the alleged damage from the pol-
lution becomes apparent), and a "continuous" or "triple" trigger in which any de-
gree of exposure, injury, or manifestation triggers policies on the risk at the time
of the exposure, injury, or manifestation. See id. § 14.09.
85. NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 663-64.
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This application of the actual injury trigger is something of a
hair trigger, in which the policyholder's burden of proof is not on-
erous. The actual injury trigger is satisfied so long as the policy-
holder can demonstrate damage at the beginning and the end of
the time in question.86 Under NSP, the court as a matter of law
found actual injury during the vast middle of this time period.87
However, under the facts of pollution claims and insidious disease
claims such as asbestos, the actual facts of occurrence and progres-
sion of such injuries are almost certainly consistent with this ap-
proach even if the policyholder might not be able to show the
quantum of injury during a specific time. Furthermore, the lan-
guage and structure of the CGL does not require the policyholder
to demonstrate a precise quantum of injury in order to obtain cov-
erage. It is sufficient if the third party claimant alleges or proves
any injury during the policy period.
Prior to the court's decision, NSP had settled with many of the
insurers.88 NSP also did not produce evidence of coverage during
many of the years in question. In fact, the pollution at issue began
well before there was any existence of insurance and continued
past the time of the insurance in dispute."' Nonetheless, the NSP
opinion did not expressly allocate to NSP Company any of the bur-
den of payment.90 The opinion reads as though coverage responsi-
bility was prorated solely among the triggered and applicable NSP
insurers in the action.9 In the supreme court action, five CGL
policies issued by the St. Paul Companies were at issue. 9' Under the
trigger approach used in NSP, insurers covering NSP from 1958 to
1970 were considered triggered and had no defense to providing
coverage. 9 Each policy contained the standard CGL language stat-
ing that the policy would pay on behalf of the insured "all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of injury or destruction to tangible property., 94 Each pol-
86. NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 662-63; Westling Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Western Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co., 581 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
87. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 664.
88. See id. at 659.
89. See id. at 658-59.
90. See id. at 664.
91. See id. at 661.
92. See id. at 659.
93. See id. at 662-64.
94. Id. at 659.
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icy also had a $5 million Policy limit.95 After 1973, the policies con-iained the qualified "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion
that was found in the Domtar policies after 1970, precluding cover-
96
age.
Thus, the NSP court was required to determine the respective
coverage responsibilities of the insurers on the risk from 195897
through 1973. The policyholder argued that all carriers from
1946 through 1985 were liable to the full extent of their policy lim-
its because all these policies promised to pay "all sums" for which• • . 98
the policyholder might be held responsible. Implicitly, this would
give NSP the right to tap the full policy limits of any triggered in-
surers in the order sought by the policyholder. NSP had initially
argued that it could do this and "make a claim for damage under
that policy, paying only one deductible and obtaining the policy's
full limits," with the insurer then required to seek contribution
from other carriers.99 As to the insurers' responsibilities vis-a-vis
95. See id. The 1958-1970 policies also imposed on NSP a $25,000 self-insured
retention ("SIR"). See id. From 1970 to 1973, the SIR was $100,000. See id.
96. See id.; see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying discussion about "sud-
den and accidental" pollution exclusions.
97. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 659-61.
98. See id. at 659. The Court referred to this as NSP seeking a finding of
"joint and several" liability of its insurers. See id. However, the term joint and sev-
eral liability is misleading in the insurance coverage context. As the term is gener-
ally used in tort law, tortfeasor defendants found jointly and severally liable are
each responsible for the full amount of the plaintiffs damages regardless of each
joint tortfeasor's relative degree of fault. A defendant who is only one percent at
fault may pay 100 percent of an award if the plaintiff comes to that defendant first
for satisfaction of the judgment. However, even courts receptive to the arguments
of policyholders that each insurer is responsible without apportionment for trig-
gered damage have limited the insurer's responsibility to the amount of unex-
hausted policy limits remaining for the triggered policy. Consequently, calling the
result sought by the policyholder joint and several liability is something of a mis-
nomer implying that a triggered insurer might be forced to pay more than its
"fair" share. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 14.10. A similar point and criticism of
the loose use of the "joint and several liability" term is made by two commentators
strongly supporting allocation. See William R. Hickman & Mary R. DeYoung, Allo-
cation of Environmental Cleanup Liability Between Successive Insurers, 17 N. KY. L. REV.
291, 314-15 (1990).
99. NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 660 n.4. The court's description implies that NSP
backed away from this position by the time the matter reached the court. How-
ever, the opinion does not clearly state exactly what NSP wanted on appeal, or at
least what the court thought NSP wanted. If NSP argued for so-called "joint-and-
several" liability, this implicitly suggests that a single insurer can be called upon to
pay the claim so long as the policy limits are not breached. Because the policy
tapped by NSP (St. Paul's 1957 policy) had $5 million in limits, this was presuma-
bly sufficient to fully satisfy NSP's liability of approximately $1.6 million plus moni-
19991
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one another, "NSP further argued that the trial court should ap-
portion the damages between carriers 'pro rata by [policy] lim-
its. '"' 1 ° As the court put the apportionment issue:
The question therefore becomes, how may a court allo-
cate damages consistent with the "actual injury" trigger
theory? One option would be to apportion the damages
as proven; in other words, each policy would cover only
those damages that are allocable to harm which occurred
during the policy period. This is the approach followed
by the court of appeals in this case. A second option
would allocate damages pro rata by each insurer's "time
on the risk." These two options provide the same result
when, as may be the case here, the damages are continu-
ous over all policy periods.
The primary advantage of the first option, allocating
damages to each policy "as proven," is that it is completely
consistent with CGL policy language limiting liability to
damages incurred "during the policy period." Practically,
however, this option is unattractive given the scientific
complexity of the issues involved, the extended period of
time over which damages may have occurred before dis-
covery, and the number of parties potentially
involved ....
Where it is scientifically possible to prove the amount of
harm occurring during each policy period, it may be
nonetheless too expensive to do so in cases involving rela-
tively small total damages. At the same time, the ex-
tremely fact-dependent nature of such an allocation
scheme may reduce the likelihood of settlement. Finally,
as a public policy matter, this court cannot ignore the
enormous difficulty insureds would face if, as is generally
the case, they had the burden of proving the amount of
damages for each policy at issue.
By contrast, a "pro rata by time on the risk" allocation
scheme could reduce the costs of litigation because it is a
more or less a per se rule. This method assumes that the
damages in a contamination case are evenly distributed
(or continuous) through each policy period from the first
toring costs. See id. at 659.
100. Id. at 660 (footnote omitted).
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point at which damages occurred to the time of discovery,
cleanup or whenever the last triggered policy period
ended. Each triggered policy therefore bears a share of
the total damages proportionate to the number of years it
was on the risk relative to the total number of years of
coverage triggered. While such an allocation scheme is at-
tractive for its simplicity, we recognize that damages are by
nature fact-dependent and that trial courts must be given
the flexibility to apportion them in a manner befitting
each case.101
The NSP court gave unduly short shrift to the possibility of ap-
portioning insurer liability according to policy limits, finding that:
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each
insurer is held liable for only those damages which oc-
curred during its policy period; no insurer is held liable
for damage outside its policy period. Where the policy
periods do not overlap, therefore, the insurers are con-
secutively, not concurrently liable. A "pro rata by limits"
allocation method effectively makes those insurers with
higher limits liable for damages incurred outside their
policy periods and is therefore inconsistent with the actual
injury trigger theory.
102
Domtar appears to recede from this statement regarding the in-
surer's limited liability for damages mounting after the close of its
policy period. However, both NSP and Domtar reflect a fundamen-
tal misunderstanding of the degree of the liability insurer's con-
tractual commitment. In addition, the supreme court's preoccupa-
tion with time on the risk rather than consideration of the nature
of the risk assumed led the court to turn its back on an apportion-
ment program that, in many cases, would more fairly reflect both
103the insurers' obligation and the policyholder's purchase.
The NSP court also held that the policyholder was responsible
for each policy period's deductible or SIR in cases of multiyear oc-
currences and the triggering of successive policies. The court re-
101. Id. at 662-63 (citations and footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 662.
103. See id. at 662.
104. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 664 ("Because at least one occurrence was re-
quired to invoke the coverage of each triggered policy, it seems apparent that NSP
1999]
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jected any role for any "other insurance" clauses contained in the
policies, holding that "other insurance" clauses are to be utilized
for coordinating coverage only where two or more policies are con-
currently triggered and provide coverage for damage taking place
during the same time period.' 5 According to the NSP court, where
the triggered policies cover different policy periods, the other in-
surance clauses are inapplicable for allocating coverage among
successively triggered insurers. 06 The court was strongly influenced
by a law review article authored by insurer counsel William Hick-
man and Mary DeYoung that advocated proration by time on the
risk.10 7
As discussed further below, the Hickman & DeYoung article,
although a worthwhile contribution to the allocation debate, is not
only partial to the insurer cause but also problematic in some as-
pects of its analysis.'°8 It has not been widely influential.'°9 The NSP
court also appears to have been strongly influenced by the amicus
position of IELA, the insurer organization that successfully argued110
for allocation to reduce insurer coverage responsibility in Domtar.
IELA has worked hard to influence judicial decisions on insurance
coverage matters and has been quite successful, perhaps undeserv-
is responsible to the extent of its applicable retained limit in connection with each
triggered St. Paul policy."). The NSP court felt strongly enough on this point to
overrule this aspect of Jostens, Inc. v. CNA Insurance/Continental Cas. Co., 403
N.W.2d 625, 630-31 (Minn. 1987) (permitting the policyholder to average the re-
tained limits of two consecutively triggered policies). See NSP, 523 N W.2d at 664.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 663.
107. See id. at 660-63 (citing Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98, at 293).
108. See infra 413-14 and accompanying discussion.
109. As of October 5, 1998, the LEXIS "Mega" database of state and federal
court decisions reveals only four cases citing the Hickman & DeYoung article. See
Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 978 F. Supp. 589, 605
(D.N.J. 1997); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Thomas M. Durkin & Sons, No. 90-0968,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14318, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 1991); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara
Fire Ins. Co., 552 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), affd in part and revd in
part, 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650
A.2d 974, 994 (N.J. 1994). Only three law review articles in the LEXIS database
cite the article. See Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Li-
ability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 257, 285 (1997); Rob S.
Register, Comment, Apportioning Coverage Responsibility of Consecutive Insurers When
the Actual Occurrence of Injury Cannot be Ascertained: Who Has to Contribute in a Settle-
ment?, 49 MERCER L. REv. 1151, 1160 (1998); TungYin, NailingJello to a Wall: A Uni-
form Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in Products Liability Cases
with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1243, 1246 (1995).
110. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying discussion.
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edly so in light of the merits of the insurance coverage matters."'S112
In addition to its typical strong brief on behalf of insurers, IELA
was aided in NSP by the absence of any countervailing policyholder
organization's amicus participation. With the field comparatively
to itself in NSP, IELA and the Hickman & DeYoung Allocation arti-
cle" 3 appear to have had substantial impact in bending the court to
its view of the wisdom of allocation and the notion that it is some-
how unfair to insurers if allocation is not imposed to limit the in-
surer's coverage responsibility.14
There is also the intriguing "missing language" episode of NSP
and the alteration of the opinion prior to final publication, al-
though one's first reading of this chronology would not have fore-
shadowed the Domtar holding. In the first NSP opinion entered
June 30, 199415 but later withdrawn for replacement with a super-
ceding opinion, the court stated:
The trial court should also hold the insured liable for its
pro rata share of any uninsured or self-insured periods.
Consistent with our decision regarding the appropriate
method of allocating damages in these types of cases, we
believe that "other insurance" clauses of the policies at is-
sue are irrelevant and therefore only affirm the court of
appeals' result. The court of appeals followed this court's
analysis in Integrity Mut. Ins. v. State Auto & Cas. Underwrit-
ers Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976). In In-
teg7ity, we considered the problem of allocating damages
between multiple insurance policies concurrently liable
for damages arising out of a single, discrete occurrence.
111. See Stempel, supra note 28, at 22-26 (describing the apparent impact of
the IELA amicus brief in an important Florida Supreme Court case addressing the
application of a CGL pollution exclusion); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unreason in Action:
A Case Study in the Wrong Approach to Construing the Liability Insurance Pollution Exclu-
sion, 50 FLA. L. REv. 463 (1998) (discussing Deni Associates of Florida, Inc. v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 1998), and E.C. Fogg, III v. Florida
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 711 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 1998), in greater detail).
112. See Stempel, supra note 28, at 22-24. IELA is active in many coverage
cases. Its briefs are largely drafted by the noted Washington, D.C. law firm of
Wiley, Rein & Fielding.
113. See Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98, cited in NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 660-
63.
114. SeeNSP, 523 N.W.2d at662-64.
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We conclude that the Integrity analysis is inappropriate for
this case. Because we hold that the insurers in this type of
case are liable only for damages incurred during their re-
spective policy periods, no insurer is concurrently liable
with any other. The other insurers in this case did not
anticipate becoming liable for damages incurred during
St. Paul's policy periods. Applying the "other insurance"
clauses as St. Paul advocates would make the other insur-
ers liable for damages occurring outside their policy peri-
ods.
116
The court later granted a request for rehearing and on August
24, 1994, the supreme court issued a revised NSP opinion that did
not contain the quoted language regarding allocation to the poli-
cyholder and the court's purported bright line distinction between
concurrent and consecutive insurer liability and the consequent
immateriality of "other insurance" clauses in the latter situation.117
The first sentence of the omitted language, stating that policyhold-
ers were responsible for some portion of coverage in multiyear torts
for periods of self-insurance or no insurance was of course highly
favorable to insurers seeking to reduce liability by allocating some
responsibility to the policyholder.118  On September 6, 1994, St.
Paul Fire and Marine Insurance filed a "Request for Clarification"
pointing out the absence of the quoted language and seeking its
reinstatement. The court issued a slightly revised version of the
August 24 opinion on September 30, 1994 that reinserted in differ-
ent form the language regarding the disutility of the "other insur-• . 119
ance" clauses in cases of consecutive triggering, but did not rein-
116. 517 N.W.2d at 924 (citations omitted) (citing Hickman & DeYoung, supra
note 98, at 307 n.45).
117. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 657
(Minn. 1994).
118. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 918, 924
(Minn. 1994), withdrawn and superseded, 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
119. The final version of this language in NSP read as follows:
Because we have determined the appropriate method of allocating dam-
ages in these types of cases and because the record does not indicate that
there was "other insurance" in effect during the period of time a St. Paul
policy was in effect, we affirm the result, but modify the discussion of-
fered by the court of appeals with regard to "other insurance" clauses. In
our view, an application of Integrity Mut. Ins. v. State Auto & Cas. Under-
writers Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976) to the facts pre-
sented is inappropriate. Integrity involved an allocation problem between
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state the language stating that the "trial court should also hold the
insured liable for its pro rata share of any uninsured or self-insured
periods."2 0 This is the "final" NSP opinion.
12
1
Although inferences from omissions are problematic, the su-
preme court's removal of the initial quoted language and its decli-
nation to reinstate it at the request of an insurer suggest that the
court, prior to Domtar, was uncertain about the matter of allocating
either indemnity or defense costs to a policyholder because of un-
insured periods. Allocation of defense costs is more problematic
and potentially unfair to the policyholder because of the breadth of
the defense responsibility that insurers themselves assumed by con-
tract as well as the industry custom and practice of ordinarily
shouldering broad defense obligations without seeking apportion-
ment until the matter is resolved or where apportionment does not
affect policyholder rights.
In addition, prior to Domtar it was also reasonable to conclude
that the court realized that its original NSP language suggesting
that no two liability insurers could be concurrently liable for a long
but hidden loss was incorrect as a matter of sound insurance law
and actual application of the facts. It would at least seem plausible
that several insurance policies can be triggered during a long-tail
tort with a lengthy period of loss, making it inevitable that there
will be some overlap of insurers responsible for injuries occurring
at a given time. There is no obvious reason to limit one insurer's
responsibility simply because injury continues in the future and
implicates other insurers. Even if a court were to conclude that
only one insurer can be liable for the discrete loss occurring at a
given juncture (assuming one could calculate the moment of injury
so precisely), this alone does not suggest that allocation to the poli-
cyholder is apt.
The second key Minnesota case which provided the backdrop
for Domtar was SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. 2 2 SCSC,
multiple insurance policies concurrently liable for damages arising out of
a single, discrete occurrence, not the factual setting presented here
where there is no concurrent liability.
NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 664.
120. Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 918, 924
(Minn. 1994), withdrawn and superseded, 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994).
121. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657
(Minn. 1994).
122. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995).
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formerly known as Schloff Chemical and Supply Company, oper-
ated a dry cleaning and laundry supply distribution facility in St.
Louis Park, Minnesota from 1976 through 1988. 12 As part of this
business, it handled perchloroethylene ("PCE" or "perc"), a dry-
cleaning chemical. 124 Perc is a volatile organic compound and pol-
lutant.125 In late 1988, the MPCA detected perc in groundwater
near the SCSC facility.126 From 1988 to 1990, SCSC was required to
remediate perc damage to groundwater. 127  SCSC sought reim-
bursement of these costs from its insurers, filing a declaratory
judgment action when it could not obtain a satisfactory coverage
response from the insurers.12  Total remediation costs paid, in-
curred, and estimated to complete the project exceeded $1.2 mil-
lion.1 29 During the time periods at issue, SCSC had primary CGL
insurance from Allied Mutual Insurance Company in the amount
of $100,000 per occurrence (with $100,000 aggregate limits), first-
layer excess/umbrella coverage from Tower Insurance Company in
the amount of $1 million (occurrence and aggregate), and $1 mil-
lion of second-layer excess/umbrella coverage provided by Allied.1
30
In the trial of the coverage action, SCSC obtained a favorable
jury verdict, with the jury concluding that property damage took
place due to an episodic spill in August 1977 and was not inten-
tionally caused.'13 Judgment was entered for SCSC and the court of
123. See id. at 308.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 309
127. See id.
128. See id. at 310.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 308-09. Excess insurance is coverage that attaches when primary
insurance is exhausted. Because most claims can be successfully defended and set-
tled by the primary insurer, excess insurance is generally available at higher limits
and lower premiums than primary insurance. If an excess policy also provided
umbrella coverage, it acts as a "gap filler" and gives coverage for certain claims that
are not within the scope of coverage accorded by the primary policy. If the first
layer of excess insurance is exhausted by a claim, the second layer excess policy
attaches. Large commercial policyholders may have four or five layers of excess
insurance. SeeJostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161,165 (Minn. 1986).
131. See SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 310. Because the jury found that damage was not
expected or intentionally caused and resulted from a single discharge incident,
the "expected or intended" exclusion to the policy did not preclude coverage nor
did the policy's qualified pollution exclusion due to the jury's finding of a "sudden
and accidental" discharge. See id. The excess insurance at issue "followed form" of
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appeals affirmed.13 The supreme court resolved a number of is-
sues in favor of SCSC. 3 3 On the matter of allocation of responsibil-
ity for payment of the remediation costs, one insurer attacked the
verdict form as directing the jury to find only a snapshot of damage
by asking for the "date" on which damage arose, thus inhibiting the
jury from finding that damage continued past August 1977.14 The
court rejected this attack due to the broad discretion granted trial
judges in framing the verdict form. 3 5 Further, the opinion stated:
Tower also argues that the trial court's policy triggering
and damage allocation schemes were erroneous. The trial
court chose to trigger the policies "vertically," by year, be-
ginning with the policies in effect in 1977. Allied's 1977
$100,000 limit was triggered first, and once that was ex-
hausted, Tower's 1977 $1,000,000 excess policy was trig-
gered. This is what is known as a "vertical trigger"
scheme.
Tower argues that this court should adopt the "pro rata
by time on the risk" theory of allocation first used by this
court in . . . [NSP]. According to Tower, this would in-
volve allocating proportional damages to Allied for all the
years its primary policies were on the risk. Under this
scheme, Tower's excess policies would be triggered pro-
portionally, for the years it was on the risk, only after Al-
lied's primary policy limit of $100,000 per year is ex-
hausted for all apportioned policy years. This would be a
"horizontal trigger" of the primary and excess policies.
... Although in NSP we adopted a "pro rata by time on
the risk" trigger method for continuous groundwater con-
tamination cases, we also noted that trial courts must be
given flexibility in apportioning damages "in a manner be-
fitting each case."
Under the facts of the present case, we reject the multi-
ple-year vertical triggering approach taken by the trial
court. We also decline Tower's invitation to apply NSP's pro
rata by time on the risk triggering approach. In NSP, the dam-
132. See id. The court of appeals did not affirm the lower court's decision of
an enhanced award of attorney's fees. See id.
133. See id. at 318.
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ages occurred over multiple policy periods, and without evidence
to the contrary, we concluded that such damages must be assumed
to be continuous. Our decision in NSP was an equitable decision
based upon the complexity of proving in which policy periods cov-
ered property damage arose. In the present case, however, we
have sufficient evidence indicating that the damage arose
from a single event in 1977. The jury found that the dam-
age was not divisible and that it was the result of a sudden
and accidental occurrence. Based on these findings, the
only covered "occurrence" was the 1977 spill. The con-
tinual leaching of the chemicals from the soil into the
groundwater did result in damages to SCSC because of
property damage. However, only Allied's 1977 $100,000
primary policy and Tower's 1977 $1,000,000 excess policy
are triggered. Damages in excess of the $1,100,000 aggre-
gate limit of the primary and excess policies on the risk in
1977 are not covered. The result is consistent with the ac-
tual injury theory.
1 6
Where the injury is deemed continuous rather than the result
of a discrete identifiable event, the important NSP-SCSC-Domtar tril-
ogy of cases thus embraces pro rata allocation of multiple insurer
responsibility according to the insurers' relative time covering the
risk at issue. For pollution-related injury extending over several
years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has announced a clear prefer-
ence for temporal proration in the face of uncertainty and com-
plexity. However, the court has also stressed the fact-dependent,
policy-dependent, and equity-dependent nature of the inquiry."'
SCSC established the inapplicability of allocation when the injuiy
underlying the coverage dispute was discrete and identifiable.
Where a triggering event is isolated, rather than part of a continu-
ous pattern of injury-producing conduct, the triggered policy is re-
sponsible for providing coverage and cannot terminate coverage
responsibilities if continuation of the injury extends beyond the
end date of the policy. 3 9 For example, in Westling Manufacturing
Co. v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co.,'4° a case decided subse-
quent to SCSC and Domtar, the court of appeals affirmed ajury ver-
136. Id. at 317-18 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
137. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 663
(Minn. 1994).
138. See SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 312.
139. See id. at 317-18.
140. 581 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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dict and trial court finding that injury resulted from a single, sud-
den and accidental release of pollutants. 4' As a result, the trig-
gered policy was responsible for covering the claim and could not
seek to allocate its coverage responsibility among other insurers.142
Taken together, these cases suggest that Minnesota courts, par-
ticularly the supreme court, appear to be seeking to treat complex
insurance coverage matters as much like garden-variety coverage
disputes as possible. Where an underlying claim can reasonably be
construed to arise -from a single injury-causing event rather than a
series of events or progressive injury, the court will attempt to de-
cide the complex CERCLA pollution case in a manner similar to its
decision in other cases. 43 However, where the underlying claim is
one of multiple, rolling, or progressive injury, the NSP/Domtar allo-
cation formula is applied.
C. Revisiting Antecedent Minnesota Allocation Law
Several aspects of Minnesota law prior to NSP and Domtar ar-
gue against direct allocation to the policyholder because of prora-
tion. Indirectly allocating coverage expense to the policyholder by
failing to take account of the availability of insurance in cases (such
as NSP) where the apportionment is only between insurers and pe-
riods of insurance rather than across all years in which damage may
have taken place is also discouraged by Minnesota law.14
In addition, whatever the merits of allocation of indemnity
claims, it would appear that on the question of defense costs, there
can be no such precise calibration because defense obligations are
determined by third party claimant allegations and behavior rather
141. See id. at 44, 49.
142. See id. at 44-45.
143. See Westling Mfg., 581 N.W.2d at 44. "Unlike situations involving continu-
ous-trigger contamination, if it is shown that property damage was the result of
single-trigger contamination, only the policies that were on the risk in the year the
damage occurred are triggered, and those insurers remain liable for all resulting
damages." Id.; see also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 733
(Minn. 1997); SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 318.
144. For example, in a case like NSP where there is no direct allocation of re-
sponsibility upon the policyholder, the policyholder might nonetheless be forced
to pay claims out of its own pocket due to the exhaustion of its insurance during
some policy periods or because some insurers are insolvent. In these situations,
the practical effect of course is to apportion some coverage responsibility to the
policyholder. This regime is hard to defend when other policies for other periods
remain triggered, unexhausted, collectible, and unreachable because of a pro-rata
allocation scheme. See infra Parts III.B.4-8 and IV.
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than any cosmically true facts. Attempting to allocate defense costs
so finely based on the nuances of different pleadings and proceed-
ings is considerably more difficult if not impossible.
Upon re-examination, the Integrity Mutual Insurance Co. v. State
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters Insurance Co.'45 opinion rejected
by the NSP court because it involved use of "other insurance"
clauses to coordinate concurrent coverage responsibility, demon-
strates a perfectly sensible approach to allocation notwithstandin
its seeming rejection by both the initial and final NSP opinions.
In Integrity, the court noted that Minnesota's approach to allocating
coverage responsibility among overlapping insurers was neither the
piecing together of the precise texts of "other insurance" clauses
nor the default rule of proration by policy limits where such clauses
are in conflict. 47 Rather, the Minnesota approach "has tradition-
ally been more complex" with a view that:
[T] he better approach is to allocate respective policy cov-
erages in light of the total policy insuring intent, as de-
termined by the primary policy risks upon which each pol-
icy's premiums were based and as determined by the
primary function of each policy. The Minnesota courts
examine the policies and determine whether the insurers
are concurrently liable on the risk, or one is primarily li-
able and another only secondarily liable. If they are con-
currently liable, each must pay a pro rata share of the en-
tire loss. On the other hand, if one insurer is primarily
liable and the other only secondarily, the primary insurer
must pay up to its limit of liability, and then the secondary
insurer must pay for any excess up to its own limit of li-
ability....
The nub of the Minnesota doctrine is that coverages of a
given risk shall be "stacked" for payment in order of their
closeness to the risk. That is, the insurer whose coverage
was effected for the primary purpose of insuring that risk
will be liable first for payment, and the insurers whose
145. 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
146. See id. at 176-77, 239 N.W.2d at 447-48.
147. See id.; Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 110 (Or.
1959) (applying proration by limits as formula for allocation notwithstanding lan-
guage of other insurance clauses). Lamb-Weston is a key case and required prora-
tion by limits often known as the "Lamb-Weston rule." This approach goes beyond
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coverage of the risk was the most incidental to the basic
purpose of its insuring intent will be liable last. If two
coverages contemplate the risk equally, then the two
companies providing those coverages will prorate the li-




Minnesota, therefore, has a rather lengthy history of taking
what might be termed a functional or purpose-oriented approach
to insurance policy construction and resolution of coverage dis-
putes. This approach, often referred to as a "closest to the risk" or
"total policy insuring intent" approach, has been noted with ap-
proval by a least one extensive commentary addressing the problem
of concurrent coverage. 149 The Integrity case, in particular, was sup-
ported because (perhaps ironically in light of the NSP court's criti-
cism) it eschewed "clause matching" and instead looked to the
market realities and implicit equities of the situation. 15  Other
Minnesota cases were similarly set forth as examples of a correct
functional approach to the problem of coordinating coverage.151
Although it is correct that concurrent coverage and consecutive
coverage are not the same thing, the NSP court never really goes
beyond this observation to explain why the same functional ap-
proach used in construing concurrent insurer liability could not be
used in cases of consecutive insurer liability.
Applied to a multiyear pollution or product liability claim, one
could regard all triggered liability insurers as "concurrent" within
the meaning of Integrity in that all successive liability insurers ac-
cepted the risk of potentially large liability exposure resulting from
industrial pollution (absent a pollution exclusion or application of
the intentional act exclusion) or from a mass produced and dis-
tributed product causing injury over a number of years. Conse-
148. Integrity, 307 Minn. at 175-76, 239 N.W.2d at 446-47 (citations omitted).
149. See Susan Randall, Coordinating Liability Insurance, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1339,
1370-71 nn.132-36 (1995) (citing with approval Minnesota cases taking this ap-
proach).
150. See Integrity, 239 N.W.2d at 449; see also Randall, supra note 149, at 1371-72.
151. See, e.g., Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Northstar Mut. Ins. Co., 281 N.W.2d 700,
704 (Minn. 1979); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 461
N.W.2d 230, 235 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). See Randall, supra note 149, at 1371
n.133 ("The approach adopted by the Minnesota courts, although rooted in con-
tract, bridges the contract and market paradigms. It minimizes or avoids problems
associated with the contract-based resolution of 'other insurance' litigation and
points in the direction of a broader understanding of coordination issues.").
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quently, the primary and excess insurers across the years in effect
were equally proximate to the risks associated with third-party
claims for pollution or defective design or manufacture.
Of course, as the NSP court noted, Integrity and similar cases
dealt with multiple policies applicable to a single time period
rather than a time series. 152 But regardless of whether the overlap-
ping is in Year 1 or upon an occurrence that spans several years,
the principal of proration by policy limits and closeness to the risk
is as sound as any proration formula. The NSP court turned its
figurative back on significant Minnesota precedent that held in fa-
vor of including policy limits as an element of a proration for-• 153
mula. The argument for proration by years is that it more accu-
rately corresponds to the relative risks taken by a series of insurers
in a multiyear occurrence case since changing conditions may
154make policy limits and premiums difficult to compare. Although
this argument has a certain persuasiveness, it seems no more accu-
rate than proration by limits or premiums. Furthermore, the NSP
court for some reason did not even consider prorating by both time
on the risk and policy limits, an approach that would have at least
introduced some cognizance of the cost of insurance purchased
and promised.
Another earlier Minnesota case, Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Insurance
Co., 155 involved the issue of allocating insurer responsibilities among
covered and uncovered claims.156 The court used closest-to-the-risk
functional analysis in dealing with a CGL insurer and an umbrella
carrier. 57 Because Mission, as the umbrella carrier, provided some
coverage not provided by the CGL, Mission's responsibility was
primary as to certain claims but secondary as to those covered by
the CGL. The court found both insurers on the risk as to some
claims. 159
152. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 664
(Minn. 1994).
153. See id. at 663-64.
154. See id. at 663.
155. 387 N.W.2d 161 (Minn. 1986).
156. See id. at 165.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 166.
159. See id. at 167. At that point, the court rendered its view that where there is
disputed coverage and an insurer acts to protect the policyholder by providing a
defense, the responsible insurer has no action for contribution against the other
insurer that shirked its defense costs responsibility. See id. This rule was "adopted"
by the supreme court in Iowa National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters
[Vol. 25
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Where no insurer volunteers, however, the insurers may liti-
gate the issue of the division of costs between different varieties of
covered claims (e.g., those as to which the umbrella policy is pri-
mary and those as to which the CGL is primary). The Jostens v. Mis-
sion court concluded that:
[T]he record establishes as a matter of law that Wausau's
[CGL] policy covered [plaintiff] Wepler's defamatory and
disparaging claims and that the wrongful discharge and
fraud claims, at least insofar as unintentional conduct was
involved, were solely within [umbrella insurer] Mission's
broader coverage. Consequently, Jostens is entitled to its
costs in defending these latter two claims from Mission. 16°
However, despite this finding as a matter of law, the Jostens v.
Mission court remanded to the trial court:
to apportion the [plaintiff] Wepler['s] defense costs be-
tween Wausau and Mission. If defense costs for the two
sets of claims are so inextricably intertwined they cannot
be fairly sorted out, the costs may be equally divided....
... Basic fairness, we think, dictates that both insurers
having been found obligated to provide a defense, both
should share equally 6the expense for having to be told
their responsibilities.
In another and potentially more relevant Josten's coverage
case, the supreme court in Jostens, Inc. v. CNA Insurance/Continental
Casualty Co., specifically refused to allocate defense costs to par-.... 163
ticular claimants or time periods. Said the court:
In the present case, allocation of defense costs based on
Insurance Co., 276 Minn. 362, 367-68, 150 N.W.2d 233, 237 (1967), and enjoys
some support in other states but is seen as the minority rule nationally.
160. Jostens v. Mission, 387 N.W.2d at 168 (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 168.
162. 403 N.W.2d 625, 631 (Minn. 1987), overruled by Northern States Power Co.
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). Although NSP overruled this
decision in part, the overruling was limited to whether the policyholder must pay a
deductible or SIR for each policy period triggered. See supra note 104 and accom-
panying discussion.
163. SeeJostens v. CNA, 403 N.W.2d at 631.
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a percentage of the uncovered settlement amounts or
time periods is not merited. It appears likely that a great
deal of the defense costs were incurred in general defense
preparation and cannot be separated by claimants or time
periods. Requiring CNA to be responsible for defense
costs is also consistent with the strong policy in favor of
requiring defense where there is even arguable coverage.
CNA cites to Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Insurance Co., 387
N.W.2d 161 (Minn. 1986), for the proposition that de-
fense costs must be allocated. That case is inapplicable,
however. There, we examined the issue of allocating de-
fense costs between two insurers. The present case in-
volves an insured party and an insurer which originally
breached its duty to defend. We therefore hold that CNA
is responsible for all costs for defense. 64
164. Id. Although a portion of the NSP opinion disapproved of a portion of
Jostens v. CNA, the above passage and analysis was not implicated by NSPs modifi-
cation. In a short paragraph near the close of theJostens v. CNA opinion, the court
averaged out the policyholder's retained limit over a seven-year period by weight-
ing the $25,000 limit in effect for three years with the $10,000 limit in effect for
four years. SeeJostens v. CNA, 403 N.W.2d at 631. The court then used the result-
ing weighted average as the policyholder's self-insured retention to be deducted
from the amounts otherwise owed the policyholder for the claims falling under
the seven years' worth of implicated policies (a three-year policy period and a four-
year policy period). See id.
In NSP, the court held:
[T]here has been one occurrence during the policy period of each ap-
plicable [insurance] policy and NSP must assume the retained limit with
respect to each of these policies. [The insurer] is liable for the excess
portion of the damages allocated to each policy up to the policy limit for
one occurrence. To the extent then that [Jostens v. CNA] conflicts with
our decision here, it is overruled.
NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 664 (citation omitted).
In effect, this portion of NSP took the view that if a policy is triggered and
the policyholder obtains the benefit of coverage during that policy period, it must
also pay the applicable SIR or deductible for that policy period even though the
loss-creating event spanning several policy periods is in essence one event. See id.
For purposes of tapping insurance coverage, each triggering portion of a
multiyear event is considered an occurrence for the policy triggered. This portion
of the NSP opinion seems correct and in retrospect, Jostens appears to have en-
joyed a mild windfall by being required to pay only one averaged SIR (and not the
higher SIR at that) even though it effectively tapped two policies.
The SIR portions of both opinions are perfectly consistent with taking an
aggregate and blended approach to the issue of apportioning defense cost respon-
sibilities among insurers. CNA in fact took just such a blended approach through
its weighted average methodology but erred in undercounting the number of oc-
currences requiring policyholder satisfaction of an SIR obligation. Nothing in
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Taken together, the Jostens cases suggest that courts ordinarily
will eschew an attempt to separate and apportion defense claims
with a common core. The Jostens v. CNA court refused to attempt
to assign intertwined defense costs to the respective claims falling1- 165
within the CGL or the umbrella policy. The Jostens v. Mission
court, although remanding for apportionment between substantive
claims (and not individual cases within the same overall substantive
claim occurrence as would occur if mass tort defenses are appor-
tioned between case-specific and generic defense costs) expressly
stated that if the "two sets of claims" are sufficiently intertwined so
as to preclude fair apportionment, the defense costs should be pro-
rated equally between the two applicable insurers.166
This treatment is consistent with the apparently longstanding
Minnesota approach to apportionment reflected in IntegrityI67 and
its predecessors and progeny. Unless one claim is clearly distinct
from another or unless one insurer is clearly distinct from another,
the insurers' responsibilities will be either equally divided or appor-
tioned prorata by policy limits (perhaps weighted by time on the
risk). Prior to NSP, there was little indication that time on the risk
was the be-all-and-end-all factor necessary to fair and reasonable
apportionment of insurers' coverage responsibility.
D. Allocation Law Outside Minnesota
Courts have divided on the question of the necessity for alloca-
tion and the manner of apportionment. Although it is correct, as
suggested by insurers and the Domtar court, that allocation has en-
joyed substantial support, it is equally correct that many courts have
rejected allocation outright, forbid allocation from reducing bene-
fits otherwise available to the policyholder, or refused to apportion
coverage responsibility to the policyholder where there are extenu-
ating circumstances such as a practical unavailability of insurance.
Courts generally view the respective obligations of coinsurers
as more in the nature of equity than particularized contract rights:
NSPs correction of this aspect of CNA disapproves weighted averaging by time
and policy limits as a means of apportioning responsibility among insurance poli-
cies when defense costs are part of an essentially integrated defense effort.
165. SeeJostens v. CNA, 403 N.W.2d at 630-31.
166. SeeJostens v. Mission, 387 N.W.2d at 168.
167. 307 Minn. 173, 239 N.W.2d 445 (1976).
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[T]here is no disagreement between the parties that a
growing number, if not a majority, of jurisdictions recog-
nize that "[t]he respective obligations as between several
insurers who have covered the same risk do not arise out
of contract, but are based upon equitable principles de-
signed to accomplish ultimate justice in the bearing of a
specific burden.
The equitable and functional underpinnings of allocation
among insurers are also reflected in the line of cases that resolves
overlapping insurance conflicts by treating the insurer closest to
the risk as primary and other insurers as secondary, with costs gen-
erally prorated by limits among insurers at the same level of prox-
imity to the risk.
169
168. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 705, 707
(E.D. Pa. 1993). Numerous other courts have made similar statements. See, e.g.,
Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 889, 895 (Cal. 1980). Relative insurer re-
sponsibility turns on "particular policies of insurance, the nature of the claim
made, and the relation of the insured to the insurers." Id. at 895. For instance,
there is no obligation on the excess insurer to participate in the defense of a poli-
cyholder where the policyholder incurred costs prior to exhaustion of primary pol-
icy and without proper notice to excess insurer as required by the policy. See id. at
894-95. But see General Accident, 825 F. Supp. at 708-09 (holding that, where excess
insurer follows form and primary policy provides for pro rata sharing if other in-
surance applicable, excess insurer must contribute pro rata with primary insurer in
paying for defense costs); Regent Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 92-2113-
EEO, 1993 WL 191344, at *3-*4 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that where the contract
language does not require contribution by an excess insurer, nothing inequitable
about requiring primary carrier to shoulder all defense costs); Home Indem. Co.
v. General Accident Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ill. CL App. 1991) (holding
that equitable contribution is inapplicable regarding obligations of primary and
excess insurers).
169. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co.,
756 F. Supp. 953, 956 (S.D. Miss. 1990). Where competing policies provide pri-
mary coverage and are prorated, the intent of the policyholder and insurer are
more informative than whether one policy is more "specific" to the risk or the
other policy more "general" in relation to risk. See id.; see also Federal Ins. Co. v.
Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 153 N.W.2d 429 (1967). In Prestemon, a garage owner
loaned a car to a customer who subsequently had an accident. See Prestemon, 278
Minn. at 219, 153 N.W.2d at 430-31. The driver had an insurance policy with an
.excess apportionment" clause but the garage policy had a textually trumping "es-
cape" clause regarding other insurance. See id. at 220, 231-32, 153 N.W.2d at 431,
437-38. The court affirmed, holding that the garage owner was entitled to cover-
age under the guaranty policy and "the excess clause contained in the [driver's]
Federal policy prevails over the escape clause contained in the [garage's] Guaranty
policy." See id. at 232, 153 N.W.2d at 438. Accord Randall, supra note 149, at 1342-
42 (endorsing the view that insurers should bear indemnity and defense obliga-
tions in relation to the market pricing of their respective commitments). Al-
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1. Cases Adopting or Endorsing Allocation Formula
In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of cases have endorsed allo-
cation. Beginning with Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, a number of courts have apportioned the coverage re-
sponsibilities of triggered insurers according to a formula, typically
proration by time on the risk."' A smaller number have adopted a
default rule of proration that involves consideration of both time
though Prof. Randall's analysis clothes itself in economic analysis, it is largely an
endorsement of a functional approach to coordinating coverage that in fact seeks
to place greatest responsibility on the insurer(s) closest to the risk.
170. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey and Illinois law and
prorating by years).
171. See, e.g., LaFarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 61 F.3d 389, 401 (5th Cir.
1995) (applying Texas law); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management
Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1202 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York and Texas law); Gulf
Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365,
371-72 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Texas law); Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 974 F.2d 754, 764-68 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying Michigan law); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying Ala-
bama law); Budd Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 820 F.2d 787, 790 (6th Cir. 1987)
(applying Michigan law); Ducre v. Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 981-83 (5th
Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d
1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Louisiana law and following Forty-Eight Insula-
tions) (prorating based on periods of no insurance and prorating by time);
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 210,
216-18 (D. Md. 1993); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1387
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
176, 206-07 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to adopt a universal bright line
rule of allocation, but finding apportionment by "qualified time on the risk" pref-
erable "unless another method would be more equitable"); Armstrong World In-
dus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(allocating coverage responsibility among insurers according to time on risk but
refusing to allocate liability to policyholder for any uninsured periods); Gulf Ins.
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 464 So. 2d 207, 209-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(where legal malpractice claim spans multiple years, proration by policy limits ap-
propriate means of apportionment); Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d
894, 918-19 (Haw. 1994); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670
N.E.2d 740, 747-49 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (allocating some responsibility to policy-
holder for periods of no insurance); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
643 N.E.2d 1226, 1258-59 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (using allocation among self-
insuring policyholder and insurers by time on risk); Continental Cas. Co. v. Medi-
cal Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where
damages giving rise to third-party medical malpractice claim span multiple years,
proration by time on risk is the most apt means of apportioning relative responsi-
bility and that apportionment by policy limits is only apt for multiple insurers cov-
ering risk concurrently). See also Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co.,
89 F.3d 1386, 1396 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Minnesota law). Diocese of Winona
was, of course, heavily influenced by the NSP decision because the federal appel-
late court was required to follow Minnesota law.
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S . 172
and policy limits. A few cases have allocated by policy limits
alone. 1713 In addition to the common methods of proration by pol-
icy limits, by time on the risk, or by some combination of these two
primary methods, courts may also apportion in equal shares be-
tween insurers or on the basis of premiums paid.
74
Interpretation of the case law requires some caution because
different cases may have focused on defense costs or liability cover-
age or both. Because the duty to defend is broader than the duty
to indemnify, one can make a strong case that, whatever the merits
of allocation for liability coverage, there should be no allocation-
at least not to policyholders-of defense costs since the CGL nor-
mally states that the insurer will defend "suits" against the policy-
holder, implying that the defense responsibility cannot be thrown
back upon the policyholder merely because the claims giving rise to
the suit straddle some periods of self-insurance or exhausted insur-
175
ance.
In addition, subsequent developments in relevant state law
may undermine or even vitiate the authority of some precedents.
For example, California appellate cases requiring allocation, at
172. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 987-90 (N.J.
1994) (adopting proration by time and limits as a default means of allocation, in-
cluding allocation to the policyholder for uninsured periods but adopting a pre-
ferred method of trial court making findings of fact, preferably by formula or
model, as to when particular injuries took place). Proration by time appears the
more popular allocation method, although proration by both time and limits has
substantial support in scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 109, at 1244-
45. See also infra note 216 and accompanying text (listing cases); Carter-Wallace,
Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 712 A.2d 1116 (N.J. 1998).
173. This was the approach, for example, of the trial court that was subse-
quently overruled in Continental Casualty Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d
789, 790-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), which endorsed time on the risk.
174. See Insurance Co. of Texas v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 163 F.
Supp. 143, 147, 151 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (apportioning on basis of premiums paid);
Stonewall, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199 (summarizing leading methods of proration).
Apportionment according to premium appears to have become significantly less
popular during the past three decades, as evidenced by the status of the 1958 In-
surance Co. of Texas case as the leading citation for this method. The criticism of
proration by premiums, one that has never seemed particularly persuasive to the
author, is that the amount of premium results from many factors in addition to
risk assumed. Although this is true, an insurer's policy limits and willingness to
insure at all also stem in large part from factors other than pure risk.
175. But see Buss v. Superior Court, 939 P.2d 766, 776 (Cal. 1997) (permitting
insurer to seek reimbursement from policyholder for costs of defending claims in
suit where insurer can satisfy burden of persuasion that certain claims were not
even potentially within coverage and are sufficiently separate from covered claims
to make reimbursement fair and practical).
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least allocation to the policyholder, appear to have been effectively
overruled by more recent state supreme court precedent. 76 The
California Supreme Court forcefully rejected allocation to the poli-
cyholder in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co.177 Aerojet-
General also rejected the NSP/Domtar view that triggered liability in-
surance somehow becomes "untriggered" simply because the policy
term ends while damage from the trigging event continues.
a. The Illustrative Stonewall Decision
Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp.,179 the
Second Circuit's decision in a lengthy asbestos-coverage litigation,
is known primarily for its continuation of a broad injury-in-fact
trigger that in effect produces a continuous trigger for alleged in-
sidious internal diseases related to chemicals or devices in the
body.80 As the court noted:
Under this trigger of coverage, an asbestos-related bodily
injury claim typically will implicate multiple policies in ef-
fect during the multi-year period of the injury process.
Each of these triggered policies promises to pay "all sums"
that [the policyholder] becomes liable to pay to the un-
derlying claimants as a result of bodily injury occurring
during the policy period. Thus, for any single asbestos-
related bodily injury claim, there may be several policies
each independently responsible under their explicit terms
for paying "all sums" that [the policyholder] becomes li-
able to pay to the claimant.
176. See Aerojet-General Corp, v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909 (Cal.
1997).
177. See id. at 930-31. More specifically, Aerojet rejected allocation to the poli-
cyholder where an insurance policy was triggered. See id. at 931-32. In California
after Aerojet, the insurer may avoid coverage only if there is no triggering of cover-
age, which effectively makes the policyholder responsible for liability in that time
period. See id. Although the Aerojet court in portions of the opinion refers to this
as allocation of costs to the insured, this is not allocation so much as it is a finding
of no coverage. See id. at 929-30. Where coverage is found by triggering due to
injury that begins during the policy period, the fact that injury continues into
other periods was expressly found not to justify imposing costs upon the policy-
holder via allocation. See id. at 928-930.
178. See id.; see also infra Part III.A.l.a (regarding the proper interpretation of
the "during the policy period" language of the CGL).
179. 73 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying NewYork and Texas law).
180. See id. at 1201-02.
181. Id. at 1201.
1999]
43
Stempel: Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Stonewall also dealt at some length with issues of allocation
among insurers and the policyholders' relative responsibility.
182
The trial court had prorated by time on the risk, an approach ac-
cepted in large part because neither the policyholder nor the in-
surers objected to the temporal proration formula as applied to the
183insurers. The trial court had also prorated responsibility to the
policyholder for periods where there was no insurance either be-
cause "it had been uninsured or its insurance had been consumed
by prior payment during any portion of the time period of a par-
ticular claimant's injury.
The Stonewall court noted that the policyholder:
observes that the policies available to it in the 1950s had
low aggregate limits, and that no coverage was available
for asbestos claims after 1985. Because the injuries suf-
fered by the claimant population have progressed well
into these uninsured policy years, prorating [the policy-
holder] NGC's liability evenly to each triggered policy
year and to each uninsured year enables the Insurers to
reallocate an increasingly large percentage of asbestos li-
abilities back to [the policyholder] NGC.
Thus, Stonewall, despite favoring allocation in general, refused to
allocate policyholder responsibility to years when insurance was
unavailable."'
182. See id. at 1201-04.
183. See id. at 1202. The opinion explained that when:
[c]onfronted with multiple insurance policies covering the same
claim, the District Court decided, on motion for summaryjudgment,
that the triggered policies' obligations were to be prorated based
upon the policies' respective triggered time periods. Specifically,
the District Court ruled that each triggered policy was responsible
for only a pro rata share of NGC's liability as to a particular claimant.
The share was determined by multiplying the judgment or settle-
ment by a fraction that has as its denominator the entire number of
years of the claimant's injury, and as its numerator the number of
years within that period when the policy was in effect.
Id. at 1202.
184. Id. at 1202.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 1203.
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Notwithstanding the potential shift of financial burden to the
policyholder, Stonewall approved the general assessment that:
[I]n the context of multiple policies triggered for con-
tinuous injuries, proration-to-the-insured is a sensible way
to interpret insurance policies that do not squarely resolve
the allocation issue. Perhaps the leading opinion in the
field, and surely one of the best reasoned, is Justice
O'Hern's opinion for the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Owens-Illinois. He begins by rejecting both sides' conten-
tions based on the wording of the CGL policy. The "all
sums" language relied on by the insured, he points out,
"was never intended to cover apportionment when con-
tinuous injury occurs over multiple years." And the insur-
ers' reliance on language limiting their coverage to injury
"which occurs during the policy period" ignores their ob-
ligation to indemnify for subsequent damages attributable
to an injury occurring during the relevant policy period.
He then relates the allocation issue to the continuous
trigger approach and argues for an allocation formula
that provides incentives to increasing available resources
and internalizing costs. He concludes that a fair method
of allocation appears to be one that is related both to time
on the risk and the degree of risk assumed. When periods
of no insurance reflect a decision by an actor to assume or
retain a risk, as opposed to periods when coverage for a
risk is not available, to expect the risk-bearer to share in
the allocation is reasonable.
We agree with the analysis of the New Jersey Supreme
Court and think it likely that New York and Texas will also
agree. We also note that proration-to-the-insured, in the
context of continuous triggering, has been approved
[in other cases].
We agree with [trial court] Judge Martin that proration-
to-the-insured is a sensible way to adjust the competing
contentions of the parties in the context of continuous
triggering of multiple policies over an extended span of
years. We agree that such proration is appropriate as to
years in which [the policyholder] NGC elected not to
purchase insurance or purchased insufficient insurance,
as demonstrated by the exhaustion of its policy limits.
However, we do not agree with the District Judge's sub-
sidiary ruling that proration-to-the-insured should be ap-
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plied to years after 1985 when asbestos liability insurance
was no longer available. Judge Martin applied proration-
to-the-insured even after 1985. His rationale was that [the
policyholder] "bargained away coverage by accepting as-
bestos exclusion clauses." We think that is not a realistic
view of the situation. There is no reason to believe that
any bargaining occurred with respect to the asbestos ex-
clusion clauses.
Moreover, we note that judges who have endorsed pro-
ration-to-the-insured have done so only to oblige a manu-
facturer to accept a proportionate share of a risk that it
elected to assume, either by declining to purchase avail-
able insurance or by purchasing what turned out to be an
insufficient amount of insurance. Thus, Justice O'Hern's
opinion in Owens-Illinois explicitly contrasts its proration
approach to "periods when coverage for a particular risk is
not available." Similarly, Judge Wald [in his concurrence
in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F. 2d
1034, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1981)] endorsed proration-to-the-
insured only "prior to the time when such coverage could
no longer be obtained." Judge Martin's opinion appears
to be the only one applying proration-to-the-insured to
years when asbestos liability insurance was no longer avail-
able.
We therefore modify the judgments so as not to apply
the proration-to-the-insured approach to years after 1985,
the point at which asbestos liability insurance ceased to be
available.
8 7
The Stonewall court then discussed two different versions of its
modified allocation formula.188 The court assumed a claimant with
an asbestos injury spanning from 1981 through 2005 but insurance
only for 1981 through 1984, with the policyholder self-insuring for
1985 and no coverage available after 1985.1 9 Under one opera-
tionalization of the circuit court's modified proration to the poli-
cyholder, proration would be based upon the number of years (five
years) where coverage was an option among the insurers and the
policyholder, forcing the policyholder to accept one-fifth or twenty
187. Id. at 1202-04 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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percent of the responsibility. Under another possible approach
considered by the Second Circuit, the twenty-five-year period would
be apportioned among the insurers as to twenty-four of the twenty-
five years since occurrence-based policies standing alone would en-
compass the entire injury period (1981/82/83/84 through 2005)
and because coverage was not available after 1985.'9' Stonewall
adopted the former approach imposing more responsibility on the
policyholder rather than the latter approach more forgiving to the
policyholder. Stonewall justified selection of this more onerous
version of its modified allocation principle on the ground that if
the policyholder had:
purchased a policy from Insurer C in 1985, that insurer
would have been liable for 1/5th of the claim (since no
proration-to-the-insured is being allowed for the years af-
ter 1985). Our solution imposes that same 1/5th share on
[the policyholder] for the one year when it was uninsured
due to its own choice.
We therefore implement proration-to-the-insured by
obliging [the policyholder] to pay a share of each claim
represented by a fraction that has as its denominator the
number of years of the injury up to 1985, and as its nu-
merator the number of those years in which [the policy-
holder] was uninsured (either because it purchased no in-




193. Id. (footnote omitted). In a footnote appended to this last quoted lan-
guage, the Stonewall court noted in passing the other financial burdens on the
policyholder as a result of the confluence of asbestos claims and the unavailability
of insurance. See id. at 1204 n.19 ("This decision, of course, does not alter NGC's
obligation, without insurance indemnification, to pay for claims based on expo-
sures occurring after 1985. As to such claims, none of the Insurers is 'on the risk,'
and no issue of proration arises.")
Prior to criticizing Stonewalls allocation approach, a point developed at
greater length below, I note that the entire Stonewall allocation discussion pro-
ceeds as if claims liability is something of a hybrid between case-specific costs and
generic liability costs due to asbestos manufacture. On one hand, it appears that
apportionment takes place on a per claim basis for each of the insurers triggered
by a particular claim. On the other hand, the court treats the liability as "generic
to the claim" in that no attempt is made to link any quantity of damage to a par-
ticular claimant or to any particular policy or insurer. The same approach could
be used for defense costs but a policyholder seeking to characterize defense costs
as generic would have a strong argument for less individual treatment than is ap-
1999l
47
Stempel: Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
2. Cases Re'ecting Allocation Formula
A well-known case early in the asbestos coverage litigation de-
termined that court-imposed allocation was not necessary and
permitted the policyholder to select among triggered policies in
claiming indemnity or defense costs.194 This has been misnamed
'Joint and several" liability.'95 Notwithstanding being saddled with a
plied to indemnity issues. The manner and fruits of defense in Case X will have
significant impact in all other asbestos claims against the policyholder. Although
this is somewhat true for judgments and settlements as well (since in a mass tort,
settlement of a case within the mass tort has ripple impact on other cases), the
overarching interrelatedness among components of the occurrence are more
pronounced for defense costs.
194. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1049 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (applying generic law or basic principles of insurance found in the
states with interests in the litigation and stating "if a plaintiffs damages are caused
in part during an insured period, it is irrelevant to [the policyholder's] legal obli-
gations and therefore, to the insurer's liability that they were also caused, in part,
during another period"). Something akin to the Keene approach predates the as-
bestos coverage litigation and is found in property insurance disputes, although
there are comparatively few cases on the topic. See, e.g., Gruol Constr. Co. v. In-
surance. Co., 524 P.2d 427, 430-31 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the dry rot
of a home which spanned multiple policy periods requires apportionment by
timespan of structure's deterioration). See also Skinner Corp. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., No. C95-995WD, 1996 WL 376657, at *2-*3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 3, 1996)
(applying Washington law and following Gruo/); American Nat'l Fire Ins. v. B & L
Trucking & Const. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 254, 256-57 (Wash. 1998) (affirming the
continued validity of Gruol in Washington, adopting continuous application of the
injury trigger, and rejecting insurer arguments favoring proration).
195. Joint and several liability is a misnomer in that it suggests that co-parties
are equally liable even though one party may have displayed only minimal fault
while the other was largely responsible for the loss or legal liability. Although re-
fusal to apportion insurer responsibility according to the liability damage accrued
during multiple policy periods has some superficial resemblance to tort law's joint
and several liability, the similarity is ultimately misleading. Under a Keene ap-
proach, an insurer who issued an untapped, high limits policy during the last year
of multiple years of loss, could be called upon to pay its full limits even though it
arguably insured less risk than low limits insurers at the early years of the loss.
However, unlike the joint tortfeasor situation, the last insurer has entered into a
contract in which the insurer agreed to pay all of its limits if necessary for a single
claim exhausting the limits so long as a covered occurrence caused some damage
during the policy period. The insurer is under no greater burden of unfairness
when tapped first by a Keene-style policyholder than it would have been if the last
person injured by the offending product or policyholder conduct had been the
one claimant with the best lawyer, the most favorable forum, and an ultra-large
jury verdict. In addition, of course, no insurer ever pays more than its policy limits
absent bad faith. The policy limits are a ceiling on liability. By contrast, the true
joint tortfeasor is potentially subject to unlimited liability in a large loss case irre-
spective of the deep pocket joint tortfeasor's relative fault. See also supra note 98
and accompanying text (addressing inappropriate use of "joint and several liabil-
ity" label in this context).
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label that erroneously creates the appearance that insurers might
pay more than their "fair" share of responsibility under this
method, many courts have followed this general approach to both
the issue of continuous trigger and the question of whether the re-
sponsibilities of triggered insurers should be determined by judicial
formula or policyholder prerogative. 9 6 Although there is scholarly
commentary favoring allocation,197 there is also scholarly criticism
of allocation and support refusing to apportion coverage responsi-
bility to the policyholder.9 '
196. See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 25
F.3d 177, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Pennsylvania law); New Castle County v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1181-82 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying
Delaware law); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 713-14 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (applying Indiana law after certification to state supreme court); Acands,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 975-76 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1984)
(applying Indiana law through prediction and holding the ambiguity of the policy
regarding apportionment precludes apportionment adversely affecting the policy-
holder under the rule of contra proferentem); Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Heath Com-
pensation & Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. 1994) (applying Missouri law);
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514 N.E.2d 150, 150 (Ill. 1987); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985) (answering certified question
from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals); J.H. France Refractories
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa. 1993). In Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liabil-
ity Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257, 266 (D.N.J. 1983), the court stated:
If injuries were sustained during the policy period and there is no
way of distinguishing those injuries from ones sustained prior or
subsequent thereto, then the insurer would be liable for the full
amount. In those circumstances the liability of each insurer would
be joint and several.
The court rejects the automatic pro rata allocation adopted in
Forty-Eight Insulations in a claim by the insured. It may be an appro-
priate standard in considering claims among the insurers, but not in
considering a claim by the insured. The pro rata method is an arbi-
trary one that assumes that the occurrence of bodily injury mirrors
exposure to the harmful substance.
Id. Further, in Lac D Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F.
Supp. 1549, 1562 (D.N.J. 1985), the court held, "[A]ny proration of liability as
against the insured would contravene the policies' dominant purpose of protec-
tion .... There is nothing here, that provides for a reduction in liability if an in-
jury occurs only in part during a policy period." Id. Proration over years is par-
ticularly pernicious in that it raises possible application of multiple deductibles,
further stripping a policyholder of purchased coverage.
197. See, e.g., Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98 and accompanying discus-
sion; infra Part IV.
198. See, e.g., Garrett G. Gillespie, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility Among
Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies in Environmental Cases: Life After
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Typical of the assessment made by courts rejecting allocation is
the analysis in Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Heath Compensation & Liability
Insurance Co.: 199
Missouri courts have recognized that insurance compa-
nies may effectively limit their coverage obligations with
an explicit pro rata provision in the terms of the pol-
icy ....
... Conversely, the Missouri Court of Appeals has held
that where a policy is silent on proration, the insurance
company isjointly and severally liable to the full extent of
the policyholder's loss (i.e. "all sums")....
A policy is activated by bodily injury or property damage
that takes place "during the policy period." The trigger-
ing language in the Monsanto insurance policies does not
define the extent of coverage. Once a policy is on the
risk, the unambiguous policy language requires the insur-
ance company to pay "all sums" for which the policy-
holder shall become liable, up to the policy limits. That
language defines ESLIC's duty under its policies as the ob-
ligation to pay "all sums" for which Monsanto becomes li-
able-not a proportionate share.
The majority of courts have held that without a pro rata
clause in the policies, the insurance companies cannot
limit their obligations to a pro rata share or a portion of
Monsanto's liabilities.2"'
In its discussion of basic insurance principles, the Monsanto
court invoked a treatise of long standing for the proposition that:
[w]ithout an express proportional limitation in the policy,
an insurance company is responsible for the entire loss up
to its limits of liability, but the policyholder is limited to a
single recovery for that loss: But where there is no provi-
sion in a policy of insurance providing for prorating if
other insurance exists upon the same subject matter, a
company against whom suit is brought after loss cannot
Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 525, 570-71 (1996).
199. 652 A.2d 30 (Del. 1994).
200. Id. at 34-35 (citations and footnote omitted).
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insist upon prorating the loss with other companies
thereon, even though the insured may be limited to the
201
recovery of a single indemnity.
In something of a hybrid between the Keene approach (so-
called joint-and-several liability) and a rigid proration, insurance
policies are subject to a continuous trigger but the policyholder is
required to tap the applicable coverage in serial order beginning
with the first triggered policy, working vertically through excess
layers, and then moving to any additional policy years after the first
202
triggered year's coverage is exhausted.
3. The Duty to Defend and Allocation
Where a court determines that allocation is apt, it generally al-
locates defense costs in the same manner prevailing for allocation
of indemnity responsibility even where the court has noted distinc-
tions between the defense obligations and the indemnity obliga-
tions of the insurer. While "an intent by coinsurers to apportion
indemnity loss equally does not control the division of defense costs
as a matter of law, that intent is an important factor of reference
with respect to such division.
2 0
1
201. See id. at 35 n.7 (citing 6 JOHN A. & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW &
PRAcrCE § 3905, at 436-37 (rev. ed. 1972 & Supp. 1993)); see also Tinsley v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 205 S.W. 78, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918) ("[P]olicy sued upon contains no
'pro rata clause.' And in the absence of a provision in the policy to the contrary, it
is held the insured may recover the full amount of his loss from any insurer, leav-
ing the latter to seek contribution."). Tinsley was relied upon heavily by the Mon-
santo court. See Monsanto, 652 A.2d at 34-35. On the question of modern Missouri
law, the Monsanto court noted the preference for allocation in Continental Casualty
Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993), but found Medical
Protective inapposite to the issue of coverage for a multiyear tort. See id. at 35.
Monsanto noted that Medical Protective "prorated the policyholder's loss among the
three insurance companies" and that "inter-insurer apportionment, of course, had
no bearing upon the insurers' obligations to their policyholder who had already
been made whole." Id. at 35 n.8.
202. See, e.g., Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So. 2d 1058, 1061 n.5, 1074-80 (La.
1992); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 707 F. Supp.
762, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (applying the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas deci-
sion of JH. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 3933 (Phila. Ct. C.P.
Apr. 18, 1996), which was subsequently affirmed in part and reversed in part, 626
A.2d 502 (1993)). Due to the change in Pennsylvania law resulting from the su-
preme court decision in JH. France, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
and remanded the district court decision. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hart-
ford Accident & Indem. Co., 25 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1994).
203. Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1537, 1541
1999]
51
Stempel: Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Cases like this, however, despite the endorsement of what
might be termed a presumption of sameness in apportioning de-
fense and indemnity payments, illustrate the judicial reluctance to
automatically or absolutely adopt indemnity allocation rules for de-
fense allocation. One court found proration by policy limits to be
the ordinary New York rule for indemnity apportionment but did
not find the rule "compelling" for defense costs in view of the dif-
ferent functions of defense and indemnity and also rejected appor-
tionment according to premiums received since the portion of a
premium could not be easily divided among defense obligations
204and indemnity risk. Similarly, an inability to allocate premiums
according to defense and liability implies a corresponding inability
to allocate defense activity to particular claims or claimants, par-
ticularly in the interrelated world of mass torts.
In many cases, however, courts have required equal sharing of
defense costs by insurers whose indemnity liability is allocated ac-
cording to policy limits.1°5 According to a more recent Second Cir-
cuit decision, "[u]nder New York law, insurers are obligated to con-





But allocation of defense costs in the case law differs from al-
location of indemnity responsibility for large scale torts in an em-
pirical sense. As noted above, most of the courts endorsing alloca-
tion among multiyear liability insurers have endorsed proration by
207time on the risk. However, in the average case of defense cost
apportionment, the claim at issue falls within one time period but
multiple insurers are implicated. Consequently, in non-mass tort,
non-latency cases, proration by time on the risk has historically
(E.D.N.Y.), affd, 836 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1987). Accord Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v.
Home Indem. Co., 650 F. Supp. 785, 792 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 232 F. Supp. 76, 84 (D. Mont. 1964); National
Indem. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 724 P.2d 544, 545 (Ariz. 1986); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Home Ins. Indem. Co., 351 A.2d 891, 895 (N.H. 1976).
204. See Cablevision, 662 F. Supp. at 1540.
205. See, e.g., Emons Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 481 F. Supp.
1022, 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Mission Ins. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 517
N.E.2d 463, 467-68 (N.Y. 1988); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 326
N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). In the Second Circuit's opinion in CabLe-
vision, equal division of defense costs was required. See Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevi-
sion Sys. Dev. Co., 836 F.2d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1987).
206. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Executive Ins. Co., 893 F.2d 517, 520
(2d Cir. 1990).
207. See supra Part II.D.1.
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taken a back seat to other methodology. The majority approach
appears to be proration among insurers according to respective
policy limits." s A significant number of courts use equal shares ap-
209
portionment in this situation. It is important to note, however,
that many of the cases on this issue involve concurrent responsibil-
ity of multiple insurers when more than one policy during the same
policy period is triggered, rather than consecutive responsibility
when policies in series are triggered over time.
In addition to utilizing the equal shares method as an alterna-
tive to proration by policy limits or time on the risk, a number of
cases hold that in cases of multiple applicable policies, each insurer
is independently liable to the policyholder for defense cost obliga-
tions. But insurers usually have apportionment rights vis-a-vis
each other regarding defense costs. As one court put it:
[W]hile liability may never eventuate, defense costs are
inevitable.
Here, where it has been determined that each insurer is
fully liable to plaintiff for indemnification, "it follows" that
each is fully liable for defense costs without proration to
the insured and subject to contribution or in accordance
with any "other insurance" clauses in the policies. Unless
a complaint on its face precludes the possibility that any
portion of the continuous process of injury fell within the
policy period of a policy, that policy creates an obligation
for the entire cost of defense against the claim. When
more than one insurer was on the risk during this period
of continuous injury, they are jointly and severally liable to
plaintiff for costs of defending the suit.
21
208. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEwMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 6.02[a] (8th ed. 1995).
209. See id. § 6.03. It appears that one insurer has defended to conclusion
(and even paid the judgment or settlement) and then sought contribution from
another implicated insurer rather than the policyholder. See id. §§ 6.01-6.03. The
only cases not fitting this generalization are the cases involving long-length losses
such as asbestos or pollution where the insurers have successfully argued that self-
insured policyholders should bear proportional responsibility for defense costs
when the loss encompasses both insured and self-insured periods. See id. §
6.02[a] [2].
210. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Group v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 734,
735 (Conn. 1974); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 372 So. 2d 960, 963
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Associated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 436
N.E.2d 1333 (N.Y. 1982), afg439 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
211. Lac D'Amiante Du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Home Assur. Co., 613 F.
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This is in accord with the general view that the duty to defend (or
duty to reimburse reasonable defense costs) is both broader than
the duty to indemnify and cannot be avoided unless the insurer can
demonstrate as a matter of law that the third-party claim cannot fall
212within coverage.
This nonapportionment position also squares with that part of
duty to defend law that considers insurers responsible for defend-
ing the entire case so long as any one of the allegations (regardless
of the truth of the allegations) falls within coverage. 21' Logically, if
an insurer cannot confine defense costs to the covered aspects of a
claim, it should not be able to obtain a reduction or limitation in its
defense obligations simply because other insurers are also impli-
cated. Under the governing contract with the policyholder, each
insurer is obligated to defend or pay for defense costs. In light of
this ironclad truth of insurance law, it would make little sense to at-
tempt to identify defense expenses as generic or case-specific and
to attempt to apportion them when the insurer is typically not
permitted even to apportion responsibility between covered and
uncovered aspects of a given case.
Other cases permit apportionment of defense costs among in-
surers as a matter of equity, but appear not to perform the alloca-
tion at the outset of the litigation but after defense and payment-
214by at least one applicable insurer-has taken place. However, to
the extent that courts differ on defense and indemnity allocation,
there is some tendency for courts to resist allocating defense costs
Supp. 1549, 1563 (D.N.J. 1985) (applying pre-Owens-llinois NewJersey law).
212. See, e.g., John Deere Ins. Co. v. Shamrock Indus., 929 F.2d 413, 417 (8th
Cir. 1991) (applying Minnesota law); Avondale Indus., Inc., v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1205 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying New York law); Centennial Ins.
Co. v. Applied Health Care Sys. Inc., 710 F.2d 1288, 1292 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying
California law); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 601 F.2d 1136,
1141 (10th Cir. 1979) (applying Oklahoma law); Villa Charlotte Bronte, Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 476 N.E.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. 1985). See also Federal Ins.
Co. v. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co., 662 F. Supp. 1537, 1539 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("In-
demnification liability is inherently limited, whereas the duty to defend is essen-
tially limitless.").
213. See, e.g., Foreman v. Continental Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir.
1985); Continental Cas. Co. v. Synalloy Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1523, 1545 (S.D. Ga.
1983); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272, 275-76 (N.Y. 1984).
214. See, e.g., National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Ins. Co., 650 F.
Supp. 1404, 1413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. LiMauro, 482
N.E.2d 13, 17 (N.Y. 1985).
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even where the court is receptive to allocation generally.2 ' When
allocation is utilized, proration by policy limits or equal shares pro-
ration appears comparatively more popular than proration by time,
216
at least as compared to the indemnity allocation cases.
4. Allocation to the Policyholder Specifically
Notwithstanding judicial reluctance to divide and apportion
defense costs, at least at the outset of the case, significant case law
supports allocation to the policyholder for self-insured or unin-
sured periods for defense costs as well as indemnity. 217 For the most
part, courts endorsing allocation of insurer coverage responsibili-
ties by time on the risk, like the Domtar court, have also, when
forced to decide the issue, endorsed allocating pro rata coverage
burden to the policyholder. However, as noted above, case law is
almost evenly divided regarding the wisdom of pro rata allocation
2181
by time even among triggered insurers. Many courts hold that
the policyholder should not be restricted in tapping applicable in-
surance even where the policyholder is not itself required to pay a• . 219
portion of covered claims.
215. See, e.g., Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 769-70 (6th
Cir. 1992) (applying Michigan law) (refusing to allocate defense cost obligations
of multiple insurers and policyholder at outset of litigation but suggesting that al-
location to policyholder for self-insured periods is apt).
216. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co., 836 F.2d 54, 57-58
(2d Cir. 1987) (applying New York law and utilizing equal share proration); Con-
tinental Cas. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 823 F.2d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1987) (apply-
ing Connecticut law); Transport Indem. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 535 F.2d 232,
238-39 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying Pennsylvania law and prorating based on policy
limits, the default rule absent other factors suggesting different formula); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 683 F. Supp. 1139, 1173 (W.D.
Mich. 1988) (utilizing equal share proration); National Grange, 650 F. Supp. at
1413; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 986, 989-90 (W.D.
Pa. 1984) (utilizing equal share allocation among two primary insurers under
Pennsylvania law prior to JH. France Reftactories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502
(Pa. 1993)). See alsoJH. France, 626 A.2d at 508-09 (holding each insurer respon-
sible for defense cost without apportionment until policy limits exhausted by
judgment or settlement but defense cost obligations accrue seriatim from date of
first loss).
217. See, e.g., Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Assoc. Metals & Minerals
Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 372-73 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Texas law and prorating by
time, including to policyholder for periods of self-insurance); Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d 920, 924-25 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying Alabama
law and prorating defense obligations by time, including proration to policyholder
for self-insurance time periods).
218. Compare Part II.D.1 andPart II.D.2.
219. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1048 (D.C.
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A variant on the "allocation to the policyholder" approach has
held that the policyholder is responsible not according to a prora-
tion formula but according to the evidence as to the amount of in-
jury actually taking place during periods of self-insurance or no in-
surance. This approach, of course, has been rightly rejected by
both NSP and Domtar as too difficult, too expensive, too time-
consuming, and too likely to fail to achieve reliable determina-
tions.2
1
III. ERRONEOUS ALLOCATION: PROBLEMS OF THE DOMTAR
APPROACH
A. The Deficiencies ofDomtar
Although there is much that is sound about the Domtar opin-
ion, its assessment of the apportionment issue is unpersuasive as a
matter of law, policy language, the nature of insurance, the factual
context of multiyear claims, and the equitable concerns that pur-
port to animate the Domtar decision. What began in NSP as a
commendable but perhaps misapplied concern for efficient resolu-.... 222
tion of inter-insurer disputes, morphed in Domtar into an unnec-
Cir. 1981); SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 588, 601 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994), affd in part, rev'd in part, 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995); Dayton Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. National Gypsum Co., 682 F. Supp. 1403, 1410-11 (E.D. Tex. 1988),
rev' sub nom. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 896 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.
1990) (holding lack ofjurisdiction).
220. See, e.g., IMCERA Group, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d
583, 608-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
221. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn.
1997); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662-63
(Minn. 1994).
222. NSFs result is clearly more defensible than that of Domtar. NSP utilized a
prorata by time approach to allocate insurer responsibility and did not reduce the
policyholder's insurance benefits because of the length of time involved in the tor-
tious conduct at issue. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 663-64. But NSF's reasoning and
rigid temporal apportionment of coverage responsibility could easily operate to
deprive the policyholder of coverage for which it paid if one or more of the trig-
gered insurers is insolvent or its policy limits have previously been drawn down or
exhausted by other covered claims. In that case, the reduction in each insurer's
coverage liability because of proration could leave the policyholder without full
insurance even though the policyholder had purchased what would have been
adequate insurance but for the court's proration. Consequently, even though NSP
did not directly impose coverage responsibility upon the policyholder, it has that
potential and is erroneous to that degree. See infta Part III.B.6 (discussing the
need to adjust proration among insurers according to insolvencies, collectability
problems, and prior exhaustion of some triggered policies).
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essarily imposed mathematical formula that can work to strip poli-
cyholders of valid coverage.
1. Domtar Misunderstands the Meaning of the Policy Language
Ironically, the Domtar court seems to misunderstand the CGL
policy language despite the fact that it is so obviously concerned
with vindicating traditional contract principles that are applied to
insurance coverage disputes. In hanging on a few words in the
Domtar policies, the court committed the classic analytic mistake of
focusing on a tree while failing to see the forest. At the same time,
ironically, the court paid virtually no attention to the words of the
policy invoked by the policyholder in opposition to the proposed
allocation.
a. The "During The Policy Period" Language of the CGL is
Designed as a Marker and Triggering Point, Not as a
Limitation on the Scope of Coverage
In particular, the Domtar court seized on the provision of the
CGL that promised to pay on the policyholder's behalf "all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of injury to or destruction of tangible property, including
loss of use. "223 The Domtar policies also contained the typical CGL
language that the insurance applies only if the bodily injury or
property damage claimed by the third party occurs "during the pol-
icy period.
22 4
Following the wrong fork taken on the jurisprudential road in
NSP, the Domtar court seized on the "during the policy period" lan-
guage to hold that a triggered insurer in multiyear torts somehow is
no longer responsible for the damages resulting from a covered oc-
currence. 2 This interpretation of the "within the policy period" or
"during the policy period" language of a CGL is clearly wrong-
headed, as everyday insurance events illustrate.
For example, assume a policyholder's truck driver runs a red
223. Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 731.
224. Id. at 732. Today this language is found in the standard occurrence CGL
in essentially the same form as was found in the Domtar policies. See Insurance
Services Office, Commercial General Liability Policy, Form No. CG 00 01 01 96,
Section I.A.1.b (1994), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE
PROFESSIONALS' POLICY KIT: A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE INSURANCE FORMS 347 (1997-
98 ed.).
225. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 732-33.
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light and collides with another car, whose driver sues. The claim is
covered under the policyholder's CGL because the injured driver is
claiming actual injury resulting from a covered occurrence (em-
ployee negligence) that was allegedly inflicted on the third party
claimant during the policy period. However, as we all know, the
bodily injury damage to the third party claimant may extend for
years past the termination of the policy period during which the
auto accident took place. If the claimant was seriously injured
(e.g., confined to a wheelchair), the damages from the covered oc-
currence could extend for decades. No CGL insurer involved in
this situation would assert that its coverage responsibility ceased at
the conclusion of the policy period. The insurer would, quite
rightly, continue to pay medical bills, economic loss, pain-and-
suffering, and other valid damages so long as the policy limits had
not been exhausted.22 6
This scenario and variants of it are so common and so clear
that the "during the policy period" language cannot mean what the
226. Even a leading case favoring proration in complex multiyear matters rec-
ognizes that the "during the policy period" language cannot be read in the man-
ner set forth by the NSP court where conventional coverage matters are involved.
See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 988-89 (N.J. 1994). In
Owens-Illinois, the NewJersey Supreme Court observed that:
As to the Insurance Companies' argument that all injury (or damages)
must occur in the policy period or that indemnity is awarded for, only the
part of the injury that occurs during the policy period, consider the sim-
ple case of an automobile accident in 1994 with a definite prognosis that
an injured occupant's spine will deteriorate in 1996 resulting eventually
in paralysis. The policy in effect during 1994 must indemnify for all
damages attributable to the 1994 accident even though the full extent of
the damages or the injury will not take place until a future date.
Id.
However, the Owens-Illinois court nonetheless found allocation to the
policyholder by time and policy limits justified for asbestos claims (as a default rule
if specific factfinding could not be accomplished) both because of the significance
of policyholder periods of self-insurance and because of its view that the ultimate
total of damages to the claimant from different asbestos "hits" over several years
would be comprised of different amounts of damage from different trigging inju-
ries. See id. at 995. The Owens-Illinois court apparently thought that it was unfair
for a triggered policy period to be responsible for all damages in the multiyear as-
bestos context when some of the damage must have resulted from injury during
other policy periods. See id. at 992-93. Although this view is defensible, it is ulti-
mately not persuasive in view of the CGL policy language, the function of liability
insurance, the expectations of the parties, and the comparative unfairness of allo-
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NSP court suggested it meant (that the insurer was not responsible
for any damages taking place after the policy term but stemming
from an injury that began during the policy term) .227 The Domtar
court acknowledged this, but imperfectly, when it observed that
"[i] t is inaccurate to conclude that a CGL insurer is never liable for
damages occurring outside of the policy period."'22  Also, SCSC
would appear to apply to the auto accident hypothetical. There is a
discrete, identifiable event and damages flowing from the event.29
Even though damage continues into another policy period, the
230triggered policy will, under SCSC, continue to be responsible.
Notwithstanding SCSC and the discrete and identifiable event
exception to the application of NSP and Domtar, the illustration
above-and the SCSC case itself-demonstrates that the "during
the policy period" language of the CGL cannot mean what NSP and
Domtar suggest it means. In fact, under the language of the stan-
dard liability insurance policy-and virtually all liability policies-
the time period during which injury takes place is irrelevant once
the policy is triggered. Liability insurers, at least until NSP,
routinely paid for losses extending beyond the end of the policy
period in which injuries triggered application of the policy. The
routine is so firmly established that there is literally no pre-1980s
case law supporting the Domtar insurers' position. 31 In cases other
than high-stakes pollution and product liability claims such as NSP
and Domtar, this continues to be the norm. Only where there is a
great deal of money at stake coupled with an opportunity to impose
some of this cost on other insurers or the policyholder does one
find insurers advocating pro rata temporal allocation of coverage
responsibility. Although the argument is couched in terms of the
distinction between less visible continuous injury and more visible
227. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (quoting relevant language
in NSP).
228. Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733. The court then unnecessarily muddled this
welcome clarification of NSP by stating that the scope of the time period of cover-
age will vary according to policy language and the facts of the case. See id.
229. Cf SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn. 1995)
(holding a sudden and accidental occurrence triggered only CGL policies on the
risk during the year the damage arose).
230. See id.
231. There is, to be sure, case law that states that liability insurance is not trig-
gered until a third party alleged injury during the policy period and that the poli-
cyholder's negligence during the policy period does not trigger coverage unless
injury also takes place. See infra notes 248-57 (discussing Singsaas). However, as
detailed in that discussion, these are cases simply about whether triggering injury
takes place-they do not support the proposition that a policy is detriggered as to
any injury that has not terminated by the end of the policy period.
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between less visible continuous injury and more visible episodic in-
jury, one retains the suspicion that the insurer coverage position is
driven by economic stakes rather than legal distinctions.
If the auto accident hypothetical is turned into a product li-
ability hypothetical, the point becomes plainer. Assume that a cus-
tomer uses a widget in Year 1 through Year 5. During each year,
the widget gives off carcinogenic fumes that gradually destroy the
user's pancreatic function, eventually requiring removal of the or-
gan and serious physical consequences for the user. Although the
pancreas may not have been diagnosed as malfunctioning until
Year 5, there certainly has been some new actual injury to the pan-
creas during Years 1 through 5. The Year 2, Year 3, Year 4, and
Year 5 injury is not the continuous progression of the Year 1 injury
but instead represents new injury that triggers each year's CGL.
However, under NSP and Domtar, the coverage responsibility is to
be divided. If the policyholder had no insurance during a given
year or if some of the policies are exhausted, the effect of the allo-
cation is to reduce available coverage. By contrast, if all the widget
fumes are released during the first three months of use, only the
Year 1 policy is triggered and the policyholder is entitled to the full
benefits of this policy. This policyholder's insurance coverage will
not be reduced by forced allocation.
Thus, it should not be surprising that when confronted with al-
location arguments such as those presented by the Domtar insurers,
the California Supreme Court emphatically rejected the notion
that a triggered insurer could somehow become untriggered simply
because damage stemming from the triggering injury was ongo-
212ing. Summarizing the correct construction of the CGL, the court
observed:
In pertinent part, standard comprehensive or commer-
cial general liability insurance policies provide that the in-
surer has a duty to indemnify the insured for those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages for a covered claim .... It is triggered if specified
harm is caused by an included occurrence, so long as at
least some harm results within the policy period. It ex-
tends to all specified harm caused by an included occur-
rence, even if some such harm results beyond the policy
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period. In other words, if specified harm is caused by an
included occurrence and results, at least in part, within
the policy period, it perdures to all points of time at which
some such harm results thereafter. To illustrate by a hy-
pothetical similar to the present [groundwater pollution]
case: Insurer has a duty to indemnify Insured for those
sums that Insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages for property damage caused by its discharge of
hazardous substances, up to a limit of $1 million. Insured
discharges such a substance. It thereby causes property
damage to Neighbor's land, in the amount of $100,000
(determined by the cost of returning the soil to its origi-
nal condition), within the policy period of year 1. It
causes further damage of this sort as the substance spreads
under the surface, in the amount of $100,000 annually, in
year two through year thirty. Insured must pay Neighbor
$3 million in damages underjudgment. Insurer must pay. . .. . 233
Insured the limit of $1 million for indemnification.
In a footnote to this section, the court added:
In Montrose, we also made plain that "successive" insurers
"on the risk when continuous or progressively deteriorat-
ing [property] damage or [bodily] injury first manifests it-
self' are separately and independently "obligated to in-
demnify the insured." "[W]here successive.., policies
have been purchased, bodily injury and property damage
that is continuing or progressively deteriorating through-
out more than one policy period is potentially covered by
234all policies in effect during those periods.
The California Supreme Court recognized that this was not
"joint and several" liability imposed upon the insurers but was sim-
ply holding insurers to the terms of their contractual understand-
235ings with the policyholder. When coverage is triggered, insurers
233. Id. at 919-20 (citations and footnotes omitted). Accord Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 901 (Cal. 1995) ("[Ain insurer on the risk
when continuous or progressively deteriorating [property] damage or [bodily] in-
jury first manifests itself remains obligated to indemnify the insured for the en-
tirety of the ensuing damage or injury.").
234. Id. at 920 n.10 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
235. See id. at 920 n.10 (applying the regime adopted in California, "successive
insurers are not 'jointly and severally liable'").
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must provide coverage up to the applicable unexhausted policy
limits and may exempt themselves from coverage only if they can
prove that the third party claim "did not even possibly embrace any-- .. . .. ,236
triggering harm of the specified sort within its policy period ....
Essentially, the Domtar and NSP courts have it backwards. The
general rule is not that the insurer's liability is limited to only the
damage taking place within the policy period. Rather, the insurer
is usually responsible for all damages that proximately flow from an
injury beginning during the policy period. This is why liability in-
surers in ordinary tort claim coverage actions do not even think of
arguing that their responsibility ends merely because the calendar
has turned a page. For the normal tort and insurance claim, this is
the indisputable case. SCSC accepts this view for such "normal"
claims where the injury stems from a single, discrete, isolated
event.23 7 Most courts (except, unfortunately, perhaps the NSP and
Domtar courts) would find such insurer argument sanctionably
frivolous in the ordinary tort claim. If a CGL carrier cut off its poli-
cyholder on December 31 of the policy year while there remained
multimillion dollar mounting injuries by a paraplegic plaintiff aris-
ing out of an injury during the year, most courts would rightly con-
sider this an act of bad faith by the insurer. Somehow, NSP and
Domtar lost sight of this common sense notion of the meaning of
the typical liability insuring agreement. The court studied the
"during the policy period" language like a horticulturist examining
a tree, or perhaps a leaf on a tree-and failed to view the forest.
Read as a whole and with some appreciation for application of
the text of the insuring agreement to normal torts and coverage
disputes, it is clear that the damage "during the policy period" pro-
vision of the CGL must mean that the damage is required to begin
2381during the policy period. Once this happens, the insurer re-
236. Id. at 929. The Aerojet court at times refers to this principle as one that
permits the insurer to "allocate" responsibility for the tort to the policyholder. See
id. A more accurate description is that the insurer can avoid coverage by proving
lack of trigger if the insurer can demonstrate that no part of a multiple year injury
could have possibly occurred during its policy term. But this is not really alloca-
tion, it is simply the defeating of coverage. Under California law, once coverage is
established, none of it can be imposed back upon the policyholder through alloca-
tion due to the length of time that injury took place. See id. at 931-32.
237. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn. 1995).
238. Although much of the CGL pollution coverage litigation may be behind
the courts due to the insurance industry's use of the absolute pollution exclusion,
the issue of insurance industry attempts to cut off coverage obligations remains a
live issue. The current standard CGL language continues to state that the insur-
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mains responsible for all of the resulting damage from a covered
matter until the liability limit is exhausted.
This is the only reasonable interpretation of the CGL policy's
"during the policy period" language. Any other view would make
coverage turn on the mere happenstance of the time of the inci-
dent creating injury or the vagaries of an injury. For example, if
the hypothetical auto accident discussed above took place on Janu-
ary 1, the insurer would probably pay for most of the resulting li-
ability, even under the NSP/Domtar view of the insurer's temporal
responsibility. But if the accident took place late on December 31,
the insurer would be largely absolved of coverage responsibility
239under the NSP/Domtar rationale. Surely this is an absurd result by
any standard.
Another variant of this hypothetical illustrates the absurdity of
NSP/Domtar view of insurer responsibility when injuries extend for
several years. If in the hypothetical auto accident above, the other
driver was instantly killed by the Policyholder's truck, the insurer
would, even under NSP/SCSC/Domtar, be responsible for the entire
amount of the third party claim for wrongful death because the
damage has been incurred in total at the time of the accident.
2 40
But if the victim is only maimed rather than killed, he lives for years
ance applies "only if" the injury "occurs during the policy period." See Insurance
Services Office, Commercial General Liability Policy, Form No. CG 00 01 01 96,
Section I.A.b.2 (1994), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, THE INSURANCE
PROFESSIONALS' POLICY KIT: A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE INSURANCE FORMS 347 (1997-
98 ed.) As a matter of literal construction, the current language continues to be
better read as resisting any apportionment that reduces coverage, even if one is a
strict textualist. In the hypothetical negligence claim discussed in this article, for
example, there is no question that injury has "occurred during the policy period."
This remains the case (and the policy remains triggered and applicable) even if
the costs of the occurring injury continue to mount in subsequent years.
239. If the accident takes place at 11:30 p.m. or so, the insurer has the best of
all possible worlds. Coverage is triggered by the injury during the policy period,
but the resulting "damage" of any calculable amount does not take place until the
next year (even the emergency room medical bills are incurred outside the policy
period). The succeeding insurer will have no liability because the injury preceded
its policy period. Thus, under NSP/Domtar as applied to a simple but serious auto
accident with a third party claimant confined to a wheelchair for 50 years thereaf-
ter, the only triggered insurer pays perhaps a few thousand dollars of this multi-
million dollar claim. No reasonable auto insurer would take such a coverage posi-
tion and no sane court would endorse it.
240. Of course, under NSP/Domtar, it is also possible that notwithstanding the
immediate death of the third party, the court would hold that the damages from
this wrongful death (economic loss to the decedent's family) took place after the
end of the policy period. Such an application of the NSP/Domtar construction of
the CGL's "during the policy period" language would be doubly absurd.
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to come and incurs damages that become choate after the conclu-
sion of the policy period, thus allowing the triggered insurer to
prorate its coverage responsibility lower with each passing year.
This sort of result from NSP/Domtar proration would also be ab-
surd. It would harken back to the days before a cause of action for
wrongful death existed and where, from a tort liability standpoint,
the tortfeasor was better off killing his victim rather than injuring
him.2 41 If NSP/Domtar proration were applied to such cases, the ab-
surdity would merely be reversed: serious injury, bringing higher
tort damages overall, would impose dramatically lower insurance
coverage responsibility while death, because of its immediacy,
would result in full coverage responsibility. From an insurance
coverage standpoint under Domtar, the policyholder is better off
making a product that kills users instantly than a product that is al-
leged to cause gradual and recurring injury over time.
One possible means of reducing this type of absurdity from use
of the NSP/Domtar approach in other insurance matters is to utilize
the concept of an endpoint that is set forth in these cases but never
really explained. Both NSP and Domtar held that the time for pro
rata allocation of coverage responsibility ceased upon discovery of
the loss or completion of remediation efforts, although it was un-
clear which date was the preferred endpoint.24 The date on which
the injury becomes expected may serve as an endpoint because at
that point, the injury ceased to be an insurable event.2 43 Although
using this endpoint can prevent the types of absurd results outlined
241. Even after the enactment of wrongful death statutes, the absurdity often
continued because the maximum statutory amount recoverable under wrongful
death statutes was not increased according to inflation, while the costs of medical
expenses, economic loss, and pain and suffering continued to be calculated ac-
cording to contemporary standards in serious injury cases. As a result, it long re-
mained the case (and may still be the case today) that from a financial standpoint
a tortfeasor is better off killing the victim rather than seriously injuring the victim,
so long as the tort does not spur criminal prosecution for manslaughter. In addi-
tion, the deadly tortfeasor has the practical advantage at trial of not having to face
a live but maimed plaintiff who can both give testimony and serve as a reminder to
the jury of the seriousness of the injury.
242. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn.
1997); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662-64
(Minn. 1994).
243. Accord Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1390-
91 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Minnesota law and allocating the coverage responsi-
bility of insurers only over the period of time when sexual abuse by a priest took
place rather than over the period of ensuing years during which the victims of
abuse continued to suffer damage, suggesting that, once triggered, an insurer re-
mained on the risk for time of ensuing damage).
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in the auto accident hypothetical above, it does not comport with
the NSP/Domtar pronouncements of the meaning of the "during
the policy period" language. 244 The NSP and Domtar courts stated
that the proper reading of the CGL policy language was that insur-
ers were only liable for the damage that took place during the in-
245surer's policy period . If this is the meaning attached by the
court, lack of trigger or fortuity in subsequent years may avoid pro-
ration but does not undo the incorrect interpretation of the CGL
language.
Similarly, a defender of the NSP and Domtar decisions could
argue that prorata allocation takes place only where more than one
insurer is triggered due to continuous injury, thereby muting the
really absurd result of having a single triggered liability insurer
have its coverage responsibility lopped off on December 31 even
though large damages continue to flow from a clearly triggered in-
cident. But if this is the case, there nonetheless is no basis for as-
signing coverage responsibility to the policyholder merely because
the injury spans years. As the SCSC decision indicates, NSP and
Domtar appear to concede that under Minnesota law a policyholder
suffers no reduction in coverage from a large loss from a single epi-
sodic event where significant damage becomes realized entirely
within the policy period from one triggering event.' 46 However, a
policyholder incurring liability exposure because of several trigger-
ing events across the years is thrust into the position of the policy-
holder with the truck accident claim: coverage is reduced because
of the multiyear nature of the injuries. Unless the coverage pur-
chased by the policyholder is fully tapped, this result, too, is absurd
in that it deprives the policyholder of coverage because it had the
misfortune of dying from a thousand cuts rather than a single slash-
ing blow.
The general rule that a triggered insurer is responsible for all
losses flowing from the claim (until exhaustion of policy limits) also
has the jurisprudential advantage of avoiding the absurd results
that would exist if the NSP/Domtar view of the meaning of the term
247were applied to ordinary tort and insurance claims.
244. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 731-33; NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 662-64.
245. See Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 732-33; NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 662-64.
246. See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text (discussing the SCSC deci-
sion).
247. Imagine, for example, if the NSP/Domtar view were the rule for the hypo-
thetical truck collision discussed above. Knowing that insurance would cease at
the end of the policy period, the prudent policyholder would seek to settle all
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Upon reflection, the "during the policy period" language
properly interpreted merely amplifies the actual injury trigger of
coverage, no more and no less. CGL coverage is triggered by a
claim of negligence-induced injury that took place during the pol-
icy period. If the damages from the injury continue beyond the
policy period, the insurer remains responsible. This is an inargu-
able norm of insurance law (and tort law) that argues against any
allocation to the policyholder. The insurer by contract has as-
sumed the risk of damages levied against the policyholder for cov-
ered occurrences causing injury during the policy term. The fact
that the injury is not cabined within a given year is irrelevant.
An insurance policy that did not operate in this manner would
be a materially different product-and a much less valuable one
unlikely to be purchased by any sane policyholder, except perhaps
at salvage yard, bargain basement rates. But the NSP/Domtar inter-
pretation of the "during the policy period" language effectively
converts a normal liability policy into this type of inferior product
with dramatically but silently reduced coverage varying according
to the nature of the third-party claim. Furthermore, the insurer al-
ready utilizes many other, more legitimate means of delimiting its
exposure: policy limits (both occurrence and aggregate); specific
exclusions; self-insured retentions; refusal to renew; extended tail
coverage; and use of the claims-made form.
The NSP/Domtar misinterpretation of the "during the policy
period" language appears to result in part from a misinterpretation
of an inarguably correct Minnesota precedent: Singsaas v.• . 248
Diederich. In Singsaas, the policyholder in Year 1 (when it had li-
claims instantaneously because its insurance coverage, like Cinderella's carriage,
was to turn into a pumpkin at the stroke of midnight. This type of policyholder
behavior, of course, is not to be encouraged as it would often result in settlement
of meritless claims or overpayment of claims.
In most CGL policies, the insurer controls the defense and settlement of
the matter. Although this may obviate the above problem, it creates another prob-
lem: horrendously intricate bad faith cases. What if the insurer-controlled counsel
defends a claim vigorously and refuses an early settlement offer? Is this bad faith
because the insurer knows that all it need do is "run out the clock" on the policy
period and then walk away from the defense? Clearly, the insurer would have this
incentive if the NSP/Domtar rationale were seriously applied to regular tort claims.
Only a hyperactive, nitpicking, look-over-your-shoulder type of bad faith law would
prevent these incentives from creating mischief. This could, at least in theory,
protect policyholders, but it would also impose significant costs and inefficiencies
upon the insurance industry.
248. 307 Minn. 153, 238 N.W.2d 878 (1976).
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ability insurance from Insurer A) performed negligent work."' In
Year 2, the policyholder ceased business and canceled its insur-250
ance. Later in Year 2, a third person was injured and rendered a
paraplegic due to the negligence. 25' The policyholder argued that
the Year 1 coverage was triggered by the negligent acts taking place
during Year 1.252 The supreme court correctly rejected this argu-
ment because the CGL policy language provided that it was trig-
gered by "bodily injury" during the policy period rather than "neg-
ligence" during the policy period. Even if the Year 1 actions of
the policyholder created a "time bomb" of sorts, CGL coverage did
not become effective until the bomb went off, which happened in
Year 2, a time when the policyholder had no insurance in force.
Unfortunately, the NSP court lost sight of the simple, elegant,
correct interpretation and holding of Singsaas by focusing on the
language of Singsaas and other cases that the CGL is triggered and
the insurer responsible only for damages taking place during the
policy period. When Singsaas and similar cases are read carefully
rather than merely seized upon for a sound bite-like quotation, it is
clear that what Singsaas meant by this statement was that injury
255rather than negligence is the trigger of coverage. Singsaas never
intended its statement that insurers are liable only for damage tak-
ing place during the policy period to mean that insurer responsibil-
ity for an injury beginning "on its watch" ends when the policy pe-
riod expires. There remain the litigation and financial
consequences to the policyholder because of the triggering in-
jury-and these can go on for years. Properly read, Singsaas stands
for the proposition that CGL coverage is triggered by injury during
that policy period and that the triggered policy is responsible for
256
the damages flowing from the triggering injury. As in the auto-
mobile accident hypothetical above, there is no termination of in-
surer responsibility merely because the year of the injury ends. For
example, in Singsaas itself, if there had been applicable CGL cover-
age in Year 2, the CGL would not only have been triggered by the
249. See id. at 155, 238 N.W.2d at 879-80.
250. See id. at 155, 238 N.W.2d at 880.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 156, 238 N.W.2d at 881.
253. See id. at 155-56, 238 N.W.2d at 880.
254. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662
(Minn. 1994).
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Year 2 injury but the CGL insurer would have been required to de-
fend the ensuing litigation (undoubtedly extending beyond Year 2)
and the lifetime of damages incurred by the paraplegic claimant
(during Years 3, 4, and beyond) until policy limits were ex-
hausted.257
The supreme court appears to have recognized this in other
contexts. For example, in SCSC, the court stated that the language
of the CGL "requires the insurer to pay all damages causally related
to an item of property damage under the policy definitions." 25 In
other cases since Singsaas (and since NSPfor that matter), the court
has focused on whether actual injury took place during the policy
period, not whether all of the damage from the injury took place
during the policy period.9  Cases prior to NSP may use language
supporting the strange construction of the "during the policy pe-
riod" language. On closer examination, however, it is clear that
these cases involve the onset of injury during the policy period
(which must take place during the policy period if there is to be
coverage) rather than damage from the injury (which need not be
confined to the policy period for coverage to apply).260 The same is
true of authorities or cases outside of Minnesota that because of
imprecise language can be quoted as suggesting limits on the cov-
257. See id. at 157-58, 238 N.W.2d at 880-81.
258. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn. 1995)
(citing Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Concrete Units, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 751, 757
(Minn. 1985)).
259. See, e.g., Fairview Hosp. & Health Care Serv. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 535 N.W.2d 337, 341-42 (Minn. 1995) (stating that a CGL policy is triggered
when the actual injury occurs). See also SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 312-13 (distinguish-
ing between injury and damages from the injury implicitly).
260. See, e.g., Jostens, Inc. v. CNA Ins./Continental Cas. Co., 403 N.W.2d 625,
630 (Minn. 1987), overruled by Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). The court in Jostens stated that: "Singsaas compels the
conclusion that damages awarded for work experience accrued outside of the pol-
icy period are not covered by the policy but are instead damages for which Jostens
is solely responsible." Id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. at 8, Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997) (Nos.
C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638).
Reading the Jostens v. CNA case as a whole, it is clear that the court re-
ferred to distinct injury caused byjob discrimination (the underlying claim at issue
inJostens), and not to the damages flowing from an incident or practice ofjob dis-
crimination. See also Reliance Ins. Co. v. Arneson, 322 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn.
1982), cited in Brief of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Associa-
tion at 16 n.17, Domtar (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638) (stating Re-
liance stands for the proposition that the "insurer has no duty to indemnify for
harm taking place after expiration of policy").
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261erage responsibility of a triggered insurer.
b. The "All Sums" Language in the Domtar CGL Buttresses
the Case Against Allocation But is Not Essential to It
In view of the Domtar court's narrow and hyperliteral construc-
tion of the "during the policy period" text of the policy, it is most
odd that the court placed almost no emphasis on the "all sums"
text of the policy.162 The Domtar CGL stated that the insurer would
pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to
263pay" because of the covered matter.
Either one is a textual literalist or one is not. If the "during
the policy period" language is entitled to literal application, so is
the "all sums" language. But the Domtar court gave the former rev-
264erential treatment while essentially ignoring the latter.
A more reasonable and nuanced interpretation of the contract
terms would read the words of both provisions in the context of the
entire policy and its purpose. So read, it is the case that the CGL
insurers did indeed commit themselves to paying all damages flow-
ing from an injury taking place during the policy term so long as
261. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental Litigation Asso-
ciation at 16 n.17, Domtar (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638) (citing
Wrecking Corp. of Am., Va., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 574 A.2d 1348, 1351
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Continental Cas. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 859 S.W.2d 789,
791 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); 9 MARKS. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 39:203, at
648 (rev. 1985)). The IELA brief referred to Wrecking Corp. for the proposition
that "coverage is limited to damage occurring while the policy is in effect," and
used Medical Protective for the notion that "none of the [insurers] agreed to pay
damages... which occurred before the inception of coverage or after the termi-
nation of coverage." See id. However, the quotation from Wrecking Corp. is wrested
from context. In that case, much as in Singsaas, the policyholder's negligence
prior to cancellation of the liability policy resulted in injury-but the injury did
not take place until after cancellation, of insurance. The Wrecking Corp. court
merely applied the standard rule that it is injury rather than negligence that trig-
gers CGL coverage. See Wrecking Corp., 574 A.2d at 1349. Wrecking Corp. does not
support the view that coverage flowing from trigger terminates when the policy
period expires. See id. at 1351.
In addition, Medical Protective does require proration because of the cumu-
lative impact of the injury (flowing from forty-eight visits to the doctor defendant
in a malpractice case). See Medical Protective, 859 S.W.2d at 790-92. However, the
allocation imposed by the Medical Protective court was only between insurers and
nothing was imposed upon the policyholder. See id. at 792. Consequently, neither
of the cases cited by IELA stands for the proposition for which it is advanced.
262. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 731-32 (Minn.
1997).
263. Id.
264. See id. at 732.
1999]
69
Stempel: Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
the damages, whenever realized or reduced to monetary form, were
proximately related to the covered injury. "All" does not mean
even the most attenuated of damages or damages that are other-
wise subject to a specific and well-understood exclusion from cov-
erage. "All sums", however, read reasonably as part of the entire
CGL, strongly suggests that each triggered insurer's responsibility
for coverage is restricted only by policy limits or specific exclusions
rather than any accidents of time, medicine, or litigation after the
occurrence of the triggering event.
Using this approach, the subsequent change in standard CGL
language from "all sums" (the language that prevailed until the
1980s) to "those sums" (the current language found in the stan-
265dard CGL) does not make a difference in case outcomes. Rather
than hanging on hyperliteralisms, construction of the CGL should
be based on a reasonable interpretation that accomplishes the pur-
pose of the CGL consistent with party intent and expectations. Re-
sisting attempts to reduce the policyholder's bought-and-paid-for
triggered coverage is a worthy judicial goal that should not be de-
feated by inordinate attachment to the "during the policy period"
language. Similarly, undue emphasis on the "all sums" language
should not run roughshod over other aspects of insurance policy
construction. But in cases like Domtar, the "all sums" language of
the CGL has teeth that should not have been defanged by the
court, particularly a court so fixated on the misleading "during the
policy period" language.
c. Although the Ambiguity Principle Should Not Be So Broadly
Construed as to Uniformly Require Insurer Liability, Insurers
Must Be Held Responsible for Their Choice of Policy
Provisions and Text
To restate the obvious: insurance policies are normally drafted
by insurers. Although on relatively rare occasion brokers (who
usually act as agents of the policyholder) or policyholders them-
selves may draft policy language, insurance policies are in the main
standardized policies written by the insurance industry. Although
large policyholders may have wealth, sophistication about insur-
ance matters, and the advice of brokers and counsel, the choice of
265. See, e.g., Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Policy,
Form No. CG 00 01 01 96, Section I.A.1 (1994), reprinted in ALLIANCE OFAMERICAN
INSURERS, THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS' POLICY KIT: A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE
INSURANcE FORMS 347 (1997-98 ed.).
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even these "sophisticated" policyholders is generally limited to se-
lecting among policy language options offered by the insurance in-
dustry. The insurer may permit the policyholder to add a particu-
lar endorsement (for an additional premium), but the policyholder
almost never is permitted to draft the endorsement.
66
The insurer's effective control over policy language is, of
course, the reason that insurance policies are particularly subject to
the standard contract law rule of contra proferentem-ambiguous
contract language is construed against the drafter-unless the am-
biguity can be resolved by reference to other aspects of the policy
or extrinsic evidence of party intent or purpose of the contract, in-
cluding any customary meaning accorded to the terminology."'
A corollary of the ambiguity principle is that it is particularly
apt to apply contra proferentem in interpreting insurance policies
where any ambiguous policy language could easily have been more•. 268
clearly drafted by the author of the policy. Regarding appor-
tionment of liability, insurers have long been in an excellent posi-
tion to set forth-in the text of the CGL-any desired apportion-
ment scheme applicable to multiyear, multioccurrence torts.
Having failed to do so, any uncertainty as to whether apportion-
ment is required and the means of apportionment should be con-
strued in a manner more favorable to policyholders than to insur-
ers. A substantial vice of the NSP and Domtar decisions is their
insistence on taking exactly the opposite approach-despite the
strong recent precedent applying ambiguity analysis to determine
that pollution cleanup costs ordered by the government constitute
damages within the meaning of the pre-1986 CGL.269 In the face of
uncertainty, NSP and Domtar reward the insurers and punish the
266. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the "Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in
Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 807, 849 (1993) (concluding that
the sophistication of the policyholder does not justify a departure from the use of
the contra proferentem rule of construing ambiguous language against the drafter
since even sophisticated policyholders are seldom the authors of insurance policy
language).
267. See generally STEMPEL, supra note 18, at ch. 5 (discussing the ambiguity doc-
trine at length).
268. See George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385 N.E.2d
1062, 1065 (N.Y. 1978) ("Had that been their [the contract authors'] intention,
surely no problem of draftsmanship would have stood in the way of its being
spelled out.").
269. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
175, 180-81 (Minn. 1990) (explaining that it is consistent with the reasonable ex-
pectations of the insured that cleanup costs will be recovered under the policy).
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policyholders.
Perhaps the best evidence of the insurance industry's ability to
address the multiyear allocation problem and failure to do so is the
"other insurance" clause found in most liability policies."' The
standard CGL and other liability policies typically contain an "other
insurance" clause that speaks to the issue of respective coverage re-. . 271
sponsibility when more than one policy applies. Non-liability
policies, such as first-party medical insurance or workers compensa-
tion policies have a functionally equivalent provision that may be
labeled either an "other insurance" or "coordination of benefits"
272clause. The "other insurance" clause in liability policies generally
provides that the instant policy shall either be excess to any other
triggered policy, prorated by policy limits with other applicable
policies, or perhaps may seek to absolve the insurer should other
insurance be applicable (the so-called "escape" clause).273 Where
"other insurance" clauses conflict, jurisdictions vary in their ap-
274proach. Many prorate coverage responsibility while others have a
hierarchy of policy 
provisions.27r-
The "other insurance" clause of the CGL could be treated as
an allocation provision for multiyear coverage matters. Indeed, the
276important decision in Keene, suggested that the "other insurance"
270. See Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Policy, Form
No. CG 00 01 01 96, Section IV.4 (1994), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN
INSURERS, THE INSURANCE PROFESSIONALS' POLICY KIT: A COLLECTION OF SAMPLE
INSURANCE FORMS 355 (1997-98 ed.).
271. See id.
272. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, ch. 13 (regarding coordination of coverage
generally)
273. See id. § 13.02 (describing types of clauses).
274. See id. § 13.03.
275. See id. (describing the treatment of conflicting or inconsistent "other in-
surance" clauses by the courts). Where two excess or escape clauses conflict, pro-
ration is normally ordered. See id. Many courts, particularly in the latter part of
the twentieth century, have found any conflict to require proration, either by
equal shares or according to policy limits. See id. The leading case of this genre is
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 341 P.2d 110, 119 (Or. 1959),
which holds that when any "other insurance" clause conflicts with that of another
insurer, the clause should be completely rejected.
Where a proration clause and an excess or escape clause are present and
a Lamb-Weston approach is not used, the insurer with the proration clause usually
must pay first. However, some courts refuse to enforce escape clauses on public
policy or unconscionability grounds, reasoning that the application of the clause
renders the coverage illusory by removing it merely because another insurance
policy is also triggered. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 13.03 n.19.
276. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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clauses be used in assigning coverage responsibility among insur-
ers.27 The NSP court, following the lead of the Hickman and
DeYoung article on allocation, found that "other insurance"
clauses apjly only where insurers are concurrently responsible for
coverage. In cases of consecutive insurer responsibility, NSP and
Domtar turned instead to their rule of proration by time on the risk
as a matter of law.280 Even if not strictly applicable, however, the
"other insurance" provisions might be used as a guide. Interest-
ingly, the standard other insurance clauses (excess, pro rata, and
escape) do not attempt to assign any coverage responsibility to the
policyholder-all such clauses speak only of dividing the coverage
burden among insurers. Only "other insurers" are expected to
shoulder a triggered insurer's burden of coverage.
The NSP and Domtar courts, and the commentators on whom
they rely, may have committed a classification error in dividing
cases of multiple coverage into the fixed realms of "concurrent"
and "consecutive" triggering. Although the string of insurers trig-
gered by years of asbestos or pollution injury are in a different posi-
tion than two automobile policies triggered by an accident involv-
ing two separate vehicles, the distinctions are not especially
dramatic. In each case, the task before the court is to ensure that
all parties to the loss event pay their fair share. In the case of con-
current insurer responsibility from the auto accident, the clear rule
is that the insurers divide up the responsibility in some form. The
fully insured drivers are not responsible except for deductibles and
amounts exceeding the applicable policy limits. There is no good
reason that this same general principle of fairness and fidelity to
277. See id. at 1050.
278. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 660-
63 (Minn. 1994) (citing Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98, at 293); see also supra
notes 107-09 and accompanying discussion.
279. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 664 (disapproving court of appeals discussion of
"other insurance" clauses because "other insurance" provisions apply only where
there is an "allocation problem between multiple insurance policies concurrently
liable for damages arising out of a single, discrete occurrence" but not "where
there is no concurrent liability"); see also Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98, at
305-06 (taking the position that other insurance clauses have no application to is-
sue of apportioning coverage responsibility for consecutively triggered policies);
supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing NSP court's reliance on
Hickman & DeYoung article as authoritative and problematic aspects of that reli-
ance).
280. See supra notes 64, 101-06 and accompanying discussion; see also NSP, 523
N.W.2d at 662-64 (describing its choice of a seemingly fixed apportionment
method as one born of equity and convenience).
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the insuring agreement should not prevail in the context of
multiyear (or consecutive) triggering. In each case, the policy-
holder should be entitled to full insurance benefits purchased to
protect the policyholder from the financial consequences of such
triggering events.
As a matter of classification, the multiyear triggering brought
about by the nature of asbestos and pollution injuries is perhaps
more accurately described as "overlapping" coverage or triggering,
rather than "consecutive" triggering. The latter term implies some
passing of the baton from one insurer to another. But as the ex-
amples above illustrate, the baton should not be passed along a
string of insurers as much as new batons are added to the load be-
cause new triggering injury keeps taking place over the years. Con-
sequently, the insurers' responsibilities do overlap, much like the
"concurrent" coverage responsibilities of automobile, property, and
general liability insurers for single event losses involving multiple
policies.
As the NSP court correctly noted, determining how much of
the damage total stems from the Year 1 injury, the Year 2 inju 7 ,
and so on is a daunting and perhaps scientifically impossible task.
But as the NSP court also correctly noted, the difficulty of the calcu-
lation should not impose undue burdens on the policyholder or
the courts. 212 A presumptive rule of apportionment makes sense for
these types of overlapping coverages extending over several years-
but only if the policyholder is required to pay only after applicable
insurance has been collected. Anything else promotes the absurd
result of punishing the policyholder because it faced more strung
out liability rather than less compressed liability claims. In effect,
Domtar's application of NSP gives less to the policyholder that needs
more (and has paid for more).
Aside from suggesting that proration to the policyholder was
never intended (at least not ex ante) by insurers and that this is anti-
thetical to the insurer-policyholder relationship, the "other insur-
ance" clauses of the CGL are important for another reason. These
clauses demonstrate beyond doubt that insurers realized the poten-
tial of multipolicy triggering and the possibility of drafting policy
language to address such situations. Indeed, the standard CGL in-
cludes the "other insurance" clause for just this purpose. Insurers
281. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 663.
282. See supra note 101 and accompanying discussion.
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could have included language addressing the issue of respective
coverage responsibility when there is consecutive triggering of dif-
ferent CGLs in different policy periods due to a multiyear or in-
sidious damage claim. But instead of drafting such language and
including it in the CGL, insurers said nothing on the subject. This
suggests that insurers had no intent of attempting to change the
general rule that triggered insurers are responsible for all damage
flowing from the triggering event and claim. At a minimum, the
CGL is ambiguous on the point-ambiguous because of the failings
of the insurance industry. Under these circumstances, the correct
judicial response is to require insurers to bear the cost of this fail-
ing rather than to impose the cost on policyholders through the
Domtar methodology.
2. Misconstruing the Nature of Liability Insurance
The Domtar court's misinterpretation of the text of the CGL
probably flows in significant part from an overly literal and frag-
mented reading of the "during the policy period" language of the
CGL.283 Also at work is a fundamental misunderstanding of the na-
ture of liability insurance and the respective equities between in-
surer and policyholder. An operating premise of Domtar is that
policyholders are given an undue benefit if they are not required to
absorb some pro rata share of a tort claim even though there exists
sufficient insurance (purchased by the policyholder) to satisfy the
claim. This premise is used, sometimes tacitly, by courts demand-
ing allocation to the policyholder, to suggest that any absence of
insurance or "gap" in a string of CGL policies somehow demon-
strates irresponsibility by the policyholder-irresponsibility for
which the policyholder must be punished by being forced to pay
some of an insured loss out of the policyholder's own pocket.
In effect, courts mandating allocation to the policyholder on
this basis are treating commercial entities like some sort of actuarial
juvenile delinquent. The court attempts to punish policyholders
for being "bad boys" who self-insured. Presumably, "good boys" are
the policyholders who dutifully purchased seamless insurance with-
out interruption, just as the insurance industry hoped they would.
Although this may be prudent risk management, failure to consis-
tently purchase CGL protection does not justify stripping the poli-
cyholder of the CGL coverage it did buy and rely upon.
283. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
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In a case decided subsequent to NSP and Domtar, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court rejected this sort of reasoning, specifically dis-
approving prominent cases that had utilized it.284 Commenting on
the "equitable" rationale invoked by insurers to reduce policy-
holder coverage through allocation, the court stated:
In answering the question of allocation of defense costs as
it did [by requiring proration to the policyholder], the
Court of Appeal erred to the extent that it strayed away
from the contractual/quasi-contractual analysis set out
[earlier in this opinion] in the direction of vague "fair-
ness" and "rough justice."
285
The Aerojet court in particular criticized the arguments in favor
of "fairness to insurers" found in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insur-
ance Co., 28 6 stating:
It is perhaps in Owens-Illinois that the concern with "fair-
ness" and 'Justice" instead of contract and quasi-contract
is most evident. There, the New Jersey Supreme Court
stated: "When periods of no insurance" along with periods
of insurance "reflect a decision by an actor to assume or
retain a risk, as opposed to periods when coverage for a
risk is not available, to expect the risk-bearer to share in
the allocation is reasonable." Only if one's expectation
ignores contract in favor of "fairness" and 'Justice." For if
284. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 930
(Cal. 1997).
285. Id. at 930 (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, the Aerojet court
specifically singled out Gulf Chemical & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying Texas law); Insurance Co. of
North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying
Illinois and New Jersey law), clarified on rehearing, 657 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1981),
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co., 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. 1994), and Sharon Steel
Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997), for this criticism.
See id. at 930 n.22. Not coincidentally, these cases, particularly Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, are the mainstay of many insurer arguments for allocation to the policy-
holder. Forty-Eight Insulations was invoked and quoted by Domtar's insurers and
the insurer amici in Domtar. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Insurance Environmental
Litigation Association ("IELA") at 16-18, Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563
N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997) (Nos. C9-95-2673, CO-95-2626, and C7-95-2638).
286. 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. 1994). Cf Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Man-
agement Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1203 (2d Cir. 1995) (viewing Owens-Illinois as one of
the "best" reasoned decisions on coverage and apportionment). See supra quoted
text accompanying note 187.
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an actor shifts a risk in some periods and not in others, so
far as contract is concerned its omission should generally
have the same effect whether it finds its genesis in choice
2817or in compulsion.
As the California decision emphasizes, Domtar's allocation doc-
trine is something of an "unreasonable expectations" doctrine op-
218erating in favor of insurers. Contract language favoring the poli-
cyholder is subordinated to reduce insurer liability for no basis
other than that it seems somehow "unfair" that so many insurers
should be responsible for years of liability claims. What the Domtar
court ignored was that its decision worked greater unfairness upon
the policyholder in addition to failing to give the policyholder the
full benefit of its contract rights.
Even where the policyholder had seamless coverage, some al-
location decisions have enforced an allocation regime that re-
quired the policyholder to absorb the financial consequences when
some of that insurance is exhausted or uncollectible even though
the policyholder has other triggered CGL coverage that has not
been fully used. In these cases, the premise appears to be a judicial
view that the policyholder deserves to be punished for purchasing
"inadequate" insurance or foolishly having bought insurance from
a now-insolvent company. 9 However, with nothing in the CGL
mandating allocation across the years or allocation of costs to the
policyholder, the policyholder can hardly be held culpable for un-
derinsurance-the insured thought it had purchased adequate
coverage because it expected to collect on any triggered policy if
triggering damages required full use of any unexhausted policies.
Similarly, the consequences of insurer insolvency hardly justify re-
ducing the policyholder's solvent triggered insurance coverage.
While most commercial policyholders have a risk management
program in place and maintain it over the years, it is not necessarily
the case that the responsible policyholders uniformly purchase li-
ability insurance for every year of operation. For example, a poli-
cyholder may self-insure for several years, then purchase CGL cov-
erage if it has reason to worry about dangerously low assets or
287. See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 930 n.22.
288. See id. at 930-31.
289. See supra Part II.D.l.a (discussing the Stonewall opinion of the Second Cir-
cuit, which implicitly criticizes policyholders for purchasing insufficient insurance
if after allocation by time there is not enough coverage to satisfy claims).
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heightened liability risk. ° Subsequently, the policyholder may re-
turn to self-insurance or move to a higher deductible or SIR as
conditions improve. The periods of self-insurance mixed with in-
surance do not in any way suggest that the policyholder is "unfairly"
seeking to obtain insurance on the cheap or to fob off on the occa-
sional insurer the consequences of the policyholder's years of tort-
feasing. The commercial policyholder is entitled to make prudent
commercial risk management decisions and enjoy the benefits of
the insurance coverage it did purchase during certain years when
that coverage is triggered.
In addition, of course, policyholders such as those in NSP and
Domtar may acquire property or subsidiary operations. They cannot
retroactively purchase insurance for years or decades gone by. But
they can buy occurrence-basis liability insurance that will provide
coverage should any of these land or business acquisitions prove to
be time bombs that cause coverage triggering injury during the
years in which the acquiring policyholder has liability insurance.
This type of CGL purchase is simple business prudence. It does not
suggest any attempt to retroactively insure against a known loss. If
this were the case, insurers could defend completely on known loss,
loss-in-progress, expected or intended, or lack of fortuity grounds.
There would be no need to discuss allocation.
In addition, the move to the claims-made form of CGL insur-
ance, which makes the coverage trigger turn on the assertion of a
claim against the insurer during the policy period, and use of a ret-
roactive date designed to avoid coverage for claims with roots in
the distant past, shows that insurers can draft policies preventing
coverage for such multiyear events decades after the injury first
took place.2 1 But prior to the wider use of the claims-made form,
the insurance industry itself chose the occurrence basis form of
CGL and used it as the primary form of CGL for twenty years. The
industry can hardly say that it was victimized by policyholders who
simply want to collect on these policies when claims for bodily in-
jury are made under the policy. Prior to the advent of the claims-
made policy, insurers saw nothing wrong with policyholders pro-
tecting themselves through occurrence coverage for the potential
290. I am here referring to society-wide liability risk (e.g., a litigation explo-
sion, an upward trend injury awards, etc.) rather than a higher risk peculiar to the
policyholder, which may suggest adverse selection by the policyholder.
291. See Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 930-31 (noting the distinction between claims-made
and occurrence policies on the allocation issue).
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liability consequences of their operations or acquisitions.
Most important, when the policyholder purchases liability in-
surance, it expects to enjoy the benefits of this purchase should a
triggering event take place. The insurance policy states that it pro-
vides coverage for such claims and there is no mention in the pol-
icy of adjusting policy limits if the claim or loss is part of a multiyear
event. The insurer has made a contractual commitment and the
policyholder has this benefit. Until all triggered insurance is ex-
hausted, there is no logical basis for requiring the policyholder to
expend its own funds simply because the loss triggering the as-yet-
unexhausted policy also caused injury during other years.
Put together, these traits of liability insurance provide no basis
for the Domtar view that equity requires allocation of coverage re-
sponsibility to the policyholder when the claims span multiple pol-
icy periods. On the contrary, equity and fairness would seem to re-
quire that the party purchasing liability insurance receive the full
benefit of that purchase when it faces third party claims clearly
triggering the policy or policies in question.
Rather than recognize this simple and inarguable aspect of
equity and fairness, the Domtar court suggests that failure to allo-
cate somehow gives the policyholder an undue benefit even though
the policyholder has yet to realize the full benefit of the triggered
insurance it has purchased. 292 Only if one finds a rule of law requir-
ing annual and uninterrupted insurance coverage as a prerequisite
to receiving the full policy proceeds of a given year can such a re-
sult be justified. Of course, there is no such rule. To the contrary,
insurance purchased in Year 1 does not become invalid or uncol-
lectible because the policyholder has no insurance in Year 2. By
the same token, the policyholder who purchased applicable insur-
ance in Year 5 should not be stripped of the benefits of this cover-
age simply because it had no such insurance during Years 1
through 4 and the claims against it implicate those years as well.
The Year 5 insurance policy is still a contract obligating the Year 5
insurer to provide coverage to the policyholder for claims against
the policyholder claiming damage from injury taking place in Year
5.
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3. The Domtar Allocation Operates as a Hidden Exclusion at Odds
with the Reasonable Expectations of the Parties, Particularly the
Policyholder
Policyholders expect to receive the defense and indemnity
they purchased when they bought a CGL policy. This is both an ac-
tual and an objectively reasonable expectation of the policyholder.
Minnesota, like many states, has adopted in modified form the
"reasonable expectations" approach initially outlined by Robert
Keeton, then a law professor and now a federal district judge, in an
important 1970 law review article.
In its "pure" form, the Keeton statement of the reasonable ex-
pectations principle or doctrine provides that "objectively reason-
able expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regard-
ing the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
expectations. " In other words, even clear policy language that
thwarted the policyholder's objectively reasonable expectations of
coverage would not be enforced. Although the Keeton version of
the concept has enjoyed favor in a number of courts, Minnesota,
like most jurisdictions, has adopted a modified or middle-level of
the reasonable expectations approach .
Minnesota, like all jurisdictions, construes ambiguous lan-
guage in light of the reasonable expectations of the policyholder
293. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions,
83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970). For more recent general commentary regarding the
application of the reasonable expectations principle and debate over the ap-
proach, see Symposium, Reasonable Expectations in the Third Decade, 5 CONN. INS. L.J.
1 (1998) (collection of several articles addressing the topic) and Roger C.
Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990).
294. Keeton, supra note 293, at 967.
295. Whether the reasonable expectations factor is a "principle," a "doctrine,"
an "approach," a "methodology," or something else is a matter of some disagree-
ment. For example,Judge Keeton has stated that the concept began as a principle
and became a doctrine during the 1970s. See Robert E. Keeton, Reasonable Expecta-
tions in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976). My own view is that "principle" or
"approach" remains a more apt term for describing the workings of the reasonable
expectations factor. See Stempel, supra note 7, at 186-87. Although I am hardly in
a position to second-guess Keeton, the characterization of the concept may not
matter to the correct resolution of insurance coverage cases through apt utiliza-
tion of reasonable expectations thinking.
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(and, for that matter, the insurer) This sort of "reasonable ex-
pectations" factor predated Keeton's article, which distilled the rea-
sonable expectations principle from its unspoken application in
caselaw. In addition, where an insurance policy provision, even
one that is textually clear, operates as a hidden exclusion, results in
illusory coverage, or makes for unfair surprise or an unconscion-
able situation, that policy provision will not be literally applied but
coverage will instead be determined by the policyholder's reason-
297able expectations.
Application of even the mildest notions of the reasonable ex-
pectations principle augers in favor of the policyholder and against
the Domtar decision on matters of allocation. The standard CGL is
at best silent on the subject. Even if one rejects my view that the
only appropriate interpretation of policy purpose, structure, and
language forbids general allocation to the policyholder, the CGL is
at least ambiguous on the point. In Minnesota and every U.S. ju-
risdiction, an insurance policy provision is considered ambiguous if
298it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Under
the longstanding rule that ambiguous language, even if not auto-
matically construed against the drafter, is interpreted consistently
with policyholder expectations, the better view is that policyholders
are entitled to triggered coverage without reduction due to prora-
tion.
If an insurance policy is otherwise silent on the issue of alloca-
tion due to consecutively triggered policies, this does not mandate
a particular focus on other policy language not designed to address
this issue. Where a court faced with no specific policy language on
296. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d
175, 180-81 (Minn. 1990); Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275
N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 1979); Brault v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 538 N.W.2d
144, 148 (Minn. CL App. 1995).
297. See Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994).
Minnesota recognizes the reasonable expectations doctrine but only to the extent
of permitting policyholder expectations doctrine to countermand policy language
that operates in the nature of a hidden exclusion. See Atwater Creamery Co. v.
Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985) (suggesting wider
applicability of reasonable expectations principle); Laurie Kindel Fett, The Reason-
able Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of
Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1113, 1124-32 (1992) (summariz-
ing pre-Regents v. Royal Minnesota law on reasonable expectations and suggesting
that Minnesota courts are too resistant to full and apt use of the doctrine).
298. See Columbia Heights Motors, 275 N.W.2d at 36; BARRY R. OSTRAGER &
THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.02 (9th ed.
1998); STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 4.08.
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the point requires allocation to the policyholder merely because of
the "during the policy period" language of the CGL, this language
interpreted in such a manner operates in the nature of a hidden
exclusion making for illusory coverage. Even if the court's reading
of the "during the policy period" language were correct (which it is
not),99 enforcing this reading of the CGL runs counter to Minne-
sota's version of the reasonable expectations approach, a middle-of-
the-road application of the concept that is not nearly as pro-
policyholder as the pure version of the Keeton doctrine often at-
tacked by insurers. Although NSP and Domtar err on this point,
SCSC is correctly decided according to the reasonable expectations
dimension because the result (continued coverage for the injury
flowing from the covered tort until exhaustion of benefits) is the
result expected by normal lay purchasers of insurance.
Under Minnesota insurance law, at least as it stood prior to
NSP and Domtar, CGL coverage could not be denied or reduced for
a covered event unless there was at least some text in the policy
providing for this exclusion. Only if one accepts the strained prem-
ise that the "during the policy period" language is that type of clear
exclusionary language, even the mildest of versions of the reason-
able expectations approach forbid reduction or elimination of CGL
coverage through allocation. Forcing the policyholder to pay a
higher percentage of tort claims in the absence of a policy provi-
sion to that effect is even more unreasonable.
4. Domtar Effects an Inequitable Reduction in Coverage
As discussed above, the Domtar approach flies in the face of ob-
300jectively reasonable policyholder expectations of coverage. In
addition, it is dramatically unfair to allocate coverage responsibility
to the policyholder across years during which the policyholder had
no control over the instrumentality giving rise to the claim or was
unaware of the events giving rise to the claim or knew nothing of
the insidious damage being wrought. In effect, the policyholder is
penalized because too many policies were triggered and the claim
resulted from too many instances of alleged damage to third party
claimants over too many years. Normally, one would expect a ra-
tional insurance coverage regime to give policyholders facing such
daunting claims more coverage rather than less, assuming that the
299. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
300. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying discussion.
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other prerequisites of coverage are satisfied. However, because of
Domtar, Minnesota now gives the policyholder facing such serious,
and potentially bankrupting liability, less than that for which it bar-
gained.
In addition to being generally unfair, Domtar has substantial
potential to impose severe inequities upon the policyholder. Allo-
cation per se, although not a correct reading of the CGL in these
instances, is nonetheless not harmful if the policyholder has a sig-
nificant amount of insurance so that allocation among insurers
does not leave the policyholder bereft of coverage. This was appar-
ently the situation in NSP.01 But where the insurance is exhausted
in some years, uncollectible due to insolvency in other years, or
where the allocation reaches back to years of policy limits now seen
as ridiculously low, allocation can result in a substantial reduction
of coverage.
Where the allocation reaches across years during which the
policyholder has no coverage, the result is particularly inequitable.
Recall that Domtar, Inc. did indeed have insurance for the post-
1970 period but that the qualified pollution exclusion barred cov-
erage under Minnesota law (a result that would not have obtained
under the law of many states, which treat the qualified exclusion as
blocking coverage only for subjectively expected or intended pollu-
tion damage).30 ' It cannot be said that Domtar, Inc. "went bare" af-
ter 1970. Domtar had fifteen years of insurance that was sufficient
to pay the claims.303 Domtar bought this insurance and relied on its
availability. Nothing in the policies suggested that policy benefits
would be reduced if the triggering claims alleged injury in periods
outside the policy period.
This is reasonable expectations in reverse. Domtar, Inc. was a
"good boy"04 during the 1970-1987 time period and purchased the
CGL coverage that was available to it at that time. Even though
Domtar was unable to produce older insurance policies, there was
evidence indicating that Domtar purchased liability insurance dur-
305ing the 1930s and 1940s as well as from 1956 on. As a reward for
301. See supra Part II.B.
302. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 729 (Minn.
1995).
303. See id. at 729 n.2.
304. See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the unspoken parental morality play util-
ized by some courts requiring allocation to the policyholder).
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its boy scout-like risk management, Domtar found itself with re-
duced insurance coverage from its 1956-1970 insurance policies,
which provided for pollution coverage. Thus, even without reach-
ing back into the first half of the century, Domtar had its 1956-1970
policies reduced in value by operation of law, a judicially imposed
inequity.
5. Refusal to Allocate to the Policyholder Does Not Render a
Windfall to the Policyholder or an Unfair Detriment to Insurers
Underlying the Domtar opinion is the notion that failure to al-
locate by time on the risk and to the policyholder for periods of no
insurance would give policyholders an unfair windfall of coverage.
But Domtar and other policyholders do not obtain a windfall if
they are merely permitted to collect insurance benefits for which
they paid and which are promised them pursuant to contract. This
is not "gouging" the insurer or overindemnification. This is merely
giving the policyholder the benefit of the bargain it made when it
purchased CGL coverage.
The notion that proration is required to prevent injustice to
the insurer has its roots in Forty-Eight Insuations. There, in a
multi-decade asbestos claim coverage dispute, the Sixth Circuit ad-
dressed the duty to defend, as well as liability coverage, and dealt
with policies that for the most part appear to have had no aggre-
gate limits on coverage and no per occurrence limit on the expense
of the duty to defend."" Writing against this backdrop, the Forty-
Eight Insulations court stated:
Were we to adopt [the policyholder's] position on defense
costs a manufacturer which had insurance coverage for
only one year out of 20 would be entitled to a complete
defense of all asbestos actions the same as a manufacturer
which had coverage for 20 years out of 20. Neither logic
nor precedent support such a result.
30 8
306. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir. 1980).
307. See id. at 1224.
308. Id. at 1225. Forty-Eight Insulations and its rationale on this point figured
prominently in insurer efforts to obtain a rule of allocation to the policyholder in
Domtar. For example, the quoted language was cited in the Brief of Amicus Curiae
Insurance Environmental Litigation Association ("IELA") at 17, Domtar, Inc. v.
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This sentiment is understandable but misplaced in the context
of insurance coverage. First, of course, it was the insurer that wrote
policies providing a duty to defend against claims of actual injury
but included no provision for proration and no requirement that
the policyholder keep insurance in force for other years. It may
sound unfair if this hypothetical insurer now must pay for cases
arising out of injury in its year, but courts frequently enforce con-
tracts that may in retrospect seem harsh. How many courts think it
is "illogical" to enforce liquidated damages, acceleration clauses,
confessions of judgment, and similar contract provisions even
though the liability created by such provisions (and usually im-
posed on the weaker, less sophisticated contracting party) may bear
little relation to the damage incurred by the party seeking to col-
lect?
Second, it is simply not the case in real life (at least not very of-
ten) that one insurer on the risk for five percent of a multiyear tort
would shoulder defense of the entire mass tort. For example, if the
court were applying the actual injury trigger, it is likely that certain
substantial parts of the mass tort simply did not involve injury dur-
ing the one year of coverage. In asbestos, for example, some plain-
tiffs did not have any contact with the policyholder's product dur-
ing the one year of insurance. Even under the exposure trigger
(really an injurious exposure) used by Forty-Eight Insulations, the
poor isolated insurer hypothesized by the courts probably does not
exist anywhere in real life. More common are cases like Domtar,
where the policyholder may not be able to prove up "portal-to-
portal" CGL coverage (sometimes because of the insurance indus-
try's refusal to write coverage in certain years) but does have years
of insurance and policy limits exceeding the cost of the claims and
defense.
Third, in the future, the now-common use of aggregate policy
limits, the claims-made CGL form, and "burning limits" (where de-
fense costs are counted against the total policy limit and act to ex-
haust coverage) make it essentially impossible that an isolated in-
surer will ever be required to pick up the metaphorical tab because
it was unfortunate enough to write coverage for a single year in the
life of a customer that essentially was self-insured in all other years.
Even if the insurer's only protection is the existence of an ag-
gregate limit on liability payments, the typical policy of this type,
like the standard CGL, provides that the insurer's obligation is ex-
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tinguished when the limits of liability are paid in judgment or set-
tlement. Even without a cap on defense costs, a prudent insurer
acting in good faith can quickly settle claims at a reasonable rate,
which will consume the policy limits relatively quickly. The insurer
will not be defending the policyholder on twenty years' worth of
asbestos claims forever. Although there may be some difficult is-
sues of good and bad faith, and the policyholder has a right to ex-
pect the insurer to do more than interplead the policy limits, no
court would prevent the insurer from settling valid claims at rea-
sonable rates. Although this requires the insurer to pay the policy
limits, that result only mandates enforcement of the contract. Out-
side the multiyear mass tort context, insurers pay the policy limits
on claims every day in this country.
Thus, despite the seductive tone of the Forty-Eight Insulations
lament and its unrealistic hypothetical, the "windfall" argument
against coverage is not supported by either contract law or equita-
ble principles any more than it is a realistic portrayal of reality.
Rather, in Domtar, we see the policyholder victimized and unable to
receive policy proceeds for which it paid. Unlike the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Domtar, the California Supreme Court recog-
nized the illogic of the insurers' "windfall" argument:
Beneath the Court of Appeal's concern about "fairness"
and 'justice" is, apparently, a belief that, without an ap-
proach like the one it adopted [allocation by time on the
risk to policyholder and insurer alike], Aerojet might get a
windfall from the insurers. That is not the case. We shall
assume for argument's sake that Aerojet has enjoyed great
good luck over against [sic] the insurers. But the perti-
nent policies provide what they provide. Aerojet and the
insurers were generally free to contract as they pleased.
They evidently did so. They thereby established what was
"fair" and 'just" inter se. We may not rewrite what they
themselves wrote. We must certainly resist the temptation
to do so here simply in order to adjust for chance-for the
benefits it has bestowed on one party without merit and
for the burdens it has laid on others without desert. As a
general matter at least, we do not add to, take away from,





309. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indein. Co., 948 P.2d 909, 932 (Cal.
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Although the California Supreme Court's analysis is perhaps a
bit too facile,1 it keeps sight of the jurisprudential "ball" of which
the Domtar court lost sight. The task of courts is to properly inter-
pret contracts, not to announce broad-reaching formulaic rules to
change the impact of contract where the court finds the result un-
duly favorable (but not unconscionable) to one side. 31' Although
there are apt instances for judicial modification of contracts, such
action is normally reserved for situations of real unconscionability
of the contract or to rectify pronounced unfairness, particularly un-
fairness falling upon a weak, needy, or unsophisticated party. Dom-
tar and similar allocation decisions may be the first line of cases
whose raison de entre of public policy is the notion that we should
all buy more insurance. The insurance industry devotes ample re-
sources to marketing its products. It hardly needs ajudicial adjunct
to its marketing operation.
Furthermore, the impact of the resolution of the case sought
by Domtar, Inc. is hardly excessively greedy or the equivalent of an
undeserved "windfall." Domtar sought merely to realize the bene-
fits of purchased insurance notwithstanding the long-term nature
of the underlying tort and the presence of other applicable insur-
ance. This is hardly the stuff of which windfalls and unfairness are
made, particularly in light of the CGL language at issue. To quote
the California Supreme Court again:
We observe that Aerojet may indeed have gotten from the
insurers more in defense costs than it could have gotten
1997) (citations and footnotes omitted).
310. Notwithstanding the "contracts say what they say" rhetoric of the Aerojet
court, the complex nature of insurance policy language applied to complex mat-
ters makes it appropriate for courts to consider extra-textual factors, including
public policy, in resolving coverage disputes. But a comprehensive consideration
of contracting factors indicates that the CGL policies were triggered and do pro-
vide coverage for the damages flowing from a triggering injury. By reducing the
policyholder's triggered coverage through allocation, cases such as Domtar do not
invoke misguided notions of fairness, equity, or public policy as mere tiebreakers
or means of deciding the unguided case: Domtar invoked its peculiar notions of
equity to trump the proper interpretation of the insurance policies in question.
311. Although notions of unconscionability and adhesion are often commin-
gled by courts, the best definition of an "unconscionable" contract is that it is one
that is so unreasonably favorable to one side (usually the drafting party) that the
law will not enforce the agreement as written. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, §
4.10[b]; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs §§ 4.27-4.28 (2d ed. 1990).
19991
87
Stempel: Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
in indemnification costs. But it got no more than it had a
right to: Although indemnification costs were limited by
the pertinent policies, defense costs were not. The insur-
ers might perhaps have avoided such a pass, as through
the issuance of "self-consuming" or "burning limits" poli-
cies, under which the indemnification limit is reduced
dollar for dollar by defense costs until zero is reached and
the duty to indemnify and the duty to defend are then
terminated. They apparently did not attempt to do so."'
6. A Balancing of Policyholder and Insurer Interests Reveals the
NSP/Domtar Allocation Approach to be a Clear Change in the
Law Advantaging Insurers
The general system of contract and insurance law is designed,
at a minimum, to be fair to insurer and policyholder. In several ar-
eas, legal doctrine leans toward the side of the policyholder to pre-
vent unfairness because of the insurer's comparative advantages in
the transaction, the policyholder's greater vulnerability, or both.
The ambiguity principle and the reasonable expectations approach
are perhaps the best examples of this. So, too, are maxims of in-
surance policy construction such as the rule that exclusions are
construed narrowly and that the insurer has the burden to demon-
313strate the applicability of an exclusion. The canon of construc-
tion that forfeitures are not favored and that the insurer shall not
be accorded unconscionable advantage, and the ground rule that
the insurer must show good faith and fair dealing, are all part of
this milieu of insurance contract law.314
312. Aerojet, 948 P.2d at 932 n.29 (citation omitted).
313. See Henning Nelson Const. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, § 1.17, at 40 ("The
insurance company has the burden of proving that an exclusion applies."); ALLAN
D. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMs & DispuTES § 9.01, at 29-30 n.3 (3d ed. 1995) (noting
that exclusions in insurance policies are given narrow construction favoring poli-
cyholder and insurer bears burden to show applicability of exclusion once policy-
holder shows that claim comes within coverage).
314. See, e.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 515 F. Supp. 38,
41 (D. Minn. 1981) (holding that in cases of uncertainty, insurer should provide
coverage purchased by policyholder); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 181 (Minn. 1990) (noting that dominant purpose of
insurance is indemnity). See also Monsanto Co. v. C.E. Heath Compensation &
Liab. Ins. Co., 652 A.2d 30, 33-34 (Del. 1994) (stating that absent inevitable clarity,
insurance policy provisions should not be construed in a manner that defeats or
reduces coverage). Regarding pro-policyholder canons of construction found in
the law of insurance coverage generally, see ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, ch. 2,
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Against this backdrop, when courts face the most significant
and complex coverage matters of pollution and product liability
spanning years or decades, one would expect courts to respond
with a body of law that accords the same protection to policyhold-
ers they obtain in garden variety coverage claims. Instead, however,
Domtar (and to some extent NSP) rendered a rule of allocation that
dramatically shifts state insurance law from the policyholder's slight
advantage to law that clearly favors the insurer. In Domtar, the
court acts as if the insurer rather than the policyholder is the one
to whom must be given the benefits of ambiguity analysis, reason-
able expectations thinking, and the like. Such a drastic shift in the
legal landscape should be supported by something more than the
vague pronouncements of the Domtar court.
7. The NSP/Domtar Allocation Formula Fosters Inequity Among
Insurers
Because NSP and Domtar allocate only by time on the risk
rather than according to premiums paid or policy limits purchased,
the consequences of the allocation imposed may vary quite dra-
matically from the relative risks taken and rewards obtained by in-
surers or policyholders. For that reason, even commentators gen-
erally favoring allocation in some cases, advocate an allocation
formula that considers both time on the risk and the respective pol-icy imis ofthetrigere " 315
icy limits of the triggered insurers. Some courts favoring alloca-
tion have also insisted that respective insurer responsibility be ap-
portioned by policy limits alone or policy limits and time on the
risk.
6
In adopting the temporal allocation formula, the NSP court
stated, without support, that proration by policy limits was inconsis-
tent with the actual injury trigger. The NSP court stated that:
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each
insurer is held liable for only those damages which oc-
curred during its policy period; no insurer is held liable
for damages outside its policy period. Where the policy
periods do not overlap, therefore, the insurers are con-
secutively, not concurrently liable. A "pro rata by limits"
allocation method effectively makes those insurers with
and WINDT, supra note 313, chs. 9, 11.
315. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 109, at 1274-78.
316. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
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higher limits liable for damages incurred outside their
policy periods and is therefore inconsistent with the actual
injury trigger theory.1 7
A major factor in the NSP court's rejection of use of policy lim-
its as a tool for apportionment again flows from the court's misun-
derstanding of the meaning of the "during the policy period" lan-
guage of the CGL." 8 The NSP court incorrectly treated this
language as limiting insurer responsibility only to the "damages"
taking place prior to the expiration of the policy's term when in
fact, the CGL language merely requires that the "injury" take place
during the policy period. Damages flowing from the injury remain
subject to the coverage of the triggered policy.
This error was then magnified by a seeming desire to reject
anything associated with "concurrent" insurer responsibility since
the NSP court viewed the pollution matter as one involving only
"consecutive" insurance coverage. Because proration by policy lim-
its is the majority rule for apportioning concurrent insurer responsi-
bility, the NSP court appears to have rejected it outright, without
stopping to think whether proration by limits, or at least some use
of policy limits in the allocation formula, might be apt for cases of
consecutively triggered coverage as well.
NSPs suggestion that proration by limits somehow violates the
principle of the actual injury trigger does not seem to follow, as a
simple illustration suggests. Under the actual injury trigger, as-
sume that the insurer in Year 1 is triggered because of a third-party
claim alleging injury that year from one of its products. Assume
further that the product is an artificial kidney the claimant alleges
was defective because its exterior casing released contaminants into
the claimant's body at various junctures during the ten years it was
inside the patient. Because the claimed injury was not readily visi-
ble at the outset, it is not surprising that the claimant is suing in
Year 10.
In this multiyear product liability coverage matter, it would
appear that the actual injury trigger is satisfied during Years 1
through 10-the claim alleges that continuous release of contami-
nants from the artificial kidney caused not only continuing damage
from the first of year of its implantation but also caused new and
317. Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662
(Minn. 1994).
318. See id. at 663.
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continuing injuries during Years 2 through 10. Consequently, all
ten policy years are triggered. In this case, there is nothing incon-
sistent with the actual injury trigger if the Year 1 insurer is required
to pay until its policy limits are exhausted. This is so even if there is
no insurance during Years 2 through 10. The Year 1 carrier is trig-
gered and is liable for the continuing damage wrought by the Year
1 injury. Applying the Year 1 policy limits to pay damages flowing
from the injury years later is not inconsistent with the actual injury
trigger: it is the essence of the actual injury trigger.
The presence of additional injury and additional insurance
coverage during Years 2 through 10 does not change, expand, or
reduce the responsibility of the Year 1 insurer-it is triggered and
responsible until its policy limits are exhausted paying triggered
claims. However, the presence of multiple insurers may require
apportionment of coverage responsibility to prevent overindemni-
fication of the policyholder or to provide for a fair sharing of re-
sponsibilities among triggered insurers. Use of the Year 1 policy
limits as part of the apportionment formula cannot be inconsistent
with the actual injury trigger when use of the Year 1 policy limits as
the sole delimitation on coverage responsibility was not inconsis-
tent with the injury trigger.
NSP further erred in its assumption that prorating by policy
limits somehow creates an unfair subsidy of the low limit insurers
by high limit insurers in cases of multiple insurance policies. Al-
though this is a possibility, it is equally possible that the NSP tempo-
ral allocation formula could result in long-term but low-limits in-
surers subsidizing the coverage responsibility of high-limit insurers
that were not on the risk as long. For example, assume that the
Year 1 insurer in the above hypothetical provided $1 million in pol-
icy limits, with the Year 2 through Year 10 insurers each providing
policy limits of only $111,111. Assume also $1 million in covered
claims. Allocation by time on the risk makes the Year 1 insurer re-
sponsible for only ten percent of the coverage ($100,000-ten per-
cent of $1 million) even though it provided fifty percent of the to-
tal coverage ($1 million-fifty percent of $2 million) and
presumably received considerably more than ten percent of the to-
tal premium dollars paid. Even though insurance is generally less
expensive per thousand when higher amounts are purchased, the
effect of the NSP/Domtar proration formula in a case like this is to
provide a huge windfall to the insurer with the high policy limits.
The Year 1 insurer in this hypothetical receives $1 million worth of
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premiums but pays only $100,000 in benefits. 9 Ironically, this oc-
curs because the court is unwilling to consider the policy limits in
apportioning responsibility.
8. The Domtar Allocation Method Creates Unwise Behavior in the
Insurance Markets
If insurance markets are to work well, insurers are in theory
taking on only good risks and eliminating or minimizing the moral
hazard and adverse selection that corrupts the insurance market if
policyholders with problems can easily obtain ample insurance at
standard rates. Policyholders making profitable but potentially
defectively dangerous products or holding property that is steadily
polluting neighboring lands or groundwater would presumably be
unable to obtain CGL coverage at standard rates-at least if the in-
surer knows that the applicant poses inordinate risks of such liabil-
ity exposure. To minimize the possibility of unwittingly providing
such coverage, insurers would presumably engage in close under-
writing scrutiny prior to issuing or renewing such policies. CGL
carriers would have this incentive because they would be liable up
to applicable policy limits for claims against such policyholders.
Rigid pro rata allocation by time on the risk undermines this incen-
tive to some degree. The insurer who recklessly writes coverage has
the consequences of its mistakes reduced even in the absence of
contract language to that effect if it has the good fortune to be part
of years of coverage and liability problems. The court's appor-
tionment of a large amount of the coverage consequences to other
years and other carriers, or to the policyholder, effectively gives the
319. Of course, the Year 1 insurer may not be able to keep all of this windfall,
depending on the rest of the policyholder's loss experience. For example, the
Year 1 insurer may end up paying the remaining $900,000 in policy limits on other
claims arising from injuries taking place during Year 1. However, if the total
claims on the Year 1 policy fail to exhaust the policy limit, the Year 1 insurer re-
ceives some significant, unbargained-for benefit from allocation by time alone-a
windfall for the Year 1 insurer vis-a-vis both other insurers and, potentially, its own
policyholder.
Also, for simplicity, the hypothetical has assumed that the $1 million Year
1 policy limits are both a per occurrence limit and an aggregate limit. However, if
the Year 1 policy has no aggregate limit, as was the case for many if not most CGLs
prior to the 1980s, the Year 1 insurer absolutely receives a windfall from time-on-
the-risk allocation that is complete at the time of allocation. Instead of paying the
policyholder with the $1 million policy the full policy limits (or at least some fig-
ure between $100,000 and $1 million), the Year 1 insurer effectively is granted a
judicially created $100,000 policy limit.
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CGL insurers re-insurance they did not in fact purchase. This hy-
pothetically careless-underwriting-single-year-CGL insurer is paid
back, or made to pay less, because other insurers are required to
pay even where the insurer in question has the policy that is the
largest, least exhausted, and first tapped by the policyholder.
The net effect of this sort of incentive system is to make insur-
ers less likely to underwrite and supervise policies and policyhold-
ers with care. The CGL insurer selling policies to petroleum facto-
ries or medical device makers in cases such as NSP or Domtar is not
really on the risk for the amount of policy limits stated in the decla-
rations page of the policy unless the claims are so large that they
completely exhaust all triggered coverage. Even then, enough
years of no insurance, lost insurance policies (not hard to imagine
when roots of the claimed injury are in the early 20th Century), or
insurance policies containing injury-wide exclusions work to lower
each triggered insurer's responsibility for coverage. This type of
allocation regime creates incentives for the insurer to act with less
care in writing policies with higher limits, for which the policy-
holder is charged higher premiums, but for which each triggered
insurer ultimately will pay less than stated in the declarations page
in many if not most of the multi-year tort claims against the policy-
holder. The incentive, even if not drastic in most cases, remains
perverse.
9. The NSP/Domtar Allocation Rule and the SCSC Exception
Fosters Inefficiency and Excessive Litigation
Under NSP and Domtar, the policyholder is likely to receive re-
duced insurance coverage, even though it paid for the coverage, if
it is sued for claims of injury taking place over an extended time
period. But under SCSC, the policyholder may enjoy full coverage
if the coverage-triggering injury is found to have taken place in
only one policy period. In cases like SCSC, where the claim-
causing injury takes place through a discrete, identifiable event
during only one policy year, the coverage provided by the triggered
policy is not reduced by the applicability of other insurance poli-
320. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn. 1995);
supra notes 122-36 and accompanying discussion (discussing the SCSC case, in
which a jury's finding that the cause of pollution injury was an abrupt discharge
served both to make the qualified pollution exclusion inapplicable and to permit
the policyholder to fully receive available policy benefits from the CGL insurer on
the risk at the discharge time).
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cies.
The impact of these cases and approaches is to make insur-
ance coverage hinge dramatically and unnecessarily on particular
court or jury findings as to how an injury took place and when it
took place. If the injury is gradual, continuous, repeated, or epi-
sodic, and took place in multiple policy periods, each triggered in-
surer's coverage responsibility is reduced pro rata. Under this re-
gime, insurers will routinely attempt to prove the injury took place
during several policy periods in order to reduce their respective
shares. Conversely, the policyholder's incentive is to have the fact-
finder conclude that there was only one injurious event or that
such events were confined to one policy period.
In addition, if the case is one like SCSC, that involves CGL
policies containing the qualified "sudden and accidental" pollution
exclusion, both parties have strong incentives to "prove" that the
pollution discharge took place in a manner favorable to their cov-
erage prospects. Because the pollution exclusion issue in insur-
ance coverage is a zero-sum game (either the pollution exclusion
applies completely or it has no application), the parties in these
disputes have more than the usual litigant's incentive to pull out all
the stops in spinning the facts. But even without the zero-sum as-
pect of the pollution exclusion, insurer and policyholder operating
a rigid allocation regime, such as that of NSP and Domtar, have a
similar incentive to resort to extremes in trying to prove that the in-
jury was either limited in time (the policyholder's preferred result)
or extended across many years (the insurer's preferred result).
All thisjockeying for position does not come cheaply. Counsel
fees increase as lawyers concentrate legal resources toward influ-
encing the court to find in the client's preferred way. The costs of
expert witnesses become particularly pronounced as expert engi-
neers, chemists, physicians, biologists, environmentalists and the
like are retained to investigate the facts of the case and render de-
tailed, persuasive, and expensive expert reports and testimony on
the topic. Because the consequences of the factfinding on the
manner and temporal span of injury are so important, the parties
are encouraged to pour more resources into the determination.
This is due to the high stakes of an adverse factual finding.
To some extent, expending legal resources in proportion to
the stakes of the case is merely rational litigation behavior. It is
[Vol. 25
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probably not wise to spend 75 cents to collect a dollar s2' but it
probably is prudent to spent $75 million to collect $100 million, as-
suming the high expenditures will increase the odds of recovering
the $100 million to nearly 100 percent. However, it is one thing for
the courts to watch litigants overspend because they find it rational
to do so in light of the stakes of the case and its factual uncertainty.
It is quite another matter when the court itself heightens the stakes
and the uncertainty. In such instances, the judicial doctrine has
322
become part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In
effect, NSP and Domtar encourage the parties in multiyear tort
claims to pursue a scorched earth policy of litigation. In addition
to being unfortunate, it is ironic one of the NSP court's principal
rationales for allocation-by-time was the furthering of convenience
321. There are usually difficulties in calculating the costs in addition to the out
of pocket costs of the 75 cents: lost time; distracted concentration from the liti-
gant's main activity; emotional upset; frayed relations with the opponent; and so
on.
322. In addition, extensive litigation over the issue of the number of years dur-
ing which an injury took place may be cost-ineffective because there is often rela-
tively little guarantee that additional marshalling of proof will significantly in-
crease the odds of a favorable factfinding. The ultimate decision in that regard
remains with the judge or jury and neither's assessment can be predicted with any-
thing near 100 percent accuracy.
For example, in SCSC, the matter devolved into a battle of experts as to
the cause of the pollution. See SCSC, 536 N.W.2d at 310-11. The jury was free to
believe either side's preferred explanation. SCSC Corporation could in theory
have retained 100 experts (assuming the court would not bar some of the testi-
mony as cumulative). But, of course, SCSC Corp.'s proferring of 100 experts
would probably engender a 100-expert witness list by its insurers. The net effect
would be something of a "Bleak House" effect, in which the transaction costs of
litigation approach or exceed the stakes of the case. See generally CHARLES DICKENS,
BLEAK HOUSE (1853) (describing the fictional estate litigation ofJarndyce v. Jarndyce
in Nineteenth Century England that consumed more than 20 years and the corpus
of the estate).
Attorneys and clients are normally too rational to reach this point of over-
litigation, but the "escalation of hostilities" effect frequently takes them too far
down the road toward the Bleak House effect. For example, studies of the opera-
tion of the federal Superfund law suggest that well over half the funds spent in Su-
perfund matters are devoted to litigation rather than to actual environmental
cleanup. In addition, this sort of overadversarialness seems particularly misplaced
for insurance coverage disputes. Insurers are said to have a relationship to policy-
holders that, while not completely fiduciary, are fiduciary in nature. See Corrado
Bros. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 562 A.2d 1188, 1192 (Del. 1989); Gibson v. West-
ern Fire Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 725, 730 (Mont. 1984); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53,
§ 11.6, at 16-18; see also STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 31.11, at 820 (noting that the
insurer has quasi-fiduciary or semi-fiduciary relationship with policyholder). In a
more rational world, one would expect insurance coverage disputes to have lower
rather than higher litigation costs.
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of the parties, the reduction of workload, and the overall efficience
of the judicial system.
10. The Draconian Allocation of Domtar is Not Justified by the
Continuous Actual Injury Trigger of NSP and Domtar
There is allocation-and then there is allocation. It is one
thing to apportion coverage responsibility for a claim reasonably
limited in time and impact. Even where there is consecutive rather
than concurrent coverage responsibility, proration seems a particu-
larly cruel consequence when the time over which coverage re-
sponsibility numbers more than sixty years. The Domtar policy-
holder was not asked to shoulder a minor share of the coverage
burden akin to a deductible, SIR, or copayment s23  Rather, the
Domtar policyholder was required to pick up three-fourths of the5 24
tab simply because of the vagaries of chance. But the conven-
tional view is that insurance exists to protect the policyholder from
the vagaries of chance. Domtar, Inc., thought it had accomplished
this through the purchase of rather extensive insurance protection.
However, the court introduced new risk into the equation by a
court-created rule of allocation to the policyholder by time on the
risk alone.
The potential inequities of strict temporal allocation become
especially apparent when applied to the multi-decade torts and in-
juries in cases such as Domtar. A hornbook rule of insurance cover-
age litigation is that the policyholder must prove that it had insur-
ance. The rule is of course, logical, defensible, and perhaps
inevitable. But in claims reaching back to the early twentieth cen-
tury, it is not surprising that even conscientious businesses failed to
retain ancient insurance policies. But without copies of the poli-
cies, or a remaining live witness who can prove the existence of
323. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn.
1997).
324. See id.
325. See 7 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 107:41
(3d ed. 1997) ("In harmony with general principles of proof, the burden of proof
is on the injured party to establish all facts essential to the existence of liability to
him or her of the insurer."); see also SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536
N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn. 1995) ("The initial burden of proof is on the insured to
establish a prima facie case of coverage.") (citing Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287
Minn. 323, 178 N.W.2d 610, 614 (1970)); Mark S. Dennison, What Constitutes 'Suit'
Triggering Insurer's Duty to Defend Environmental Claims - State Cases, 48 A.L.R.5th
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coverage, the policyholder is unable to claim the benefit of these
ancient policies that it probably purchased (most businesses
probably purchased at least some liability coverage during the first
half of the century).
Under Domtar, the policyholder is twice damaged. First, it is
unable collect insurance benefits for which it in many cases paid
but can no longer document because of the passage of time. Sec-
ond, the long time frame during which injury took place is utilized
to reduce the insurance coverage that the policyholder is able to
prove up. There simply is no legal or equitable justification for this
type of court-imposed punishment of a policyholder.
11. Strict Allocation by Time is Not Justified by the "Liberality" of the
Minnesota Courts'Application of the Actual Injury Trigger
One might defend NSP and Domtar as cases balancing benefits
and burdens judicially imposed upon insurers and policyholders.
Many insurers, in coverage disputes implicating multiple years, ar-
gued that the CGL was not triggered unless a claimant's injury was
"manifested" during the coverage period or unless the injury in
question was palpable, tangible, or medically diagnosable.2 6 Al-
though the manifestation trigger had some initial judicial support,
it has become a clear minority in CGL trigger jurisprudence. So,
too, insurer arguments that injury has not taken place unless it is
detectable have generally been rebuffed by courts. The bulk of
courts interpreting the CGL apply an injury trigger (usually re-
ferred to as an "actual injury" trigger or an "injury-in-fact" trigger)
but do not require that the injury be particularly demonstrable. It
is usually sufficient (at least regarding the duty to defend) if the
third-party claimant alleges injury during the coverage period or if
expert witnesses can establish the existence of injury during the
policy period.
Even though such determinations may be the product of 20-20
hindsight (we now know that asbestos fibers in the lungs do dam-
age), this does not make the injury any less real or any less trigger-
ing of coverage. Insurers sometimes bemoan this dominant juris-
prudence of the injury trigger as too favorable to policyholders
326. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 1982); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (arguing coverage is triggered only by manifestation of either asbestosis or
lung cancer); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations Inc., 633 F.2d
1212, 1218-19 (6th Cir. 1980).
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since it makes the CGL applicable for even the initial stages of in-
jury, still relatively minor, that took place long ago. Although one
can understand the financial concerns of CGL insurers required to
defend and cover lawsuits with roots sometimes far in the past be-
cause of the subtle onset of insidious injury undetected for years.
Yet the courts have nonetheless correctly concluded that even
slight, undetected injury far in the past triggers insurance coverage.
First and foremost, the CGL policies themselves were written
to cover claims arising from such initially slight purported injury.
There is nothing unfair about utilizing an injury trigger-insurers
wrote the policies with injury triggers. Second, requiring some
minimum quantum of injury would convert the injury trigger to a
manifestation trigger, something not set forth in the CGL and
problematic in other respects. Third, the application of the injury
trigger based on allegations of even undetected and initially slight
injury is fully consistent with the purpose of the CGL and the intent
of the parties underlying the CGL.
Liability insurance containing "duty to defend" coverage is
"litigation insurance"-it is designed to protect the policyholder by
providing a defense to claims of policyholder-caused injury. If the
claimant alleges injury during the policy period, courts have cor-
rectly concluded the insurer should not be permitted to avoid its
contractually established duty to defend. Courts argue that the
claimant is mistaken or that the claimed injury was too trivial until a
later juncture. Such arguments are inconsistent with the CGL's
structure and purpose: claims alleging covered injury trigger the
duty to defend even if the claim is "groundless, false, or fraudu-
lent." The insurer cannot second-guess the bona fides of the claim
in order to deprive its policyholder of coverage. The insurer must
defend. If it obtains information permitting it to avoid coverage, it
may take action (e.g., a summary judgment motion seeking elimi-
nation of a covered claim) to minimize its liability coverage. But in
the meantime it must defend.
In actual cases, investigating and defending insurers have
normally been unable to avoid coverage based on the claim's "real
facts." For example, in the asbestos cases, medical evidence sup-
ports the assertion that asbestos does both immediate and continu-
ing damage and that the introduction of new asbestos particles into
the body causes new, additional, and continuing damage. In the
pollution cases, the facts of the claims frequently show that injury
to land, water, or people took place on a continuing basis well be-
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fore it was detected by the claimant or others. In short, judicial ap-
plication of the actual injury trigger as something of a "hair trigger"
or "claimant allegation trigger," is perfectly proper. Indeed, it is
compelled by the CGL policy language and the nature of CGL in-
surance.
A number of courts have used an "exposure" trigger of cover-
age in the multiyear asbestos and pollution cases. For example, the
leading exposure case, Forty-Eight Insulations, 1 7 held that CGL cov-
erage was triggered for asbestos claims whenever the claimants
were allegedly exposed to asbestos fibers.128 Because it viewed itself
as having granted the policyholder something of a gift through the
seemingly easily satisfied exposure trigger (a super-sensitive hair
trigger), it was required that the responsibility of triggered insurers
be allocated by time, including allocation to the policyholder.
Forty-Eight Insulations has been very influential both in prompting
other courts to adopt an "exposure" trigger and in prompting allo-
cation by time on the risky.
However, on closer examination, the Forty-Eight Insulations "ex-
posure" trigger appears to have been an actual injury trigger mis-
named by the court. The court spoke of exposure as automatically
131bringing injury, which implies that the exposure to the asbestos
was not benign but began hurting the claimant on contact. Subse-
quent medical evidence presented in the asbestos cases has been
consistent with the medical evidence before the Forty-Eight Insula-
332tions court. Forty-Eight Insulations noted, with apparent approval,
medical evidence that exposure to asbestos fibers begins to cause at
least some injury immediately and that asbestos-related diseases are
327. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212
(6th Cir. 1980).
328. See id. at 1224.
329. See id. at 1225.
330. See, e.g., Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine Inc., 752 F.2d 976,
993-94 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Louisiana law); Porter v. American Optical Corp.,
641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Louisiana law); Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1391 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). NSP and Domtar, of
course, are part of this strand of post-Forty-Eight Insulations insurance law doctrine.
331. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1222 ("The medical evidence is un-
controverted that 'bodily injury' in the form of tissue damage takes place at or
shortly after the initial inhalation of asbestos fibers.").
332. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d
1178, 1197-98 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 983-85 (N.J. 1994) (describing etiology of asbestos-
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progressive, continuing, and triggered anew as additional bodily
contact with asbestos takes place.W3 In light of these statements in
the opinion, the Forty-Eight Insulations decision might be more ac-
curately described as an actual injury case, and as one that properly
rejected insurer efforts to require a minimum quantum of tangible
injury or manifestation as a prerequisite to coverage. For example,
the court stated:
[M]edical testimony establishes that tissue damage starts
to occur shortly after the initial inhalation of asbestos fi-
bers and that the tissue damage worsens as the victim
breathes in more and more asbestos fibers. The advocates
of the exposure theory characterize asbestosis as a series
of continuing injuries to the body which accumulate to
cause death or disability....
The district court adopted the exposure theory....
The principal basis for the district court's position, how-
ever, was the medical evidence. The medical testimony
established that "each tiny deposit of scar-like tissue causes
injury to a lung." From this, the court reasoned that
"each such insult-causing injury is an 'occurrence' for the. 334
purpose of determining which coverage applies.
The circuit court in Forty-Eight Insulations affirmed this aspect
of the district court's findings and conclusions, in effect finding
that inhaled asbestosis caused coverage-triggering injury at the time
of inhalation and that new intake of asbestos fiber caused new in-.• • 335
jury as well as further deterioration of old injuries. Nonetheless,
Forty-Eight Insulations regrettably used the "exposure" terminology
unfortunately used by the district court and policyholder counsel.
In retrospect, the terminology has suggested to courts and com-
mentators that policyholders can gain coverage without being re-
quired to demonstrate the requisite claims of injury.3 7
During the intervening eighteen years, insurers have contin-
ued to argue that the injury trigger requires something more like
manifestation to obtain coverage but courts have largely rejected
333. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1217.
334. Id. at 1217 (citations and footnote omitted).
335. See id. at 1219.
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these arguments. For the most part, courts have applied the actual
injury trigger with common sense and sensitivity and refused to
take on the burden of gauging the amount or severity of injury dur-
ing any particular policy period in order to evaluate whether there
has been "enough" injury to trigger coverage. 3 But most of this
CGL construction has been accomplished through an appropriate
application of an actual injury trigger. The exposure trigger has
been spurned because its nomenclature appears inconsistent with
the CGL language339 even though its use in Forty-Eight Insulations
was perfectly consistent with the CGL text.
34
0
To a large degree, the NSP court operated within this larger
judicial school of thought when it refused to require the policy-
holder to demonstrate precisely how much damage took place dur-
ing particular policy periods.34 However, like a number of other
courts, including the Forty-Eight Insulations court, the NSP court ap-
pears to have viewed itself as having favored the policyholder with
its choice of a relatively easily satisfied trigger (although a self-
338. The leading case on this point is probably American Home Products Corp. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984). In American Home Prod-
ucts, the Second Circuit generally affirmed a well-crafted district court opinion that
correctly adopted the actual injury trigger for the CGL but incorrectly required
that an asbestos-related injury be medically diagnosable before the CGL trigger
was "pulled." See American Home Products, 748 F.2d at 765, afJ'g 565 F. Supp. 1485
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit correctly reasoned that injuries in their in-
fancy might elude diagnosis but nonetheless were injuries within the meaning of
the CGL. See id. Consequently, coverage attached without any requirement of di-
agnosability. See id. The appellate court might also have added that a diagnosabil-
ity requirement or other insistence upon a minimum amount of injury would in
effect erroneously convert the CGL, which was written with an "injury" trigger, to
policies with a "manifestation" trigger.
Since American Home Products, the injury trigger has been widely accepted
in the form of the Second Circuit opinion rather than in its trial court form. See,
e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1194
(2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York and Texas law); Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc. v.
Employers Ins., 746 F. Supp. 1310, 1325 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Triangle Publications
Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 703 F. Supp. 367, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1388 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). See ANDERSON ET
AL., supra note 53, §§ 4.9-4.11.
339. See American Home Products Corp., 748 F.2d at 764-65.
340. The manifestation trigger has been rejected on the ground that it runs
contrary to the language of CGL policies and that it provides insurers an opportu-
nity to unfairly cancel coverage. This after years of receiving premiums when the
first manifested claims are made against the policyholder even though the source
of the claims stems from years of accumulated injury. See, e.g., Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, 633 F.2d at 1220; Yin, supra note 109, at 1262-65.
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identified injury trigger in NSP) and then utilized a temporal allo-
cation scheme as a counterweight favoring insurers by limiting
their responsibility for coverage notwithstanding a finding that the
insurance was triggered.32 In a case of full coverage such as NSP,
the negative consequences of this approach are not readily appar-
ent. However, the ravages of rigid temporal allocation become all
too apparent in a case like Domtar, where the policyholder is clearly
not given advantage from triggering of coverage but in fact has its
coverage reduced in the same breath due to allocation across the
bulk of the twentieth century.
Although one can debate the correctness of the relatively hair
trigger version of the actual injury trigger, it is a debate insurers
have consistently lost during the last twenty years. Beginning with
key 1980s cases such as Keene343 and American Home Products Corp. v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. and extending through cases such as
Owens-Illinois,345 NSP, and Domtar, courts have correctly found that
insurance is triggered by allegations of even slight and hidden in-
jury. This is what the CGL says and this is what the CGL promises
policyholders as well as the measuring stick by which insurers calcu-
late risk. Unfortunately, many judicial discussions have clothed this
inarguable concept in language like the "exposure" trigger, the
61 346"continuous" trigger, or the "triple" trigger. In fact, there is no
342. See id.
343. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
344. 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984).
345. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994).
346. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 14.09 (describing principal court decisions o
n trigger of CGL coverage according to terminology used in cases themselves or
commonly used by commentators). Forty-Eight Insulations adopted the term "expo-
sure" trigger but appeared in fact to regard exposure to asbestos as being tanta-
mount to injury. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633
F.2d 1212, 1222-23 (6th Cir. 1980); supra Part II.D.1.
Cases using hybrid triggers (triggers that combine elements of exposure,
injury, or manifestation), particularly the continuous trigger, obscure with their
nomenclature the essence of the courts' determinations: at least some injury has
taken place during a policy period. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,
667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), is the motherlode of all continuous trigger cases.
But Keene involved asbestos injuries just as did Forty-Eight Insulations and for asbes-
tos and similar chemicals, harmful products, and pollutants, injury is inflicted (or
is at least alleged to have been inflicted) on the claimant from mere exposure and
continued, at least through any times of manifestation, and usually beyond. See id.
at 1045.
In effect, the properly applied actual injury trigger in cases like asbestos
becomes a continuous trigger because of the proper application of the injury trig-
ger, not because the court has benefited the policyholder by formulating a "con-
[Vol. 25
102
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/5
DOMTAR BABY
inconsistency between the two trigger formulations for many prod-
uct or pollution claims. "[I]n the asbestos context, the inju 7 -in-
fact trigger of the CGL policies becomes a continuous trigger."
In the vast majority of decisions, the courts have in fact merely
been applying an actual injury trigger that is activated by the asser-
tions and medical or environmental facts of the cases before the
court. For asbestos, exposure itself causes injury. For pollution,
the contamination was long unseen from the surface but was caus-
ing injury for years. Coverage should have been described in cases
such as Keene based on an injury analysis without the additional
baggage of a purported "continuous" trigger that opened the deci-
sion to criticism as one unduly favorable to policyholders.
Minnesota law clearly recognized this, at least prior to NSP and
Domtar
We view this "actual injury" rule to be sufficiently broad to
recognize that in cases involving long exposure to a toxic
substance there can be damage with more than one mani-
festation and more than one insurance policy can afford
coverage. We reject the argument that there can be only
one occurrence in a case where property damage results
from continuous or repeated conditions of exposure.3
Regarding trigger jurisprudence, NSP is not directly contrary
to this sensible view, although NSP does read as though it is based
tinuous" trigger out of whole cloth. In addition (although courts and commenta-
tors seem to lose sight of this fact), for purposes of determining a CGL insurer's
duty to defend, it is the allegations of the third-party claim that are key. Thus, re-
gardless of the "real" science or etiology of asbestos, pollution, or medical devices,
duty to defend coverage of the CGL is triggered under an injury approach when
the claimants allege actual injury beginning during a policy period. Where cases
settle reasonably, the same rule should apply to determining the trigger of liability
coverage unless the insurer can prove that no damage took place during the policy
period at issue, a point recognized by the NSP court despite its misfiring on the
matter of apportionment. See Northern States Power v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523
N.W.2d 657, 662-63 (Minn. 1994).
347. Flintkote Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., No. 808-594 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 17, 1993), reported in 7 Mealey's Litig. Reps.-Ins. No. 45, at A-56, A-57 (Oct.
5, 1993) quoted in ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, § 4.10, at 224. Accord Sentinel
Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (Haw. 1994); Armstrong World Indus.
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. A049419 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1996), reported in
10 Mealey's Litig. Reps.-Ins. No. 25, at A-i (May 7, 1996) (stating actual injury
trigger not inconsistent with continuous trigger in asbestos or similar cases).
348. Industrial Steel Container Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d
156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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substantially on efficiency concerns that can be interpreted as per-
mitting the policyholder to trigger coverage with a lower showing
of injury than might otherwise be required.3 49 Thus, it is possible
that the NSP court viewed itself as conferring a benefit on the poli-
cyholder that needed to be matched with the burden of proration
by time on the risk.
Reflection on the trigger issue, however, reveals that use of the
so-called continuous trigger was not an unwarranted judicial gift to
the policyholder. Rather, NSP correctly (if perhaps unwittingly)
applied the standard actual injury trigger, which in cases such as in-
sidious harm from products or pollution becomes something of a
rolling actual injury trigger. Application of the injury trigger re-
sults in continuous trigger of the CGL not because policyholders
are benefiting from some newfangled or extra-textual trigger but
because the third-party claims and actual facts of the underlying
lawsuits activate the injury trigger during multiple policy periods.
Once it is realized that courts finding multiple policies trig-
gered in cases such as asbestos and pollution have merely correctly
applied the injury trigger and done nothing extraordinary to favor
the policyholder, the case for allocation that goes beyond the in-
surers or that operates to deprive the policyholder of coverage col-
lapses. The policyholder has not been "given" anything by the
courts regarding trigger and the jurisprudence of the dominant ac-
tual injury trigger does not "take away" any benefits owed the in-
surer. Consequently, there is no need to adopt as a counterweight
an allocation regime that advantages insurers or deprives policy-
holders of some coverage benefits.
Consequently, the aversion of some courts to permitting poli-
349. See NSP, 523 N.W.2d at 663. The court stated:
Where it is scientifically possible to prove the amount of harm occurring
during each policy period, it may be nonetheless too expensive to do so
in cases involving relatively small total damages. At the .same time, the
extremely fact-dependent nature of such an allocation scheme may re-
duce the likelihood of settlement. Finally, as a public policy matter, this
court cannot ignore the enormous difficulty insureds would face if, as is
generally the case, they had the burden of proving the amount of dam-
ages for each policy at issue.
Id. (footnotes omitted). What the NSP court overlooked, however, was that the text
of the CGL imposes no such requirement on the policyholder. The policyholder
has coverage if it can show that damages flowed from an injury beginning during
the policy period. There is no requirement that the policyholder show exactly
how much of this damage from covered injury took place at given time periods.
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cyholders to select the order in which they will call upon insurers to
defend or pay claims is unwarranted. If several CGL policies are
triggered, a policyholder should be permitted to select the order in
which triggered insurers are approached for defense and payment.
There is nothing unfair about this. The insurer required to defend
or pay may seek apportionment of coverage responsibilities vis-a-vis
other insurers and thus can avoid paying anything above its fair
share. There is no need to reduce the policyholder's benefits,
force the policyholder to contribute to the insurance fund, or re-
quire the policyholder to defer receiving insurance coverage while
apportionment among insurers takes place.
Unfortunately, however, the impression persists in some quar-
ters that permitting the policyholder to select its order of request-
ing the benefits of triggered coverage somehow imposes 'joint-and-
several" liability upon insurers or constitutes an improper policy-
holder license to "pick-and-choose" among insurers. Both views are
wrong.
Allowing policyholders to enjoy the full benefit of multiple
triggered insurance coverage is not imposition of joint-and-several
liability upon insurers. In a case of true joint-and-several liability,
each of several defendant tortfeasors are all potentially required to
pay all of the plaintiffs claim even if the most easily tapped defen-
dant is only one percent at fault (although the paying defendant is
entitled to contribution in proportion to fault from the other de-
fendants). Under a Keene regime where the policyholder selects
350the year when coverage is first sought, the targeted insurer is in a
350. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1049-50 (permitting the policyholder to select the
applicable policy for a particular claim but also stating that the policyholder's right
to recovery was limited to the amount of the selected policy). This limitation is
unnecessary. If actual injury/continuous injury triggers the coverage of several
policies and policy years, there is no reason why the policyholder should not be
permitted to tap a second insurer for coverage if the policy limits of the first in-
surer selected are exhausted. In subsequent administration of the case, the trial
court permitted the policyholder to draw benefits for covered claims from more
than one triggered policy, suggesting that it was eventually recognized that the
'one policy" restriction of Keene was something of a slip of the pen. See Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17282 (D.D.C. July 31,
1985) (other insurers required to assume defense when Liberty Mutual, policy-
holder's designated carrier, exhausted; carriers informally agree among them-
selves to prorate by risk). Accord Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 597 F.
Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1984); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1983 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16944 (D.D.C. 1985). Although the one policy limit or one policy period
restriction might work fine for isolated claims falling within the ambit of one pol-
icy's coverage, it would work to reduce coverage in mass claims situations by limit-
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far different position. Absent bad faith, this insurer will never be
required to pay more than its remaining unexhausted policy limits
for the year in question. In other words, an insurer first tapped by
the policyholder in cases of multiple triggered policy years never
pays more than its fair share. When a CGL carrier writes coverage,
it knows it is at risk of paying the full policy limits for a triggered
claim. Under a Keene system, the insurer first approached by the
policyholder continues to have this risk and only this risk. The in-
surer is never required to pay for the fault of others or the liability
of others. The CGL contract itself previously obligated the insurer
to potentially pay the entire policy limits if triggering injury takes
place during the policy period.
Because the NSP and Domtar courts incorrectly read the CGL
as entitling the insurer to further reduce its policy limits if all injury
was not complete at the close of the policy period, the supreme
court also erroneously viewed NSP Company's desire to first tap the
1957 St. Paul Companies CGL as an effort to obtain unfair advan-151
tage. In reality, all NSP Company wanted was to receive the
benefits to which it was rightly entitled under a contract that had
more value than other applicable contracts. There is nothing un-
fair to the insurer if the policyholder draws down triggered benefits
so as to maximize coverage. The insurance policy promised the
policyholder coverage for triggered claims without any limitation
based on other loss experience or insolvency of other carriers.
Thus, if the 1957 St. Paul policy was the one with the most benefits
readily available to NSP Company, NSP should have been permit-
ted to receive these benefits without reduction and without the
prerequisite of simultaneously approaching other triggered insur-
ers for a pro rata share of coverage. What was inconvenient in NSP
became intolerable in Domtar the policyholder was not only pre-
vented from enjoying the fruits of purchased insurance in the most
expeditious manner but was denied some of the contractual benefit
merely because of the timespan over which injury took place.
ing the policyholder's right to recover for claims that straddle different policy pe-
riods.
351. See Northern States Power v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 660 n.4
(Minn. 1994) (criticizing the NSP position as greedy). The NSP court is correct,
however, in suggesting that it would be unfair to permit a policyholder to tap mul-
tiple triggered policies but to pay only one policy year's deductible.
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B. Although Ironclad Allocation Schemes Generally Hold Potential for
Mischief, Allocation to the Policyholder is Particularly Problematic
Even if allocation is restricted to insurers, the policyholder may
be deprived of the benefit of the bargain when the insurer is per-
mitted to reduce coverage responsibility. Where some of the time
periods involve insurance that is uncollectible because of insol-
vency or because the policyholder has already properly called upon
this insurance for covered claims, inter-insurer allocation works an
injustice. Even if allocation among insurers by time on the risk is
the general rule, it should not be an inflexible rule and should be
subject to adjustment in cases of uncollectability or exhaustion.
Many commentators favoring allocation largely recognize and ad-
mit this need to fine-tune an allocation formula so that the policy-
holder is not denied coverage in such situations. But no amount
of fine-tuning can justify imposing coverage costs on the policy-
holder when the policyholder is simultaneously prevented from re-
ceiving available triggered insurance coverage.
Several reasons make imposition of coverage burdens on the
policyholder especially unjustified. Although some of these rea-
sons apply to rigid allocation schemes generally, they take on par-
ticular force where the policyholder is included in the allocation
mix. In addition, allocation to the policyholder raises additional
problems not found if allocation is restricted to insurers.
1. Allocation to the Policyholder Undervalues CGL Policy Language
and the Insurers' Role in Crafting the Terms of the Policy
Perhaps the most succinct assessment is provided in the recent
Armstrong World Industries Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. case:
The insurers [attempting to limit their payments through
proration] have confused the trigger of coverage and the
scope of coverage... . [T]he event which triggers an in-
surance policy's coverage does not define the extent of
the coverage.... [O]nce a[n all sums] policy is triggered,
the policy obligates the insurers to pay "all sums" which
the insured shall become liable to pay. . . . The insurer is
responsible for the full extent of the insured's liability (up
to the policy limits), not just for the part of the damage
352. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 109, at 1290; Gillespie, supra note 198, at 534-35.
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that occurred during the policy period .
The Minnesota Supreme Court put the matter succinctly
nearly thirty years ago:
If the underwriters intended that the policy not include
the use [of the automobile resulting in the loss at issue],
they could have easily said so. Under the most favorable
aspect of construction, it may be said that at the very most
the language chosen by [the insurer] is ambiguous and
must be construed in favor of [the policyholder], thereby
yielding the same result.
2. The Policyholder-Insurer Relationship is Dramatically Different
Than the Relationship of Overlapping or Serially Triggered
Insurers
As the Armstrong World court noted:
A distinction must be drawn between apportionment
among multiple insurers and apportionment between an
insurer and its insured ....
[In an all-sums policy] once coverage is triggered, the
insurer's obligation to the policyholder is to cover the
policyholder's liability "in full" up to the policy limits ....
The logical consequence of this ruling is that the policy-
holder is covered (up to the policy limits) for the full ex-
353. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
354. Federal Ins. Co. v. Prestemon, 278 Minn. 218, 227, 153 N.W.2d 429, 435
(1967) (citing Quaderer v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 N.W.2d 383, 116 N.W.2d
605 (1962)). Accord Pan-American World Airlines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505
F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying New York law and finding rationale of constru-
ing ambiguous provision against insurer buttressed by more exclusionary language
used by insurance industry in other policies but not present in policy at issue in
coverage litigation; thus holding that policy's exclusion for war, riot and insurrec-
tion did not preclude coverage for loss of airplane to skyjacking, which can be
characterized as mere crime rather than act of war or civil insurrection); Kief
Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 35-36 (N.D.
1995) (holding that the insurer precluded from arguing that property insurance
coverage was triggered only upon "discovery" of loss when the insuring agreement
spoke of damage caused rather than discovered, and criminal loss provisions of
same policy demonstrated the insurer's ability to require discovery as a trigger in
the policy text if it so desired).
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tent of its liability and need not pay a pro rata share.""
The key point, obviously related to the contract point made
previously, is that the policyholder is entitled to certain benefits
from its insurance policies, irrespective of whether other policies
are involved in the underlying matter (absent express "other insur-
ance" provisions that reduce or void coverage where overlapping
insurance exists).
3. The Illogical Prejudice Against the Self-Insuring Policyholder
Cases allocating coverage burdens upon the policyholder, even
largely sound cases like Stonewall356 appear beguiled by an apparent
siren song of proration that obscures a court's ability to realize that
it has engaged in the judicial rewriting of contracts judges so often
deplore.
First, the assumption in Stonewall, Owens-Illinois,s" and similar
cases is that a policyholder who "goes bare" is to some extent unde-
serving of full insurance coverage even if policies purchased by the
policyholder would otherwise allow for full indemnity. This senti-
ment is reflected in Judge Weinstein's wiseacre aphorism in Uni-
royal that "[s]elf-insurance is called "going bare" for a reason. "'5s
This same unduly dismissive characterization of the policyholder's
conduct is of course found in the Stonewall trial court's assessment
(rejected by the Second Circuit) that the insured had "bargained
away" asbestos coverage.3 59  As the Second Circuit in Stonewall
noted, anyone familiar with the insurance market of the mid-1980s
could not seriously describe the unavailability of asbestos or other
product liability coverage as the result of manufacturers' risk accep-
tance or wheeling-and-dealing over coverage terms.360 The forced
355. Armstrong World, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-11.
356. Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d
1178 (2d Cir. 1995); see supra Part II.D.l.a (noting that Stonewall made a welcome
modification of the trial court's onerous position that the policyholder was responsi-
ble for post-1985 losses even though the insurance industry united in refusing to sell
asbestos coverage).
357. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994) (using
continuous injury trigger, requiring factual examination of timing of damage from
triggering injury, but adopting default formula of allocation according to time on
the risk and respective policy limits of triggered insurers).
358. Uniroyal Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
359. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1203-04.
360. See id. at 1204.
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shift from the occurrence to the claims-made policy, one chroni-
cled in the Insurance Antitrust Litigation brought by state attorneys
general against insurers for alleged collusion in forcing industry-
wide adoption of the claims-made CGL form, 61 further evidences
the degree to which insurers rather than policyholders were calling
the shots regarding liability coverage during most of the time peri-
362ods at issue in mass tort insurance coverage cases.
But on closer analysis, this judicial assessment that the policy-
holder without ample annual insurance has somehow done some-
thing wrong and punishable is erroneous and unfairly critical of
the policyholder. The courts prorating to the policyholder over-
look:
(1) the terms of the occurrence CGL itself, which provides for
all sums coverage without restriction related to uninsured
periods;
(2) the insurers' own role in underwriting these policies to
customers it knew (at least constructively) had self-insured
or purchased small policies in the past; and
(3) prorating to the policyholder for the multiyear tort pro-
vides reduced coverage for this type of claim as compared
to the "typical" episodic tort claim that arises from an oc-
currence taking place in only one policy period.
Although there is perhaps some room for debate, the logically
stronger public policy is to provide for broader coverage of the
multiyear mass tort than the "single shot" or "garden variety" tort so
long as this is done without doing violence to contract language,
party intent, the purpose and function of the CGL, reasonable ex-
pectations, insurance principles or other important public policy
factors. Applied to cases like asbestos, medical products and pollu-
tion, it appears that no other factors of significance auger in favor
of providing policyholders with less mass tort coverage than would
exist from a barrage of "plebeian" torts.
361. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993).
362. The tightness of the insurance market was so pronounced in the mid-
1980s that Time magazine ran a cover story describing the ironclad tightness of the
liability insurance market and a situation where coverage was simply unavailable
from conventional insurers, even for policyholders willing to pay premium prices.
See Sorry: Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 20.
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4. Prorating Coverage to the Policyholder Vitiates the Very Function
of Liability Insurance
The CGL policy language-which was drafted by the insurance• - 363
industry -weighs against proration. The policyholder could rea-
sonably expect not to absorb losses for which it had purchased in-
surance and may have had an actual expectation to this effect. A
substantial amount of evidence of the drafting history of the CGL
suggests that individual insurers and perhaps the entire industry
knew that multiyear torts would trigger several policy periods but
the CGL drafters specifically declined to seek an express proration
provision in the policies.
Proration to the policyholder also violates the function and
purpose of CGL. The very theory of insurance is that the policy-
holder accepts and shoulders a certain but manageable expense
(premium payment) in return for obtaining protection against a
larger but contingent loss (the tort claim). The insurer obtains
some upside certainty through the policy limits. When the policy-
holder pays the premium it should therefore be accorded the full
benefit of the CGL. Although the policyholder may need to shoul-
der deductibles or retentions or co-payments if expressly written
into the policy, the insured normally has an ironclad right to cov-
erage should a qualifying tort claim be made against it. Thus, if a
manufacturer's improperly made widget explodes and kills some-
one, the insurance in place at the time of the explosion provides
coverage. But under the rationale of Domtar and similar cases, the
policyholder does not obtain full coverage when the widget silently
injures a large group over several years if the policyholder was un-
insured for so much as a single year. But the CGL in each case is
the same in language and structure. Thus, proration to the policy-
363. This authorship holds true even in most cases involving large commercial
or "sophisticated" policyholders. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482
N.E.2d 467, 469 (Ind. 1985) (finding insurer's "manuscript" policies written for
larger commercial insured to be considered as authored by the insurer and con-
strued against insurer in cases of ambiguity where policy language "identical in all
material respects to the coverage provision in the insurance industry's Compre-
hensive General Liability Policy (CGL)").
364. See generally Eugene R. Anderson et al., Environmental Insurance Coverage in
New Jersey: A Tale of Two Stories, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 83, 202-04 (1992) (discussing that
the drafters clearly understood that the CGL does not limit the insurance com-
pany's obligation to a "portion" of the policyholder's liability); EUGENE R.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 53, §§ 4.1-4.2 (discussing the drafter's understanding
of the triggering of several policy periods for consecutive torts).
365. See ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 1-5.
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holder gives the policyholder less coverage under the same CGL
form than would be provided by that CGL form under ordinary
circumstances.
This aspect of Domtar-judicial activism to reduce purchased
policy benefits-is particularly pronounced and pernicious when
the proration occurs because other liability insurance in other pol-
icy periods has been exhausted by other claims. In these cases, the
policyholder is not some careless lout "going bare" but instead is a
victim of the mass tort phenomenon and the growth of liability
claims during the twentieth century. The policyholder buys insur-
ance every year. When the policyholder is hit with claims-the very
reason it purchases insurance-some policies become exhausted as
expected. However, the unexhausted policies continue to purport
to provide "all sums" coverage. Under these circumstances, the
policyholder is even more obviously deprived of purchased CGL
coverage simply because the very events insured against have come
to pass.
In view of the public policy benefits of maximizing funds for
tort injury compensation when this can be done without violating
contract norms, the clear weight of considerations suggests that
manufacturers facing a mass tort should at least do no worse in
seeking insurance coverage than do manufacturers facing ordinary
and episodic tort claims. However, proration to the policyholder
providesjust this perverse result: policyholders who have purchased
the "all sums" occurrence coverage once trumpeted by the insur-
ance industry find their insurance protection reduced by judicial
fiat simply because of the configuration of the underlying tort,
which took place over several years rather than in one big bang of
injury.
5. Proration to the Policyholder is Unjustified for Even Pronounced
Instances of Self-Insurance
These basic and unassailable arguments against proration to
the policyholder hold true irrespective of the type of tort claims,
the number of years when insurance is lacking, the market for in-
surance, and the policyholder's irresponsibility in not purchasing
insurance. Consider the "horrible hypothetical" invoked by the
Forty-Eight Insulations court in support of proration to the policy-
holder.3  A manufacturer goes bare for nineteen years and pur-
366. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
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chases one year of CGL coverage with a policy limit of $1 billion.
During this twenty year period the asbestos or similar injury occurs.
The Forty-Eight Insulations court asked in almost rhetorical fashion
whether it could be fair to require the insurer to pay when the
manufacturer has gone so long without coverage, and quickly con-
cluded that this was sufficiently unfair to require proration to the
policyholder.m'
But a more sustained analysis reveals no unfairness, no wind-
fall and certainly no legal basis for denying the policyholder the
benefits of the coverage purchased through a (95 percent!) pro
rata reduction. Examining the single CGL in isolation shows that
the insurer promised to pay, without reduction, as much as $1 bil-
lion in settlement or judgment of claims without any reduction be-
cause of any absence of insurance in other years. The insurer
could have included such provisions in its policy but did not. Con-
sequently, the Year 20 insurer is obligated to pay (and to defend
under this variation of the Forty-Eight Insulations hypothetical, which
is remarkably similar in impact to Domtar) without regard to
whether the insurers for Years 1 through 19 were exhausted, insol-
vent or unwilling to pay. By implication, the complete absence of
any insurance in Years 1 through 19 should not have any impact on
the contractual duties of the Year 20 insurer vis-a-vis the policy-
holder.
As a matter of contract law, then, the Year 20 insurer's obliga-
tions can not be reduced by the status of Year 1 through Year 19 in-
surance or its absence. When the Forty-Eight Insulations/Domtar hy-
pothetical is examined more closely, it also becomes apparent that
there is nothing unfair about holding the Year 20 insurer to its con-
tractual arrangement and nothing improper about permitting the
policyholder to enjoy the full "fruits" (bitter though they may be in
the mass tort context) of the Year 20 policy. The policyholder paid
for the Year 20 policy. The insurer took the application, engaged
in underwriting and issued the policy. The policyholder's activities
in other years implicated by the tort claims are irrelevant to the du-
ties owed the policyholder by the Year 20 insurer.
1219 (6th Cir. 1980).
367. See id. at 1225.
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6. Where the Policyholder is in Some Way Undeserving of Coverage,
One or More Traditional Defenses to Coverage Will Be
Applicable, Making Proration to the Insured Unjustified or
Superfluous
It should also be emphasized that the Year 20 insurer, lest
courts continue to have some inclination of pity, has a variety of
grounds for contesting coverage if there really is anything im-
proper or unjustified about the policyholder's request for coverage.
With or without foundation, experienced insurer counsel can often
suggest as many as two dozen possible defenses to coverage for the
average claim, and often do so in their first response to a policy-
holder's claim. Without slicing the subject as finely as do many in-
surer counsel, it is safe to say that at least half a dozen and probably
a dozen defenses are available should the coverage claim stem from
any legitimate possibility of serious wrongdoing or overreaching or
unfair conduct by the policyholder. For example, the insurer may
contest coverage on the basis of:
* late notice
" inadequate documentation of the loss
" failure to cooperate
" unauthorized claims resolution
" the claim stemming from injury expected or intended from
the standpoint of the policyholder
" the claim lying outside the scope of coverage
" the claim falling within an exclusion from coverage
" the claim stemming from negligence during the policy pe-
riod but not actually resulting in injury during the policy
period
" the exhaustion of the policy's limits from other claims
" lapse of coverage due to premium nonpayment
" rescission of the CGL due to misrepresentation in the ap-
plication process
* rescission of the policy on mutual mistake or any other
grounds available under contract law.
Although this list undoubtedly is overdone for even the aver-
age mass tort matter, it serves to illustrate the point. If there is any
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serious problem with the claim, the insurer has a wealth of widely
recognized defenses to coverage. The insurer hardly needs the
benefits of a partial or hidden defense to coverage in the form of
proration to the policyholder.
This raises a further jurisprudential problem with proration to
the policyholder. It provides an additional, unwritten, unexpected
tactical defense and substantive benefit to the insurer. This is prob-
lematic for several reasons.
First, recognition of such "implied" defenses to coverage or
grounds for reducing coverage run counter to contract law norms,
which generally do not recognize refusals to honor a contract
based solely on nontextual arguments. The insurers may character-
ize their proration position as a "prudential" argument that at-
tempts to prevent windfalls and to spread the imposition of loss,
but as the analysis earlier in this article underscores, the policy-
holder obtains no windfall and the insurer is not entitled to spread
back to the policyholder the loss that the insurer previously ac-
cepted without reservation.
Second, adoption of this sort of defense runs counter to the
maxim of insurance contract interpretation that exclusions should
be narrowly construed in favor of the policyholder and that the in-
surer bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exclusion.
Although the policyholder has the initial burden to show that a
third-party claim comes within coverage, this burden has been eas-
ily satisfied by the manufacturer defendants in mass tort product
liability claims such as asbestos or silicon implants. Consequently,
an attempt to reduce the scope of coverage operates in the nature
of an exclusion and the insurer bears the burden to persuade
courts by a preponderance of the evidence that something about
the mass tort coverage situation justifies a de facto diminution in
coverage simply because the injury resulted over several years, in-
cluding some time periods for which insurance is not available. As
delineated above, the insurers simply cannot make a sufficient
showing to justify coverage reduction, even for the manufacturer
who buys insurance only in the last year of a twenty year period.
The policyholder remains entitled to the insurance it bought for
Year 20.
Third, acceptance of proration to the policyholder-or for
that matter, any allocation among insurers that fails to account for
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insolvency, exhaustion or collectability368-provides insurers with
yet one more bite at the metaphorical apple of claims denial. In-
surers ordinarily have many potential opportunities to avoid or re-
duce coverage. Under these circumstances, it seems odd for courts
to stretch to create another ground for diminishing coverage ab-
sent a compelling command from the contract language, the na-
ture of the insurance business, tort law or statute. Applied to mass
product liability claims to date, no such compelling need appears
to exist for creating from relatively whole cloth yet another insurer
defense to coverage.
Fourth, the availability of proration or allocation defenses by
insurers provides not simply another defense but a defense largely
repetitive of other existing defenses. A defendant can by definition
prevail by playing defense and engaging in a war of attrition in
which the claimant must again and again move forward to prove its
entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition to of-
ten wearing the claimant down for settlement, this tactic can per-
mit winning by attrition in litigation, even where the defendant as a
technical matter bears the burden of persuasion and the detriment
of rules of construction.
Applied to the insurance coverage context, the defense advan-
tage works something like this. The policyholder makes a claim.
The insurer denies and cites the laundry list of defenses noted
above, including intentional act, misrepresentation and the like.
To the extent some defenses involve the language of the insuring
agreement clause, the policyholder bears the burden of persuasion.
Even if the defense is in the nature of an exclusion on which the
insurer bears the burden of proof, the policyholder is nonetheless
forced to put on a case, often at substantial expense (including in-
puts of cost in kind such as employee time and distraction from the
company's main business) and delay.
Assume the policyholder surmounts these defenses. Having
proven that it did not expect or intend the loss, that the loss was
fortuitous and not known, that adequate notice was provided to the
insurer, that damages were mitigated, that it was sufficiently coop-
erative, and that it did not engage in ex gratia settlements, the poli-
cyholder faces yet another hurdle, one that is essentially insur-
368. In addition to concerns over insolvency, there may be an issue as to col-
lectability of some insurance policy proceeds. For example, a foreign insurer may
not be insolvent but its assets may be difficult (or perhaps impossible) to reach if it
refuses to honor ajudgrnent against it in a coverage action.
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mountable under the essentially rigid allocation formula used by
Domtar. Despite having shown its entitlement to defense and in-
demnity, the policyholder now has its indemnity reduced, often
dramatically, through an apportionment not provided by contract
or insurance essentials. Only if the policyholder can, per SCSC,
show that the pollution came from a discrete, identifiable, tempo-
rally cabined cause, can the policyholder obtain coverage.
But the great and unspoken irony in this sudden emergence of
allocation as a de facto coverage defense is that allocation to the
policyholder (or allocation that fails to account for insolvency and
exhaustion of other policies) can be justified only on equity
grounds. Therefore, to be permitted, allocation must be necessary
to prevent unfairness or in some other way "do equity" among the
disputants.
But, as detailed above, a failure to allocate is anything but un-
fair to the insurer. The insurer accepted the risk of nonallocation
by issuing a contract that committed it to providing defense and
indemnity without allocation. Enforcement of this term of the in-
suring agreement is far less onerous to the insurer than enforce-
ment of deadlines, default provisions, and penalties frequently en-
forced in contract litigation. Thus, allocation is not necessary to
give equity to the insurer.
Allocation could perhaps be justified on equitable grounds if it
is used to prevent unjust enrichment to the policyholder. But as
long as the policyholder does not get overpaid, there is no unjust
enrichment-unless the apportionment is intended to serve as a
proxy for denying or diminishing coverage because of other mis-
conduct or undeservingness on the part of the policyholder. But
the policyholder has already proven itself to be deserving and not
possessed of unclean hands by virtue of triumphing over the in-
surer's defenses of intentional harm, known loss, misrepresentation
and the like. Thus, when the arguments for allocation are pursued
full circle, the inevitable conclusion-the point where argument
can go no further-is that there is no equitable justification for ap-
portioning coverage responsibility to the policyholder.
Even without allocation, the policyholder will bear substantial
coverage responsibility in many ways in a typical complex products
liability mass tort. The policyholder must often:
* shoulder a deductible or retention;
" suffer the costs of insurer insolvency when no overlapping
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coverage exists;
* suffer insolvency costs because excess insurers will seldom
be required to drop down;
" incur the transaction costs of pursuing through litigation
coverage it should have received without dispute;
" perhaps absorb additional costs if after providing a defense
the court finds them to have paid counsel too well;
" pay the liability costs after policy limits are exhausted;
" pay for judgments and settlements for which no insurance
policy is triggered.
Consequently, the policyholder often pays, at least initially, vast
sums from its own treasury even where it was prudent and pure of
heart regarding insurance. Imposing further costs on the policy-
holder through allocation can be justified only if the insurer was
not pure of heart-but the policyholder's successful parrying of
other "bad policyholder" defenses of the insurer precludes such an
assessment. In the end, proration to the policyholder merely pun-
ishes the deserving insured based on an unspoken and inaccurate
perception that the policyholder is in some way an undeserving in-
sured merely because it was self-insured or ran out of insurance
during some years.
7. Prorating Coverage to the Policyholder Defeats the Purpose of
Liability Insurance by Effectively Punishing the Policyholder for
Negligence or Miscalculation
Related to this is yet another argument against allocation to
the insured: it essentially punishes the policyholder for perceived
negligence in failing to purchase insurance or buying too little in-
surance. However, the very purpose of insurance is to protect the
policyholder from the consequences of negligence. Consequently,
even if one accepts for purposes of argument that the policyholder
was negligent, this should not strip the policyholder of the insur-
ance it did purchase, just as a policyholder's negligence giving rise
to tort claims does not negate insurance coverage. Rather, the es-
sence of insurance is to provide coverage to the negligent policy-
holder, regardless of the form of that negligence.
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8. Proration to the Policyholder Violates Reasonable Expectations
and Substitutes Ex Post Analysis for the Ex Ante Analysis that
Normally Governs Contract and Commercial Law Policy
Allocation to the policyholder is wrong in large part because
the courts, seemingly without appreciating the consequences of
their actions, have changed the rules of insurance coverage in the
proverbial middle of the game and have done so at the expense of
the policyholder, the entity that under traditional insurance juris-
prudence is supposed to receive the benefit of any close legal ques-
tions.
In addition, the court's implicit determination that the policy-
holder was negligent in failing to buy insurance is of course a post
hoc evaluation. In effect, the courts allocating to the policyholder
employ 20-20 hindsight to find fault with risk management strate-
gies of decades previous on the basis of 1990s knowledge of the po-
tential ravages of mass tort claims. Under traditional insurance
doctrine, difficult issues related to risk bearing under conditions of
uncertainty are resolved against insurers and in favor of policy-
holders-not the other way around. Apportionment against the
policyholder thus in another manner turns the principles of insur-
ance law inside out in the cause of inequity rather than fairness.
V. THE IMPOVERISHED AND UNREALISTIC ARGUMENTS OF THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY: ADVOCATES OF ALLOCATION TO THE
POLICYHOLDER EMPLOY UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS AND
ERRONEOUS CONCEPTS OF THE INSURING ARRANGEMENT IN ARGUING
FOR ALLOCATION TO THE POLICYHOLDER
Courts and commentators favoring allocation to the policy-
holder make a superficially persuasive case that tends to implode
upon examination. Several of these infirmities-ignoring the in-
suring agreement and the function of insurance and mischaracter-
izing issues of fairness and desert-are detailed above. In addition,
those favoring proration to the policyholder have, at least implic-
itly, rested support for imposing costs upon the insured on an es-
sentially strained or inaccurate portrayal of liability insurance ar-
rangements. Recent scholarly commentary has delineated these
fallacious assumptions and arguments in greater detail than one
finds in the case law and permits closer examination of this aspect
of the error of allocation to the policyholder.
Of particular interest is the recent article by Professors J. David
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Cummins and Neil A. Doherty, Allocating Continuous Occurrence Li-
ability Losses Across Multiple Insurance Policies.369 Cummins & Doherty
advance a sophisticated rationale for allocation to the policyholder
that when applied to multiyear mass tort claims may deprive the
policyholder of even more coverage than would be lost under the
Domtar regime.370 The Cummins & Doherty thesis sufficiently out-
371raged some policyholder counsel to engender a swift response.
The policyholder response is quite persuasive and deserves more
credence than the theoretical case for allocation. Although there
have been other thoughtful commentaries on the allocation is-372
sue, I will focus on the Cummins & Doherty piece because it pre-
369. J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, Allocating Continuous Occurrence Li-
ability Losses Across Multiple Insurance Policies, 8 ENVTL. CLAIMSJ., Spring 1996, at 5.
Although the Environmental Claims Journal is a proprietary publication rather than
an established law review, it is widely read by insurance coverage attorneys, who
will undoubtedly marshal favorable commentary in case briefs and argument. In
addition, Cummins and Doherty, both professors at the Wharton School of Busi-
ness at the University of Pennsylvania, have substantial academic reputations that
may make invocation of their allocation writings persuasive to courts.
370. See id. at 22-23.
371. See John E. Heintz et al., Allocation of Indemnity among Multiple Insurance
Policies, 9 ENVTL. CLAIMSJ. , Autumn 1996, at 5.
372. See Michael G. Doherty, Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability
Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (1997) (arguing alloca-
tion among policies where proportions of damage cannot be determined due to
extended periods of time over which the damage occurred); Gillespie, supra note
198; Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98; Yin, supra note 109; see also James M.
Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate Over the Appro-
priate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625 (1997) (arguing not so much for alloca-
tion as that continuous version of actual injury trigger is inapt for product liability
injuries where damage in later years is merely profession of disease or deteriora-
tion of claimant's condition set in motion by original injury rather than result of
years of separate, coverage-triggering injuries). In general, there has been rela-
tively little academic commentary on the issue. There have been some well done
articles that are too partisan for my taste, particularly in their suggestion that poli-
cyholders are to blame for multiyear torts or are insurance delinquents who failed
to buy enough insurance and thus somehow forfeit the insurance actually pur-
chased. See Laura A. Foggan & John C. Yang, Tortfeasors' Responsibility for Uninsured
Periods: Allocation, Economics, and Market Demand, 8 ENVrL. CLAIMSJ., Summer 1996,
at 3 (contributing article by lawyers representing IELA); Hickman & DeYoung, su-
pra note 98, at 290-91 (implying that policyholders' just dessert is to shoulder por-
tion of coverage where insurance is not seamless). Although arguments based on
wrongdoing would be persuasive if the policyholder's role in the underlying tort
met the expected or intended defense, the known loss defense, or the loss in pro-
gress defense, it really becomes only an exercise in rhetorical posturing when trot-
ted out to justify imposition of coverage responsibility upon the policyholder. To
date, most courts, like NSP and Domtar, have rejected the insurance industry ar-
gument that the asbestos and pollution defendants should be denied coverage be-
cause of their conduct in the underlying tort actions.
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sents the full array of the mainstream insurer arguments for alloca-
tion, it takes the most extreme position for allocation-and be-
cause it is one of the most sophisticated presentations. 73
Cummins & Doherty take the basic position that policyholders
should bear some of the coverage responsibility for multiyear oc-
currences for any periods of self-insurance.374 Beyond this, how-
ever, Cummins & Doherty also take the position that the maximum
insurance coverage available to the policyholder in a multiyear oc-
currence situation is the insurance coverage it possesses in a typical
year or year of greatest coverage. 5 They take this position out of a
belief that policyholders engage in risk management in which they
attempt to purchase and keep in force a certain amount of insur-
ance in case faced with an occurrence-any occurrence, even a
multiyear mass tort with massive liability. Based on this assumption,
Cummins & Doherty take the position that any apportionment that
gives the policyholder (even the policyholder who never self-
insured) more coverage for a series of related claims than this
maximum one-year coverage package in effect "stacks" different li-S •• 376
ability policies and thus violates basic insurance principles.
Cummins & Doherty calculate and defend the calculation of
their aggregate insurance coverage in a series of illustrations which
posit that the policyholder has a package of insurance for each year
that includes: $10 million deductible, primary coverage of $40 mil-
lion, excess coverage of $50 million on top of the primary level,
and policyholder self-insurance (an "upper SIR") for amounts in
373. The sources cited in the previous note, particularly NailingJello to a Wall
(Yin, supra note 109), are also sophisticated in approach, particularly as to the
economics and mathematics of allocation. But the Cummins & Doherty piece is
the most pro-insurer academic contribution to the debate (they would allocate
more coverage responsibility to the policyholder even though Yin advocates some
allocation to policyholders). Consequently, the Cummins & Doherty article is my
principal target for criticism.
374. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 19-20.
375. See id. According to Cummins & Doherty, "a sensible approach" is to first
"establish the aggregate liability of all insurers and self-insurers (i.e., the policy-
holder) and then to find a heuristic for allocating this total across all insurers and
self-insurers." Id. at 7. But according to Cummins & Doherty, the policyholder is
not permitted to aggregate years of occurrence coverage to determine the scope
of the insurers' liability. See id. at 18-19.
376. See id. at 7 ("Stacking of limits per event or occurrence (or of the per
event or per occurrence deductibles) over the years is incompatible with the rea-
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excess of $100 million."' Thus, for a $200 million, one-year claim,
the policyholder would obtain $90 million in insurance coverage
(the $40 million primary limit and the $50 million excess limit) but
would pay $110 million of its own money (the $10 million deducti-
ble and the $100 million "upper SIR" above the excess policy limit).
In all of the Cummins & Doherty scenarios, this basic package of
insurance is the same in each year, obviating any need to calculate
the apt amount when the policyholder's coverage package varies
from year to year.17s
The rationale for this assumption is the idea that when the
policyholder purchases coverage for a particular policy period, the
amount of insurance purchased is the maximum that the policy-
holder wished to purchase for application to any one occurrence.
Cummins & Doherty posit that this is the policyholder's objective
no matter how extraordinary the occurrence, how large the liability
flowing from the occurrence, how many years are spanned by the
occurrence, and whether other insurance policies are involved .
Hence, where a multiyear mass tort arises from one cause and is
deemed one occurrence under the policy, the policyholder is lim-
ited to one year's worth of insurance for that entire occurrence-
no matter how multiyear or mass the occurrence. In other words,
the policyholder gets the same aggregate coverage for asbestos,
Dalkon Shield, Times Beach, Agent Orange, and breast implants as
the policyholder would possess for a fatal auto accident, defaming a
competitor, or tortious interference liability.
Cummins & Dohertyjustify this result under a self-styled "prin-
ciple of symmetry" that suggests treating the multiyear mass tort
occurrence as the risk management equivalent of the episodic tort
liability that happens crisply in one policy year.' s° They also offer a
"rational risk manager" model of behavior to reconstruct the intent
377. See id. at 14-18.
378. See id. at 15-18. Although Cummins & Doherty are not clear on what
happens then, it appears they endorse using the coverage package of the year
closest to the occurrence's initiation as the benchmark for each year of the
multiyear occurrence. See id. at 21-23. Where this cannot be done, they would ap-
parently average coverage packages to calculate the deductible, the primary policy,
the excess coverages, and the maximum aggregate limit or "upper SIR" or permit
use of the year with the highest coverage package as the benchmark. See id. But
even under the most favorable application of the Cummins & Doherty approach,
the policyholder is essentially limited to one year's worth of insurance even
though it faces a crippling multiyear tort claim.
379. See id. at 15.
380. See id. at 13-15.
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of the policyholder in purchasing insurance prior to the multiyear
tort claims:
[W] e believe the clear and consistent intention of the par-
ties is that the policyholder is protected by a single de-
ductible of $10 million per occurrence consistent with its
calculated capacity to bear and absorb smaller losses. The
primary insurer, having assessed its financial capacity, has
agreed that it can bear $40 million per event and has been
paid for coverage at that level; similarly with the excess
carrier. Thus, if it was financially appropriate to have a
$10 million deductible and $90 million of coverage for
Cases 1 and 2 [single-year occurrences], given the finan-
cial capacities of the policyholder and insurers, then it was
sensible to have $10 million deductible and $90 million
coverage in Case 3 [for a multiyear occurrence].82
By characterizing the single year's insurance package as the
outer limit of intended coverage, Cummins & Doherty then make a
gigantic inferential leap, suggesting that collection under more
than one triggered policy amounts to impermissible "stacking" of
policy limits:
We do agree that policies in separate years can be trig-
gered by an event that results in bodily injury or property
damage in those years. What we disagree with is that such
triggering implies stacking of either deductibles or per
occurrence limits. This implication is inconsistent with
the functioning of insurance markets.
Cummins & Doherty also state:
[T] he idea of stacking violates any reasonable interpreta-
tion of the risk-bearing capacities of the parties, their
plausible risk management strategies, or the pricing of the
contracts.... Occurrences that just happen to span two
policy years would (retroactively) be determined to have
twice as much coverage as occurrences within a single pol-
381. See id. at 18.
382. Id. at l7.
383. Id. at 19.
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icy year. Occurrences that spanned five years would have
five times the coverage as occurrences happening in an
instant, and so on. This random approach fits no sensible
model of risk management that we have ever encoun-
tered.
... Stacking would expose the insurer that continued
coverage in any layer to paying many times over for the
same event, despite the fact that the annually renewed
policies limit coverage per occurrence. In this way, stack-
ing may force the insurer to pay beyond its declared pru-
dent capacity to absorb the loss. Stacking violates the
principles of diversification on which insurance rests and
for this reason, it would be uninsurable prospectively.•
As part of this calculation of a single-shot amount of coverage,
Cummins & Doherty characterize any liability rising above their
calculated one-year maximum policy limits as an "upper self-
insured retention," theorizing that the rational policyholder acting
prior to the onset of the occurrence "chose" to self-insure for losses
above the policy limits-even where these losses stem from long tail
occurrences triggering several policies.
As discussed in greater detail below, Cummins & Doherty's
feigned shock comprises the insurance scholar's equivalent of pro-
testing too much. The expectation of coverage from several poli-
cies because of a multiyear occurrence is hardly shocking, irra-
tional, or unfair. For example, assume the policyholder made a
batch of defective widgets in Year 1 and this manufacture was one
occurrence. Assume the widgets are pulled from inventory in Years
1 through 5, causing horrendous injury that equals or exceeds pol-
icy limits in all years. A policyholder would presumably expect cov-
erage under all of these policies, which were all triggered by dam-
age caused by an occurrence during each year. Although the five
384. Id. at 18.
385. See id. at 19-20. Cummins & Doherty do treat their "one-occurrence/one
policy period coverage package" model logically regarding deductibles and there-
fore would impose only one deductible on the policyholder. See id. at 27. The
amount of the deductible would be calculated in the manner in which the policy
limit is calculated. They acknowledge that this approach would benefit policy-
holders with relatively small multiyear losses because multiple deductibles would
erode significant amounts of coverage. See id. at 35-36. They also appreciate that
the effect is exactly the opposite for the policyholder who has large multiyear
losses in which the insurance received after multiple deductibles provides signifi-
cant coverage near or at the policy limits. See id. at 36.
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triggered policies may each have a "per occurrence" limitation, the
per occurrence limit applies separately to each insurer-this is what
the CGL provides. Had insurers wished to further limit their own
policy's exposure where the occurrence also caused injury during
other policy periods, the CGL could have been so drafted.
Cummins & Doherty describe a multiyear tort as some sort of
odd coincidence with little meaning for liability or insurance. They
conjure a misleading example (damage that begins late in Year X
and continues to the beginning of Year Y) in an attempt to argue
that policy periods and amounts are essentially arbitrary conven-
iences of accounting that should not distract judicial focus from a
single occurrence. But in reality, most multiyear torts are some-
thing more than a tort that straddles calendar years. On the con-
trary, the famous multiyear torts of the reported cases are insidious
or hidden injury that takes place gradually over an extended period
of time. For these types of claims, policyholders undoubtedly ex-
pect triggered policies to respond and it is not in any way unfair to
the insurer or overcompensating to the policyholder for all trig-
gered policies to be responsible as promised in the policy limits for
which premiums (separate premiums each year) were charged.
To the extent that Cummins & Doherty's arguments are ac-
cepted, the consequences would be to strip the policyholder of a
substantial amount of coverage for which it paid. The only means
of avoiding this result, under this theory of limits, is to readjust the
strict cause analysis that dominates judicial determinations of what
constitutes an "occurrence." Instead of seeing the manufacture of
asbestos or widgets as the "cause" of loss, courts could characterize
each installation of product or each shipment of product as the
cause. Although this approach runs somewhat against the text of
the typical CGL's unifying directive attempting to link as one all
loss stemming from substantially the same underlying conditions,
the suggested expansion is not precluded by policy text (a court
could interpret the "substantially the same conditions" language to
apply to the injury to claimants rather than the cause of the injury).
Cause analysis has been popular with the courts in recent years
in part because it limits the number of deductibles or self-insured•386
retentions that must be satisfied by the policyholder. At the same
386. See STEMPEL, supra note 18, § 2.06[h] (discussing modem comparative
popularity of "cause" analysis, which measure number of "occurrences" according
to cause of loss rather than "effects" analysis, which determines number of occur-
rences according to number of affected claimants).
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time, cause analysis limits the insurer's exposure by making it far
less likely that the insurer will be required to pay the policy limits in
numerous instances arising from related circumstances. In es-
sence, cause analysis is popular not so much because it is invariably
decreed by clear policy language but because it results in most
cases in evenhanded interpretation consistent with the parties' ex-
pectations and does not unduly favor either insurer or policy-
holder.
But if the Cummins & Doherty approach is adopted, the bal-
ance of fairness tips strongly toward the insurer and creates unfair-
ness. Under their scheme, the insurer still retains the advantage of
a narrow definition of occurrence that limits the number of occur-
rences. In addition, even where the loss spans many years, the in-
surer's policy limits are not threatened more than once. Further-
more, the many insurers triggered by the multiyear occurrence,
despite having faced no greater risk, are permitted (even com-
pelled) to share in the multiyear loss. In other words, the Cum-
mins & Doherty approach turns insurance into a means of spread-
ing risk among insurers for benefit of the insurers when insurance
is supposed to spread risk among policyholders for the benefit of
policyholders. Insurers have ample means to share risk through
obtaining reinsurance or diversifying their risk portfolios and do
not need to obtain relief from policyholders. The Cummins & Do-
herty approach both turns risk distribution inside out and gives in-
surers a judicially created benefit at odds with their contractual
commitment to policyholders.
The Cummins & Doherty thesis is riddled with other problems
as well, many of which are addressed at some length in the policy-
holder counsel article written directly in response. In addition, it
bears emphasis that Cummins & Doherty have mischaracterized the
notion of "stacking" policy limits, a term unfortunately borrowed
from automobile insurance. This is common misunderstanding
made even by commentators favoring the application of multiple
policies and policy periods to multiyear torts.
This attempted analogy suffers from a fundamental
387. See Heintz et al., supra note 371, at 6-8.
388. See, e.g., Thomas Baker & Eva Orlebeke, The Application of Per-Occurrence
Limits From Successive Policies, 3 ENVrL. CLAIMSJ. 411, Summer 1991, at 420-21; Gil-
lespie, supra note 198, at 572-73 (comparing application of CGL policies in succes-
sive years to stacking of uninsured motorist benefits under multiple automobile
coverage's in same policy period).
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mischaracterization of risk. In the uninsured or underinsured mo-
torist cases, the typical scenario has a policyholder who insures two
or more cars with the insurer. Car 1 is hit by an uninsured driver,
causing damage dramatically higher than the uninsured motorist
benefits available in Car l's insurance policy. The policyholder
then seeks to collect Car 2's uninsured motorist benefits as well, ar-
guing that both policies were purchased and a covered loss has oc-
curred under one policy, activating the related policy. Many states
permitted such stacking under older, more ambiguous versions of
the standard auto policy. Subsequently, insurers amended auto
policy forms to add anti-stacking language, and courts have rou-
tinely enforced such language to preclude stacking."'
The commercial liability situation is simply very different. In
the auto stacking case, the insurer has issued one policy that covers
a particular risk: the chance that Car 1 will be involved in an injury-
producing event. The insurer also issues a policy for Car 2 that in-
sures a different particular risk: the chance that Car 2 will be in-
volved in an injury-producing event. Even in the absence of anti-
stacking language, it would make sense for courts to prohibit stack-
ing on the ground that the insurer has arguably made a separate
valuation of the risk involved with insuring each car, attempted to
limit its maximum liability for incidents involving the car, and cal-
culated a corresponding premium specific to that car. Thus, the
Car 1 policy and its risk is different than the Car 2 policy and its
risk. It seems unfair then to saddle the Car 2 policy with the Car 1
risk and loss.
390
By contrast, the typical CGL policies issued to a commercial
policyholder over several years all cover the same type of risk: liabil-
ity and claims against the policyholder. Only the time periods are
different, and for each time period the policy in force takes on the
risk of covered loss occurring during that time period. Conse-
quently, if the event causing loss during the policy period causes
loss in other policy periods, multiple policies are triggered. Cum-
mins & Doherty concede this point.39 When a policy is triggered
389. See Hanson v. Prudential Property Cas. Ins. Co., No. 98-0692, 1999 WL
8391, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999); Magnifico v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 710
A.2d 412, 420 (N.J. 1998); Willison v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 690 N.E.2d 1073,
1077 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); Hamic v. Doe, 499 S.E.2d 619, 626-27 (W. Va. 1997).
390. However, the converse could be persuasively argued if auto insurers in
fact tend to assess risk more by drivers or households insured rather than cars in-
sured.
391. See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 18.
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by a covered loss, it applies to the loss because it agreed to cover
the occurrence or a portion of a large occurrence that implicates
its coverage period. Once this happens, there is no unfairness in
requiring each triggered insurer to pay so long as (a) it does not
pay more than its policy limits; or (b) the policyholder is not over-
indemnified.
392
Thus, the CGL insurer in Years 1 through 8 of an eight-year
tort is not being asked to do anything it did not agree to do at the
outset: pay for defense and damages triggered by injury during its
period of coverage. By contrast, the insurance policy of Car 2 is be-
ing asked for something it arguably did not agree to provide: insur-
ance coverage for Car 1. Consequently, multiyear commercial li-
ability occurrences make a far more compelling case for
application of multiple policies than do auto policies.
In addition, Cummins & Doherty make a number of other ar-
guably incorrect conceptual assumptions regarding the nature of
insurance. Perhaps most egregiously, they have a narrow and inapt
concept of insurance, stating that "[a]n insurance policy is an
agreement between two parties to share risk. 393  Although this
definition is not strictly false or inaccurate, it misses the mark. All
contracts allocate risk but not all contracts are insurance. Insur-
ance, logically, must be something more than risk sharing or alloca-
tion in the broad sense. In addition, although the policyholder
with deductibles, SIRs, or copayments shares risk, many policyhold-
ers think of themselves as removing risk (not sharing it) when they
purchase insurance. Insurance is usually described as one party's
agreement to suffer a certain but relatively small loss (i.e., the pre-
mium payment) in return for obtaining the insurer's agreement to
cover the possibility of contingent but larger losses.3 94 By defining
392. This assumes that there is no showing of bad faith by the insurer. The
existence of bad faith can justify requiring the insurer to pay more than the policy
limits. Similarly, fraud by the policyholder can result in negation of coverage that
would otherwise be available under the terms of the policy and the nature of the
third-party claim.
393. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 19.
394. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 11, at 17 (2d ed.
1996). ProfessorJerry stated:
It can be said, then, that a contract of insurance is an agreement in which one
party (the insurer), in exchange for a consideration provided by the other party (the
insured) assumes the other party's risk and distributes it across a group of similarly
situated persons, each of whose risk has been assumed in a similar transaction.
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insurance in this inapt manner, Cummins & Doherty move toward
a biased outcome that requires policyholders to function as co-
insurers even where they assumed no such role.
For example, Cummins & Doherty may be incorrect even in
characterizing the deductible purely as an item of risk sharing. Al-
though the deductible has elements of this, it also serves as a con-
tract demand of sorts by the insurer and a means of behavior modi-
fication. For example, the insurer may be unwilling to write
coverage without a deductible even where the insurer is willing to
purchase a no-deductible policy, even at substantial costs. The de-
ductible in many cases is not so much a measure of risk allocation
but a means for reducing moral hazard, adverse selection, or exces-
sive claims by the policyholder, particularly small claims that are
administratively costly to the insurer.
If, instead of using the misleading Cummins & Doherty defini-
tion, insurance is more properly characterized as a means of trad-
ing the certain small loss of premium payment for protection
against the contingent large loss, there is nothing wrong (in eco-
nomic or ethical theory) with permitting liability policies covering
multiple years to apply to a loss and pay in full up to their policy
limits. The policyholder has paid the required premium, the poli-
cies have been triggered and losses have been incurred and paid
for or are in the process of resolution. The large risk assumed by
the insurer may turn out to be larger than the insurer would have
preferred, but the insurer is still only being asked to honor its con-
tract. There is no windfall to the policyholder, and no moral haz-
ard in light of the inadequacy of the insurance to cover all liability
claims.39
Id. at 17 (emphasis in original); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 2-3 (describing
insurance as the process of risk transfer from policyholder to insurer, risk-pooling
or diversification by insurers, and risk-allocation, again by insurers). Although it is
true that the insurance policy operates to some extent to allocate risk among the
parties (i.e., by setting forth what is or is not covered), as ProfessorJerry and oth-
ers have noted, all contracts allocate risk between the parties and thus this sort of
risk allocation is not what makes insurance different than other contractual under-
takings. See, e.g., JERRY, supra, § 10[d], at 16 ("[All1 contracts either expressly or
implicitly allocate risk in one way or another.").
395. Moral hazard has been described in various ways but generally refers to a
tendency to take less care when protected against financial responsibility for loss
(by insurance, a benevolent parent or employer, etc.). Although the notion is to-
day largely identified with this economic definition, the concept continues to carry
some of the implications of its name: that insured parties may not only take less
care but act recklessly, intentionally, or even nefariously in causing or ignoring
losses. See generally, Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REv.
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Thus, when Cummins & Doherty state that "any allocation rule
must respect the clear division between insured and self-insured
risk," they are overstating the case. 96 If the policyholder did noth-
ing more than buy policies over several years, it has not really as-
sumed for itself the risk that large losses will fall in years where it is
not a self-insurer. Rather, the policyholder is simply buying the
available coverage; it is not attempting to assume a significant per-
sonal risk. This is particularly true in the real world of 1970s and
1980s liability insurance, which had soft and hard cycles or mini-
cycles. At many junctures, insurance was not available at all, avail-
able only with low limits, or available only at prices so high as to
force self-insuring that the policyholder would have preferred to
avoid. 97
Similarly, when Cummins & Doherty state that "the economic
function of insurance [is] to share the risk between the parties ac-
cording to their respective abilities to bear that risk," they are mis-
398characterizing the process. Although some attempt to reach op-
timal allocation goes on, much insurance is purchased without a
calculation of risk-bearing ability. The policyholder is more inter-
ested in obtaining coverage than finding an optimal risk-sharing
arrangement. Many policyholders may see insurance as a means of
jettisoning risk rather than allocating or sharing it. The policy-
holder may also be purchasing insurance because of a mandate
imposed by the government, a lender, or a contractor. For the
policyholder, the optimal arrangement is one in which the policy-
holder pays the required premium to be rid of the risk of a large
claim, a multiyear claim, an employment claim, and the like. The
policyholder wants to transfer risk, not to share it. The occurrence
CGL purports to do this for each policy period. Consequently, lim-
iting the policyholder to one year's worth of insurance in the face
of a multiyear tort distorts the insuring arrangement. Prorating
among insurers without adjustments for insolvency and exhaustion
237, 288-92 (1996) (concluding that the breadth and effects of the moral hazard
concept are overstated and that a moral hazard has a limited impact in real world
applications).
396. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 19.
397. Recall the asbestos coverage matter in which the court found that an in-
dustry-wide asbestos exclusion added to the CGL in the mid-1980s effectively pre-
vented policyholders from obtaining coverage even if they so desired to pay for it.
See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Management Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1202
(2d Cir. 1995).
398. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 19.
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of policy limits further distorts the original insuring arrangement
of the parties.
Related to this misconception is the Cummins & Doherty as-
sumption that policyholders buy policy limits in the amount they
desire and that any amount of loss above the policy limits is an up-
per level self-insured retention. Rejecting the findings of the
Owens-Illinois court (and implicitly Stonewall as well), Cummins &
Doherty suggest that "[1] ike any other economic transaction, insur-
ance is always available at the right price. 3 9 9 This pronouncement
flies in the face of recent history of "hard" liability markets.
In addition, Cummins & Doherty argue for something like a
"sophisticated policyholder" defense without factual support. Ac-
cording to them:
An insurance contract is written when both parties agree
on a set of mutually acceptable conditions. Usually, in the
bargaining leading up to the sealing of contract, a wide
range of coverage options and policy conditions are con-
sidered at different prices. Moreover, the parties to many
general liability policies that incur continuous occurrence
liabilities are often corporations that bargain on equal
terms with insurers.4°0
Cummins & Doherty also appear to reject, at least for com-
mercial policyholders, the time-honored rule of insurance policy
construction: contra preferentem or construing contract ambigui-
ties against the drafter. They theorize that "there are two blades to
the pair of scissors that cuts the contract, and [therefore] the ques-
tion 'which blade did the cutting?' is meaningless.
40'
399. Id. at 20.
400. Id.
401. Id. The footnote following the above quote provides another window on
the Cummins & Doherty thought process through the non sequitur: "Within this
bargaining process, it is routine for policyholders to seek deductibles. In some
cases, the policyholder itself may seek to restrict coverage by means of upper lim-
its." Id. at 20 n.16.
The policyholder's purchase of given amounts of insurance with differing
requested deductibles hardly indicates a policyholder role in the design or word-
ing of the liability policy. The policyholder, even in the pro-insurer world of
Cummins & Doherty, is merely buying insurance "off the rack" and looking at
price tags and attempting to select the blue suit it can afford (rather than the grey
suit that costs substantially more). This hardly makes the policyholder a "co-tailor"
of the insurance contract.
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This view, and consequently a good deal of the argument for
allocation to the policyholder, runs counter to the bulk of general
contract theory, which posits that even among equal bargainers,
one party is often responsible for contract language and, in close
cases, this party should bear the brunt of any ambiguity in language
that can not be resolved readily by resort 
to nontextual sources.
Further, the Cummins & Doherty thesis that there is some-
thing illogical about having larger aggregate policy limits available
for the multiyear occurrence also fails scrutiny. By definition,
multiyear losses are usually large losses taking place over time in
unusual circumstances. It stands to reason that the large losses
would trigger more insurance policies and hence more coverage
than smaller, more episodic torts or even large claims such as
commercial liability litigation.
The degree to which Cummins & Doherty are willing to stretch
in favor of insurers is revealed in their arguments in favor ofprora-
tion to the policyholder. In the course of criticizing Keene, they
inveigh against the Keene court's refusal to permit allocation of
losses among covered and uncovered years, because the Keene ap-
proach:
retroactively creates insurance for the missing years (for
which no premium was ever charged since no contract was
ever written) and mandates that the involuntary insurer
for these years is the firm which insured other years
spanned by the occurrence. By symmetry, this reasoning
could be reversed to suggest that the full loss should be al-
located only across those years in which no insurance was
purchased, leaving the insurers to escape all liability for
any MYO [multiyear occurrence] in which there was a
single year of self-insurance. The logic is just as tight and
the equip' considerations just as compelling as those used
in Keene.
402. See E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs § 7.11, at 518 (2d ed. 1990);Jeffrey
W. Stempel, supra note 266, at 846-49 (stating that courts have been reluctant to
abandon the contra proferentem approach to contract interpretation even where
the party that did not author unclear language, is sophisticated, or has bargaining
power or wealth).
403. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(applying general legal principles).
404. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 19.
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The above-quoted argument is as outrageous as it is bizarre.
Imposition of financial responsibility for insured losses solely on
the policyholder merely because of some "gap" years would com-
pletely vitiate the insurance contracts concededly in place for most
years of a multiyear occurrence. Each of these policies must im-
pose at least some responsibility on the insurer when triggered.
Whatever their common ambiguities, insurance policies are at least
clear on this point. As even Cummins & Doherty concede, an in-
jury that takes place across years triggers applicable policies. By
definition, then, these policies must pay something. The insuring
agreement does not permit the insurer to avoid all payment simply
because the policyholder was without insurance in a different pol-
icy year. Only the most extreme insurer advocate would take such a
position.4°s
Continuing to function as industry apologists, Cummins &
Doherty also argue against the holdings of Owens-Illinois and Stone-
wall that there be no proration to the policyholder for periods
when insurance was unavailable. According to them, "insurance is
always available at the right price. "  This assessment is the aca-
demic equivalent of Judge Martin's trial court holding in Stonewall
that the asbestos makers "bargained away" coverage through pur-
chasing insurance coverage after 1985 that contained nonnegotia-
ble asbestos exclusions. The Second Circuit reversed this assess-
ment because of its unrealistic view, a view that becomes no more
realistic when enunciated by Cummins & Doherty.
Pushing their views to an extreme, Cummins & Doherty then
argue that proration to the policyholder should not be mitigated
through recalibrated proration when an insurer's assigned portion
of the loss is unavailable for payment because of policy exhaustion
405. This portion of the Cummins & Doherty article can be viewed as rhetori-
cal and aimed at attacking Keene so as to not literally represent their views. The
entire article, after all, advocates shared apportionment rather than apportion-
ment only to the policyholder. But I am disinclined to give Cummins & Doherty
this favorable a reading. Although Keene can be responsibly attacked as permitting
the policyholder too good a deal, it is fallacious to argue that permitting all trig-
gered insurers to escape responsibility altogether is merely a conversely similar
good deal for insurers. On the contrary, total proration to the policyholder com-
pletely destroys the insurance promise that was made, while the absence of prora-
tion merely demonstrates a judicial preference for resolving a tough case on the
basis of policy language, the insuring relationship, and public policy grounds
rather than on the basis of concern that proration to the policyholder is necessary
to combat adverse selection and moral hazard.
406. Cummins & Doherty, supra note 369, at 20.
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or insurer insolvency. According to them:
In the case of insolvent insurers, the loss should be as-
signed to the insured rather than to solvent insurers cov-
ering the insured in other years of the trigger period. In a
competitive insurance market, the price of insurance re-
flects the probability that the insurer will become insol-
vent, so safer insurers command higher prices and riskier
insurers receive lower prices. In buying insurance, poli-
cyholders are aware of the possibility that the insurer may
become bankrupt, and this possibility plays a role in the
choice of insurer. It is part of the mutual understanding
between the two parties that the risk reverts to the policy-
holder in the event of the insurer's insolvency. ... [For
the solvent insurers, t]he agreement between these insur-
ers and the policyholder was to cover losses arising from
periods when they provided coverage, not from periods
when other insurers were on the risk. Likewise, the pre-
miums paid to the solvent insurers did not contemplate
their payng claims for policy years when they were not on
the risk.
7
This argument is refuted on the grounds previously discussed,
which refute the notion of proration to the policyholder in gen-
408eral. But it is particularly galling to argue that the policyholder
should pick up the tab for insolvent carriers when that same poli-
cyholder has yet to fully reap the benefits of other triggered poli-
cies which it purchased and which by definition cover the loss in
question. Even if the Cummins & Doherty risk assumption argu-
ment is correct (and it is not), the policyholder has implicitly
"agreed" only that it can not expect to collect from the insolvent
carrier. The policyholder never imagined-let alone agreed-that
it would be forced to forgo benefits from solvent insurers because
the claim against the solvent insurers is related to a claim against an
insolvent insurer. There is simply no connection.
Proration, therefore, completely undermines the insuring
agreement and the policyholder's expectations in cases of
multiyear occurrences and insurer insolvency. Even in states like
Minnesota that do not embrace the classic Keeton formulation of
407. Id. at 37-38.
408. See supra Part III.B.
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the reasonable expectations doctrine, expectations analysis is used
to resolve ambiguous policy language and can be invoked to over-
ride even clear text where the text is deceptive or operates in the
nature of a hidden exclusion. 409 The entire allocation conundrum
proceeds precisely because there is no on-point text in the policy.
Thus, expectations analysis is particularly apt and favorable to the
policyholder as the insolvent insurer situation both lacks policy
language favorable to the insurer and, if applied as urged by Cum-
mins & Doherty, operates like a hidden exclusion or limitation on
coverage in that it imposes a reduction in coverage ex post facto on
the policyholder.
In addition, the Cummins & Doherty view of the market reali-
ties of insurer insolvency seems incorrect. As noted in one policy-S 410
holder counsel's rebuttal, studies reflect no difference in pre-
mium among insurers of varying solvency or financial strength. In
addition, an outsider has difficulty evaluating insurer strength not-
withstanding the availability of Best's, Moody's, and Standard &
Poor's. Several once highly-rated insurers have become insolvent.
State regulators are supposed to police insolvency but do an inevi-
tably imperfect job, particularly so because insufficient resources
are usually committed to the task by insurance departments and
state legislators. Some insurers appear falsely sound because of
misrepresentations or carelessness in preparing financial state-
ments, but this may not be noticed by regulators or raters. Under
the circumstances, policyholders can hardly be blamed for assum-
ing that any admitted insurer or carrier with decent private ratings
is an insurer who will be available to pay if the policy is triggered.
In addition, the Cummins & Doherty "let them eat cake" posi-
tion on insolvency is also in part the product of their failure to ap-
preciate that large multiyear torts are in fact qualitatively different
types of covered occurrences. If we were to assume an ordinary
episodic liability claim arising shortly after the insurance went into
effect, the Cummins/Doherty view might make sense. If the poli-
cyholder buys a policy from Company A in 1980 and the loss occurs
in 1981, it might be reasonable to argue that the policyholder knew
enough or should have known enough about the insurer's condi-
tion to be charged with some responsibility for the insurer's inabil-
ity to pay claims in 1981. But when the policyholder buys insurance
409. See supra notes 293-98 and accompanying discussion.
410. See Heintz et al., supra note 371, at 20.
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from Company A in 1957 and undetected injury during 1957
prompts a claim in 1987, the policyholder can hardly be retroac-
tively charged with constructive knowledge and risk bearing of the
insurer's financial condition 30 years in the future. Too much time
has passed to seriously argue that the policyholder "had it coming"
because it bought occurrence insurance from a company that was
unable to pay years later.
The Cummins & Doherty thesis and the arguments of others
urging proration to the policyholder also tends to muddy the dis-
tinction between occurrence and claims-made coverage. Under
occurrence coverage, of course, the policyholder has purchased
unlimited prospective protection regarding any injuries occurring
during the policy period. The policyholder could stop buying in-
surance and it would forever have insurance coverage for losses
caused by an occurrence during that initial policy year. Many busi-
nesses that cease operations or are sold do just that if they have
solid occurrence coverage in place: they decline to purchase fur-
ther insurance. There is no need to keep buying insurance to
cover the potential tail claims stemming from any injuries during
the policy period. This, of course, is why occurrence insurance is
generally much more popular than claims-made insurance and
dramatically more popular with merchants or professionals who
wish to retire without continuing to buy claims-made insurance un-
til death (or for their estates or heirs after death). The mid-1980s
switch to claims-made product liability coverage was consequently
opposed by most manufacturers and many state regulators. The ef-
fect of the switch, even with no or liberal retroactive dates, was not
only to limit the scope of the insurer's risk, but also to require the
policyholder to keep claims coverage in force forever lest claims
should arise decades after an initial injury.
When courts require proration to the policyholder, particu-
larly in the Cummins/Doherty manner that provides no escape
hatch for insurer insolvency or unavailability of insurance, they in
effect require the policyholder to continue to purchase insurance
year after year after year even when no significant risk is apparent.
Where covered losses are reallocated from insurers to a policy-
holder, the practical effect is to require the policyholder to keep
buying insurance just as that policyholder would need to under a
claims-made system.
In addition, the policyholder must continue to buy lots of in-
surance. If it fails to do so, it could end up woefully uninsured if
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ever faced with a multiyear mass tort. As other commentators ob-
serve:
[T]he [Cummins & Doherty] model and Owens-Illinois
create the unfair result by, in essence, requiring the poli-
cyholder to buy insurance each year to maintain the full
value of earlier coverage limits. This result is not only un-
411fair, it makes little economic sense.
Judges following the Cummins & Doherty approach would
limit the policyholder to the policy limits of a single year even
though the policyholder had paid and paid and paid for continued
coverage. Furthermore, the policyholder must invest substantial
resources in hoping to purchase insurance only from carriers who
will be solvent for decades to come. Thus, another oft overlooked
and odious effect of proration is that it converts occurrence cover-
age into claims-made coverage, a move that clearly violates policy-
holder expectations and resolves a difficult situation in favor of in-
surers rather than policyholders, totally reversing standard
insurance law doctrine.
In addition, courts following this approach give insurers some-
thing of a "free" victory through adjudication when insurers them-
selves seem not to have expected or felt entitled to this victory since
they expended considerable effort in the executive and legislative
arena to switch to claims-made forms in the 1980s. Because risk
distribution is the primary expertise of insurers, it is the insurance
industry rather than individual policyholders who should shoulder
the close or debatable liabilities engendered by the multiyear oc-
currence. Insurers facing these responsibilities have the right of al-
location against each other and are also protected by deductibles,
policy limits, and reinsurance.
To be sure, other commentators have supported proration,
but most have accepted that adjustments should be made accord-
ing to solvency and remaining insurance available under losses sub-jectto . 412
ject to proration. To a large degree, commentary favoring alloca-
411. Id. at 24.
412. See, e.g., Yin, supra note 109, at 1276-78 (arguing for proration to policy-
holders for years of self-insurance, but with an adjustment for insurer insolvency;
unclear about adjustment for exhaustion of some triggered policies); Developments
in the Lawv---Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1583-84 (1986) (advocat-
ing allocation by hybrid of time on the risk and the policy limits, with a proration
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tion generally, and to policyholders in particular (save perhaps for
the Cummins & Doherty article), has not advanced substantially
beyond the Hickman & DeYoung article cited by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in NSP. Allocation of Environmental Cleanup Liabilityr 413
Between Successive Insurers. This article, despite some flaws, ren-
dered a largely accurate picture of the judicial approaches to allo-
cation then used. Although largely pro-insurer, Hickman &
DeYoung refrain from extreme or erroneous statements in the vein
of the Cummins-Doherty article. According to Hickman &
DeYoung, a court allocating by time on the risk "will likely allocate
liability to the insured proportionate to the period of time it was
uninsured. ,414
Hickman & DeYoung endorse a textualist approach examining
the particulars of the insurance policies rather than adopting a
formula on the basis of public policy. Although they imply that the
contractualist approach favors insurers (largely because, in their
view, it precludes cases like Keene, which permitted the policyholder
to select and order the response of the insurers), subsequent de-
bate suggests that, if anything, a strict textual approach to all sums
policies will favor the insured more often than it favors the insurers
on questions of apportionment.
Additional recent commentary has rejected proration, con-
cluding that "the case against proration carries more weight."4"5 In
particular, this author finds allocation cases such as Owens-Illinois
disturbing because of the practical impact of their rejection of the
venerable ambiguity rule favoring the policyholder when disputes
arise because of unclear policy language. "After all, why should
drafters bother to formulate clear policy terms if courts will cast
aside contra proferentem and come to their rescue with public pol-
icy arguments?"
a4 1
As this author also notes:
The insurance industry drafted the policies over which the
millions and millions of dollars have been spent to deci-
formula applying to policyholders for self-insured periods).
413. Hickman & DeYoung, supra note 98, at 314-15.
414. Id. at 313 (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 662 F.
Supp. 71 (E.D. Mich. 1987) and Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978)).
415. Gillespie, supra note 198, at 574.
416. Id. at 579.
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pher through court battles. The simple reality is that if
the policies had been clear, minimal litigation would have
occurred. This fact argues for the use of contra proferen-
tem. That doctrine spurs carriers to create clear policy
language, because if they produce unclear terms, courts
will interpret them in a pro-coverage manner.
V. A MORE REASONABLE AND RATIONAL APPROACH TO
APPORTIONING COVERAGE RESPONSIBILITY
Although Domtar is a potentially disastrous ticket to unfairly
depriving policyholders of coverage, the error of its allocation
scheme stems from legitimate concerns about the efficiency and
equity of insurance coverage in complex, multiyear torts involving
both ongoing progressive damage and new injury occurrences over
time. In these situations, NSP and Domtar are clearly correct in
holding that the law does not require a baroque inquiry into the
exact quantum of injury and ensuing damage taking place at par-
ticular junctures in a coverage saga such as asbestos or pollution
matters. But, as demonstrated in this article, a rigid allocation
formula holds similar potential for waste and inequity.
Insurers will try to make strategic use of the NSP/Domtar alloca-
tion formula. One tactic employed by insurers even prior to Domtar
was an argument that NSP required proration of coverage respon-
sibilities into years when the policyholder was able only to obtain
claims-made coverage after a certain time. The practical effect of
this insurer position would be to allocate coverage into years where
the policyholder could not have purchased insurance no matter
how hard it tried. To the extent that use of an NSP/Domtar alloca-
tion formula forces the policyholder to look only to certain insol-
vent insurers in particular years to which coverage responsibility
has been rigidly prorated, the allocation operates to deny cover-418
age, a direct violation of the venerable maxim that forfeitures of
insurance coverage are not favored in the law.
Even if insolvency is not a problem, a policyholder faced with
judicially imposed limits on where it can look for coverage may find
417. Id. at 578-79.
418. SeeJames F. Hogg, The Tale of a Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 515, 553-58
(1998) (making the point that the effective loss of coverage by operation of law
occurs due to an industry-wide switch to claims-made forms, but the point is appli-
cable where allocation extends into time period where insurance coverage is
marred by insolvency or has been previously exhausted by claims).
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that the insurance in certain years of the allocation formula has
been exhausted through other claims. In this instance, the policy-
holder is left holding the metaphorical bag, unable to collect some
insurance that has already been used in some allocation years and
barred by NSP/Domtar allocation from seeking unspent coverage
from other triggered insurers in other triggered years. In addition,
insurers may argue that NSP (and now Domtar) requires the court
to adjudicate the issue of relative insurer coverage responsibility
and applicable allocation of coverage among insurers and the poli-
cyholder. This effort can result in more than a little motion prac-
tice, delay, and expense in the case.
The ongoing continuation of triggered damage does not make
the triggered insurer any less responsible for the claim. This
should be the case even if the NSP and Domtar allocation doctrine
remains unchanged. The pollution in those cases was found to
bring new injury in different years rather than continuing injury
from the events of a single year. Nonetheless, the 3M insurers' ar-
gument, based on the "during the policy period" language of NSP
and Domtar, appears to have given the trial court additional pause.
Four years after their insurers raced to the courthouse to attempt
to avoid providing coverage, 3M's dispute with the forty-four insur-
ers who filed the amicus brief in Domtar and who wrote hundreds of
millions of dollars of coverage for (and collected corresponding
premiums from) 3M remains pending.
Insurance coverage law should prevent delaying tactics, unrea-
sonably protracted insurer-policyholder litigation, and unexpected
coverage reductions without a clear basis in the policy as well as
windfalls to either insurer or policyholder. The NSP/Domtar alloca-
tion scheme appears to fail these tests. A better approach would
retain the relative simplicity and efficiency wrought by a formula or
per se rule, prevent overindemnification, and permit the policy-
holder to receive the benefits of purchased insurance.
The best means of satisfying these objectives is no formula.
Rather, the policyholder, once having shown that coverage is trig-
gered, should be able to call on any triggered insurer for coverage.
Each insurer would, of course, be limited in its responsibility by the
policy limits (both per occurrence and aggregate limits), as well as
by any applicable exclusions and reductions in coverage for
amounts spent on defense, investigation, or mitigation if so pro-
vided in the policy language. In cases where several years of insur-
ance policies are triggered, the policyholder should be allowed to
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approach the insurers for coverage in any order desired by the
policyholder absent specific and clear policy language revising this
prerogative.
After an insurer has provided coverage (both payment for de-
fense and payment of liability), the insurer retains a right of in-
demnity as against other triggered insurers. In determining the
relative responsibilities of triggered insurers vis-a-vis one another,
use of an allocation formula makes perfect sense. However, the apt
formula is one that considers both time on the risk and the policy
limits provided by the respective insurers. The apportionment of
relative coverage responsibility among the insurers should not de-
lay payment or provision of a defense to the policyholder. How-
ever, a lead insurer (e.g., the first insurer approached and required
to provide a defense) should in appropriate protracted, complex,
or expensive cases be permitted to seek interim payments from
other triggered insurers or to obtain an award of interest on these
expenditures from insurers who were able to sit on the sideline
during the early stages of multiple-year tort litigation. This form of
inter-insurer apportionment vindicates the judicial interest in effi-
ciency and equity without depriving the policyholder of coverage.
Because the policyholder is permitted to determine the order in
which coverage is sought, no special rules of apportionment are re-
quired to account for time periods when some applicable insurance
is unavailable due to insolvency or exhaustion due to other claims.
This proposal is, of course, essentially what the D.C. Circuit
suggested in Keene' 9 nearly two decades ago during the relative
youth of today's modern mass tort insurance coverage litigation.
Keene has been subjected to predictable criticism by insurers as too
friendly to policyholders.' 0 Keene has also been erroneously labeled
419. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
420. But Keene did state that only one insurance policy should be applicable to
a triggering claim, suggesting that a claim for serious injury might exceed applica-
ble policy limits and that the policyholder would be unable to look to other poli-
cies for coverage even if the claim involved injury in other policy periods. See id. at
1049-50. In a sense, then, my proposal is more favorable to policyholders than
Keene. However, this is justified in cases where more than one triggering injury
takes place to the same claimant in more than one policy year and the total dam-
ages from the injuries exceed any one policy limit. In such cases-surely rare-the
policyholder is entitled to tap the other triggered policies. This point appears to
have been recognized in the subsequent history of the actual Keene case, where
(according to my conversation with knowledgeable counsel) multiple policies were
utilized to satisfy claims.
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a decision providing for 'joint and several" liability of insurers.
However, as detailed in this article, a Keene-like approach with allo-
cation among triggered insurers simply permits the policyholder to
receive coverage to which it is entitled by contract and for which it
has paid premiums. The allocation among insurers that takes place
after the policyholder has received policy benefits is not dispropor-
tionate as in the case ofjoint and several liability, where a one per-
cent negligent manufacturer must pay 100 percent for what was
mostly the negligence of a slipshod but impecunious small con-
struction company or individual. Rather, the insurers pay accord-
ing to time on the risk and policy limits written, both factors par-
ticular to each insurer. No insurer pays disproportionately in
relation to its own stake in the case and its own agreement to bear
risk.
Minnesota courts may have been irrevocably brainwashed by
the 'Joint and several" liability criticism of Keene fueled by insurers
and may be unwilling to permit policyholders complete discretion
over the manner in which policy proceeds are collected and insurer
defense obligations initiated. But one need not embrace Keene's
approach in order to improve significantly on NSP and Domtar. All
that is required is a rule providing that no amount of coverage re-
sponsibility be allocated to the policyholder unless the total
amount of liability exceeds the applicable triggered insurance.
When triggered insurance is exhausted, of course, there is no fur-
ther need for allocation to the policyholder. By definition, pay-
ments not covered by insurance must come from the policyholder.
In determining the manner in which. the policyholder is per-
mitted to draw upon triggered insurance in cases where the total
insurance exceeds the costs of the triggering claims, allocation by
time on the risk and policy limits is appropriate-so long as the al-
location formula is recalibrated to account for previously con-
sumed insurance and insurance uncollectible because of carrier
solvency. This permits the policyholder to enjoy more of its pur-
chased insurance coverage but does not require any insurer to pro-
vide coverage that was not already promised in the insuring agree-
ment, which simply states that the insurer is responsible where an
injury takes place during the policy period. Insurers writing these
policies knew all along that they were at risk of paying the full pol-
icy limits if triggering injury took place. Insurers were paid for as-
421. See supra notes 98, 194-95 and accompanying discussion.
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suming this risk, sometimes quite handsomely. They should not be
heard to complain if their contribution and indemnity from other
insurers is reduced because of the insolvency of some insurers.
The economic and other policy arguments made by insurers in
favor of allocation of coverage responsibility to the policyholder are
flawed in logic or premised on doubtful or even erroneous pre-
sumptions. Despite the high profile of recent cases such as Domtar,
the more persuasive intellectual case weighs against proration to
the policyholder, except perhaps in extreme cases where the poli-
cyholder's scanty insurance can be shown to be a calculated at-
tempt to purchase insurance for a known or highly expected loss at
an advantageous premium. If a policyholder has engaged in such
behavior, the "expected or intended" defense, the "known loss," or
the "lack of fortuity" defense is the applicable avenue of analysis. If
none of these fortuity defenses applies, the policyholder is entitled
to receive the insurance benefits for which it paid.
In addition, the approach suggested in this article creates in-
centive for insurers to more carefully underwrite risks (to attempt
to avoid signing onto the risk of a portion of a multiple-year tort)
and to consider the policyholder's risk management behavior in
other years (to avoid being unable to obtain indemnity from a trig-
gered but insolvent insurer in another year when injury occurred).
Insurers are in at least as good a position to assess risk exposures
and the quality of other insurers as is the policyholder. Revising
NSP and Domtar in the manner suggested would thus appear to fos-
ter more prudent insuring decisions at the outset. Under Domtar,
insurers have too much incentive to write coverage, bank the pre-
miums, and litigate excessively in an attempt to persuade courts to
reduce the insurer's exposure by judicially imposed proration by
time on the risk alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
Examining the recent history of allocation law in Minnesota
reveals a state jurisprudence where historical concern for the un-
derdog has somehow performed the proverbial 180 degree somer-
sault. Driven by a misplaced and miscalibrated concern for fairness
to insurers and formulaic consistency, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has made a classic wrong turn and adopted a doctrine that
works substantial unfairness upon policyholders and the insurance-
purchasing public.
Ironically, Minnesota courts remain possessed of a strong im-
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pulse to achieve fairness and equity in insurance coverage matters
as in other areas of the law. But in Domtar that impulse is applied
in the service of the insurance industry and against policyholders
notwithstanding policy language and other interpretative factors to
the contrary. It is as if the insurance industry has miraculously
morphed into an archetypical underdog requiring the special pro-
tection of the court-a most odd result.
There is no good reason of contract law, equity, or public pol-
icy that justifies a reduction in the policyholder's coverage simply
because it is the victim of multi-year claims by third parties rather
than more typical liability claims. But Domtar punishes the policy-
holder unfortunate enough to be faced with such events. Liability
insurance is supposed to remove or mute the ravages of such fortu-
ity. Domtar only exacerbates it.
422. A significant amount of the current coverage literature is written by poli-
cyholder counsel and insurer counsel-with the twain meeting only on occasion.
Both policyholder and insurer lawyers have engaged in more than a little rhetori-
cal posturing. From the perspective of some policyholder counsel, all insurers
sometimes seem to be part of a vast Ponzi conspiracy where premiums are received
but coverage is extracted only after protracted litigation against a united industry
front. Many insurer counsel seem to see a world where most claimants are at-
tempting fraud against the insurer or are using insurance as a means to reckless
behavior.
Although there is of course partisanship on both sides, the stridency of
the insurer rhetoric is notable. For example, policyholders seeking coverage are
routinely labeled "tortfeasors" or "polluters." See Foggan & Yang, supra note 372.
This is hardly the portrayal of insurer advertisements or other promotional mate-
rial. There, a more realistic view obtains: the policyholder is simply a customer
protecting itself from the ravages of modern litigious society. Although inconsis-
tency between a sales arm and a service arm of a company is hardly news, insurers
owe something more to their clients and the public. Rather than attempting to
make insurance coverage a morality play, insurers should focus on efficient resolu-
tion of cases, making appropriate compromises, revising policies and disclosures
in the future to minimize coverage litigation.
In any event, the notion that insurers are the poor sheep victimized by
unscrupulous policyholders absent judicial intervention to help insurers through
doctrines like allocation by time on the risk is belied by common sense and every-
day review of the days' news. See, e.g., John D. McKinnon, Insurer Eyed Regulator's
Love Life, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1998, at F1 (describing seeming insurer efforts to
obtain embarrassing information about state employee in order to, according to a
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